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ABSTRACT 
The first part is concerned with the literature. The first chapter 
deals with the problem of definition and is a general outline of all the 
issues, many of which will be discussed in more detail later. The second 
examines the positions taken by a wide variety of writers including psych- 
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ologists, psychiatrists and artists themselves on the subject of the creative 
process and in particular whether it can be divided into stages. In it 
there is a greater concern with creativity in the arts in general. In the 
third the writings on the creative process are linked with those about child- 
ren's creativity and in particular their musical work. The fourth chapter 
examines the history of the relationship between creativity and education 
and draws on the preceding chapters to set out some of the educational 
implications. 
The second part turns to a survey of children's compositions and the 
development of an eight-stage spiral of development. This is based on the 
psychological concepts of mastery, imitation, imaginative play and meta- 
cognition and on an interpretation of hundreds of children's compositions. 
(The age range is 3 to 11). The second chapter links this spiral with the 
preceding chapters on creativity. 
The last chapter outlines the implications for various aspects of the 
curriculum and possible wider implications. It also contains a wide variety 
of areas that future research might explore. The first appendix deals with 
practical suggestions for implementing the implications in the classroom. 
The second hints at its possible use in understanding the work of adult 
composers. The third appendix deals in more detail with the children's 
compositions and thus illuminates the progress of the development more fully. 
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CHAPTER I 
DEFINITIONS OF CREATIVITY 
Introduction 
Creativity and creative are much used words today. There are 
catalogues of 'creative percussion' and handbooks of 'creative 
activities'. It is a bandwagon, a rallying cry for the converted, 
a bastion against the upholders of traditional methods. But if we 
look at its meaning we find that it is as multi-faceted as a diamond 
and that each writer on the subject is looking at that collection of 
facets that happen to be facing him at the time. The first chapter 
will be an attempt to tease out some of the strands of meaning. 
Indeed the term 'creativity' did not appear in the Oxford Dictionary 14 
till the twentieth century when in 1972 'creativity' is defined"-, 
as the creative power or faculty: ability to create; 
(l) 
'creation' 
on the other hand was earlier defined as the action or process of 
creating. 
Golann puts together in this quotation many of the strands that 
it is hoped will be unravelled later: 
A striking feature of the literature on creativity 
is the diversity of interests, motives and approaches 
characteristic of many investigators. Creativity 
has been viewed as a normally distributed trait, an 
aptitude trait, an intrapsychic process, and as a 
style of life. It has been described as that which 
is seen in all children, but few adults. It has 
been described as that which leads to innovation in 
science, performance in fine arts, or new thoughts. 
Creativity has been described as related to, or 
(1) Oxford Dictionary, London, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 673. 
(2) Oxford Dictionary, London, Oxford University Press, 1933, P" 1152. 
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equatable with, intelligence, productivity, 
positive mental health, and originality. It 
has been described as being caused by self- 
actualisation and by sub. iiation and restitution 
of destructive impulses. 1) 
The Myth of Divine Creation 
The notion of creation must be implicit in the term 'creativity'. 
Elliott outlines how the concept of creativity as traditionally applied 
to works of art is linked with the myth of divine creation. Creativity 
is bringing a new thing into being; it is part of the concept of an 
artist. 
Either instantaneously or by process of making, 
God freely brought into being, ex nihilo or from 
some pre-existent indefinite material, a concrete, 
infinitely rich, perfectly ordered and beautiful 
world, the most wonderful of all created objects 
save man himself. He made it for man, not only 
as his environment and to sustain him, but, more 
importantly, for him to contemplate and wonder at 
a perpetual occasion for him to praise his maker. 
ý2ý 
This link may be in part due to an ancient link between art and 
religion. Much early art was not for art's sake but for religious 
ends. Bell(a) and Tolstoy(4) both see a link between art and 
religion today. Indeed later references to the role of play in 
(i) Golann, S. E., Psychological Study of Creativity, Psychological 
Bulle tin, Vol. 60, No. 6,1963, pp. 548 - 565. 
(2) Elliott, R. K., Versions of Creativity, Proceedings of Philosophy 
of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. 5, No. 2,1971, 
pp. 139 - 152. 
(3) Bell, C., All, New York, Capricorn Books, 1958, pp. 181 - 190. 
(4) Tolstoy, L., at Is Art? London, Oxford University Press, 1930, 
pp. 121 - 34. 
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creativity have their roots in religion too as in Sachs. 
(') 
And a 
concept of the word "God" by Rickman 
(2) 
is used at one end of an 
evaluation scale as the absolute beauty at the other end of which we 
recognise the power of death which we say is ugly. 
Perhaps the most worked out link is in Dorothy Sayers. The speech 
of Archangel Michael at the end of The Zeal of Thy House sums up her 
thinking (worked out in more detail in The Mind of the Maker). 
(3) 
Praise Him that He hath made man in His own image, 
a maker and craftsman like Himself, a little mirror 
of His triune majesty. 
For every work of creation is threefold, an earthly 
trinity to match the heavenly. 
First: there is the Creative Idea; passionless, 
timeless, beholding the whole work complete at one, 
the end in the beginning, and this is the image of 
the Father. 
Second: there is the Creative Energy, begotten of 
that Idea, working in time from the beginning to the 
end, with sweat and passion, being incarnate in the 
bonds of matter; and this is the image of the Word. 
Third: there is the Creative Power, the meaning of 
the work and its response in the lovely soul; and 
this is the image of the indwelling Spirit. 
And these three are one, each equally in itself the 
whole work, whereof none can exists ithout other and 
this is the image of the Trinity. 
(1) Sachs, H., The Creative Unconscious, Cambridge, Massachussetts, 
Sci-Art, 1947, pp. 211 - 215. 
(2) Rickman, J., On the Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse, 
in Ruitenbeck, H. M., The Creative Imagination, Chicago, Quadrangle 
Books, 1965, pp. 97 - 121. 
(3) Sayers, D., The Mind of the Maker, London, Methuen, 9th ed. 1947, 
1st published 1941. 
(4) Quoted in Brabazon, J., Dorothy L. Savers: The Life of a Courageous 
Woman, London, Victor Gollancz, 1981, p. 206. 
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Elliott continues: 
Our ordinary concept of creativeness is still 
dominated by this She divine creatio7 myth. 
Instances of creating are arranged in a hierarchy, 
from accidental production and mechanical fabrica- 
tion through simple originative making (as when a 
schoolchild makes something of his own choice out 
of clay) to production which involves uniqueness 
or originality and is further classified as invention 
or artistic creation. The closer the analogy between 
human activity and the mythical paradigm, the more 
confidently we attribute creativeness to the agent. 
This is why tti)artist's claim to creativeness is 
unassailable. 
The artist is even said to create a world (e. g. Shakespeare, Dostoyevsky). 
The creation of the world is seen as the model of artistic 
creation. 'Creating a job' (out of nothing), 'creating havoc' (out 
of nowhere) and so on are examples of the, use of the term in this sense. 
Very good scientists that reconstruct the world fall into this category 
(e. g. Newton, Einstein, Freud) but not lesser ones. All successful 
artists fall into it. People see artists as set apart, as having 
God-given qualities. The creator 'par excellence' is God and whenever 
we create some new thing we feel we are God-like and achieving immortality. 
(Lytton, 1971): 
(2) 
Lorenz(3) coined and redefined the term 'fulguration' for creative 
acts. It is a term used by mediaeval mystics for God's creative acts and 
contains the idea that God's lightning caused new things to come into 
existence. 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Quoted in Plummeridge, C., Creativity: The Need for Further 
Classification, Psychology of Music, Vol. 8, No. 1,1980, pp. 34 - 39. 
(3) Lorenz, K., The Enmity Between Generations and its Probable Ethologic 
Causes, in Piers, M. W., Play and Development. A Symposium, New York, 
W. W. Noughton & Co, 1972, F. 68. 
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This divine aspect of creativity has fascinated man down the ages. 
One early explanation of the flash of inspiration that leads to the 
reinterpreting of human experience was that it was a divine madness, a 
seizure of the individual by the gods. The Greeks called it 
'enthusiasmos' (from which came their word for inspiring creators, 
'enthusiasts') - or God within. It is found in contemporary literature 
too. Kris quotes Helene Deutsch who has to use God to explain inspiration. 
The stage nearest to inspiration is eastacy: 
What had been projected as a vision, God, is now 
in ecstacy taken back into the ego, but not as an 
antithesis between ego and superego, or between ego 
and God: ego and God are one. (1) 
This view explains how some people are reluctant to inquire into 
the sources of creativeness; it is a feeling almost of sacrilege and 
a fear that such inquiry will cause the departure of God within. There 
is a vast literature on the subject starting with Homer and Socrates. 
It is this line of thinking that leads to the position taken by 
some researchers into creativity that creative acts cannot and should 
not be analysed because doing so will destroy the very essence of the 
act of creation. It can be observed and appreciated but not caught. 
MacLeod writes: 
The psychologist who insists that creativity can be 
studied scientifically must bear the burden of proof 
in the face of centuries of testimony from mystics 
and artists, and even from ordinary people, who claim that 
in at least his moments of inspiration man is not 
subject to the laws of nature. (2) 
(1) Kris, E., On Inspiration, in Ruitenbeck, H. W. (ed. ) The Creative 
Imagination. Psychoanalysis and the Genius of Inspiration, Chicago, 
Quadrangle Books, 1965, pp. 23 - 46. 
(2) MacLeod, R. B., Retrospect and Prospect, in Gruber, H. E., Terrell, G. 
and Wertheimer, M. (eds. ), Contemporary Approaches to Creative 
Thinking, New York, Atherton Press, 1963, pp. 175 - 212. 
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And after a carefully reasoned account of the creative products and 
creative processes Briskman concludes: 
The creative artist or scientist does not simply 
produce a transcendent product; in a certain sense 
he actually transcends himself on producing something 
he could not have willed, which he could not know he 
has the ability to produce. As a bearer of a tradition 
he has not only gone beyond it, he has gone beyond 
himself, he has transcended himself. One is reminded 
of the beautiful story about Haydn who listening for 
the first time to his Creation, boe into tears and 
said: 'I have not written this. 'U ) 
It is this mystery that leads some people to be antagonistic towards 
research projects into creativity. Barron says that a fifth of the 
writers approached to take part in his survey saw it as intrinsically 
evil. 
The objections to such research are mainly on these 
counts: it is an expression of the effort of organised 
society to encroach upon the individual and rob him of 
his fruits; it is presumptuous because it seeks to 
describe and to understand what is intrinsically a 
mystery. Psychological diagnosis is, moreover, a form 
of name calling;, it is the way of having the last word; 
it does not respect the individual. Finally, it is the 
present seeking to impose itself upon the future and to 
perpetrate the status-quo through techniques which will 
identify the potentially constructive deviant and permit 
society to control him. ` 
He quotes Pope Paul Xllth speaking to astronautical scientists in his 
justification for research: 
All creation has been committed and offered to the 
human spirit, that man may penetrate it and thus be 
able to understand more and more fully the infinite 
grandeur of his Creator. 
(1) Briskman, L., Creative Products and Creative Process in Science 
and Art, in Dutton, D. and Krausz, M. The Concept in Creativity in 
Science and Art, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publications, 1981, 
pp. 129 - 155. 
(2) Barron, F., Creative Vision and Imagination, in Frazier (ed. ), New 
Insights and the Curriculum Year Book 1963, Washington D. C., 
Association of Supervision in Curriculum Development, 1963, 
pp. 285 - 305. 
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Creativity In Humans and Animals 
It is in this spirit that people claim that it is creativity 
that sets man apart from animals. Wehner writes: 
The importance of 
based on an ideal 
than animal - as 
leisure in humane 
And Duerkson writes: 
arts education must instead be 
view of man as something more 
a create who can use his 
ways. ` 
The things and events we call music are human behaviours. 
There are no other animals that use sounds in the musical 
sense with the level of sophistication and variety of 
purpose characteristic of human musical activity. The 
human being never seems satisfied with his environment 
as he finds it. He reconstructs his surroundings so 
he can control them. Music is a way in which the 
human constructs his environment of sound, and participa- 
tion in music by derinition, makes a person more human 
than other animals. 2) 
Flannery talking about the value traditionally placed on conceptual 
thinking attempts to redress that balance in saying: 
In other words the prevailing thought about the 
nature of man existing over hundreds of years 
has cheated each of us of a special kind of 
consciousness that is possible to us and only 
to us - as homo sapiens. The ability for aesthetic 
consciousness sets us apart from the rest of the 
animal kingdom as sharply as conceptual thinking 
does. It is the kind of consciousness which helps 
us to learn why our own particular life is important 
enough to endure. Without this kind of consciousness 
one starts to thii* of himself as just another person- 
nothing special-, O) 
(1) Wehner, W. L., The Endless Stream that never arrives, Music Educators Journal, Vol-59, No. 19 1972, pp. 24 - 7. 
(2) Duerkson, G. L., Some Similarities between Music Education and Music 
Therapy, Journal of Music Therapy, Vol-4, No. 3, pp. 95 - 9" 
(3) Flannery, M., Images and Aesthetic Consciousness, Art Education, 
Vol. 27, No. 3, March 1974, pp. 4-7. 
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Later she describes aesthetic consciousness in terms of imagination 
which usually means fantasy or 'creativity'. 
It must, however, be added that other writers see it differently. 
Chisholm(') makes the case for the creative element in bird, fish and 
insect sounds and claims that apart from social reasons such as mating, 
identifying a territory etc., some sounds are made 'purely for the 
pleasure of doing so'. 
Lorenz(2) sees the link between animals and art in the area of 
perfecting rituals (the beautiful colours of fish and birds may have 
evolved in order to enhance particular ritualised movements. ) This 
brings us back to the religious links in art mentioned earlier. He 
says that we cannot know whether emotions are involved in animals, 
but has a feeling that they may be. 
(3) 
The Self as God and Creativity 
Having outlined the divine concept of creativity Elliottý4ý goes 
on to describe how this traditional concept has been influenced by 
philosophers such as Nietzsche. Although Sachs sees the modification 
as originating with Rousseau, when: 
The emphasis was no longer on the expectation 
of nature's parental solitude (once thought to 
be the gift of the benevolent God) but, on a 
consistent, well-planned - in the wider sense of 
(1) Chisholin, E., Creative Music in Education, in Grant, W., Music in 
Education, Colston Papers No. 14, London, Butterworth, 19639 
pp. 188 - 202. 
(2) Op. cit. PP- 57 - 9" 
(3) Op. cit. p. 180. 
(4) Op. cit. 
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the word - scientific activity. This and 
only this was looked for to bring about 
desired results. The ideal was now no longer 
to leave as much as possible of nature's own 
free will, but to compel it to deliver the 
goods that had bge hitherto accepted as 
voluntary gifts. l1J 
It led to the invention of machines. 
Nietzsche, in Zarathustra sees the concept of God as now obsolete 
and calls upon man to assume the role of creator. In looking to the 
future for a still-to-be accomplished transformation of the moral and 
spiritual life-worlds, 
(2 ) 
he retains the idea of infinitude in creation; 
but man is now the creator. But the re-creation of man depends upon 
the recreation of the individual self. The relationship between the 
two concepts is clearly seen in the title of the book, Psychology as 
Religion: The Cult of Self-worship(3) which deals with four of the 
major theorists of the view - Erich Fromm, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow 
and Rollo May. Their concept of artistic creation as being somehow 
a process of self-realisation arises from this modification of the 
divine concept. 
There is much written about the idea that somehow artistic 
creation is an exploration of one's self. At its lowest, art is 
seen as a form of therapy or, indeed, as a working out of our 
neuroses, (although such principles are not an adequate basis for 
the use of the techniques in the classroom. ) Freud set out this 
view when he wrote that the artist is an incipient introvert who is 
not far from being neurotic. 
(1) Sachs, H., The Creative Unconscious, Cambridge, Mass, Sci-Art, 
1947, P. 226. 
(2) Elliott, R. K., op. cit. 
(j) Vitz, P. C., Psychology as Religion: The Cult of Self worship, 
Tring, England, Lion Books, 1977,1979. 
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He is impelled by too powerful instinctive needs. 
He wants to achieve honour, power, riches, fame 
and the love of women. But he lacks the means 
of achieving these satisfactorily. So, like any 
other unsatisfied person, he turns away from 
reality, and transfers all his interests, his 
libido too, to the elaboration of his imaginary 
wishes, all of which might easily point the way 
to neurosis .... The artist finds 
his way back 
to reality in this way .... In the first place, 
he understands how to elaborate his daydreams so 
that they lose their essentially personal element, 
which could repel strangers, and yield satisfaction 
to others as well. He also knows how to disguise 
them so that they do not easily disclose their 
origin in their despised sources. He further 
possess the puzzling ability of molding a specific 
material into a faithful image of the creature of 
his imagination.... If he is able to accomplish all 
this, he makes it possible for others, in their return, 
to obtain solace and consolation from their own 
unconscious sour es of gratification which had become 
inaccessible. (l) 
Storr(2) disputes this view that all human beings are 'neurotic' 
and that artists are acting as therapists by providing symbolic solutions 
to inner conflicts. He writes that the term 'neurotic' implies mental 
illness and that we know that mental illness causes a deterioration 
in the quality of production and often the quantity too, Painters 
who have been schizophrenic often show a decline in flexibility and 
Schumannts output lessened during his depression. Neurosis blocks 
creativity and it is a myth that artists are more neurotic than other 
types of people. Rudolf and Margaret Margot Wittkower in their book 
(1) Freud, S., Creative Writers and Daydreaming (1908), in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, pp. 126 - 136. 
(2ý Storr, A., Creativity in Music, Psychology of Music, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
1975, pp. 9- 16. 
15 
Born under Saturn(') illustrate how painters have been of every 
conceivable personality type. We all carry with us the tensions and 
immaturities of childhood and there is a possibility of resolving them 
symbolically in artistic production but that does not mean we are 
neurotic. Storr sums up: 
We are, therefore, creatures of conflict who seek 
for reconciliation of conflict and creatures who 
tend to become cut off from the emotional springs 
within us because of our capacity for abstraction. 
The hypothesis of science and the theorems of 
mathematics may move us aesthetically to some 
extent, since they provide some degree of order in 
the midst of complexity. But they do not, as does 
music, put us iý touch with the emotional basis of 
our inner life. 2J 
Psychopathology and Creativity 
Hilgard(3) also claims that only some creative people are neurotic 
and argues that excessive neuroticism prevents creativity. He does, 
however, list some 'immature or child-like' qualities manifested among 
some creative people; 
1. The dependency upon others, with refusal to accept (or 
carry out) the ordinary social responsibilities of adult life, 
2. Def_ iance of authority or convention, 
3. A 
'sense 
of omnipotence or what Gough(4) has called sense of 
destiny, 
(1) Referred to in Storr, A., op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Hilgard, E. P., Creativity in Problem Solving, in Anderson, H. (ed. ), 
Creativity and Its Cultivation, New York, Harper Row, 1950, pp. 162 - 
180. 
(4) Gough, G., Imagination - Undeveloped Resource, in Proceedings of the 
First Conference regarding the Development of Personnel Management, 
Los Angeles, University of California Institute of Industrial 
Relations, 19579 PP. 4- 10. 
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4. Gullibility or uncritical acceptance in some intellectual 
sphere, no matter how critical in others. 
He cites examples of these in his experience. It is worth commenting 
here that in the chapter on the creative process the regression to 
childish processes is discussed, so perhaps it is not surprising to 
find these qualities in creative people. He concludes that psycho- 
therapy might make a person more or less creative. There is no 
knowing. Others like Lussheimer(l) claim it can only improve talents. 
Indeed there has been much writing about the relationship between 
mental abnormality and psychopathology and creativity. Some suggest 
that insanity or some form of mental abnormality is related to, or even 
identical with, the mental conditions which promote genius. Lombroso(2) 
is the classic exponent of this view. But there is equally much 
literature that says that while creative individuals may be of insane 
temperament the insanity is a block to creativity and they operate 
best at their sanest, such as Jacobson. 
(3) 
Genius makes for insanity 
but neither insanity nor the insane temperament makes for genius. 
ý4ý; 
Others differentiate between normal and abnormal genius like Babcock 
nonetheless he dismisses the normal genius who achieves his status by 
'industry and tact' and says his work will not be remembered but gives 
long lasting fame to the products of the abnormal, adding: 
(1) Lussheimer, P., The Growth of Artistic Creativity through The Psycho- 
analytic Process, in Ruitenbeck, H. M., The Creative Imagination - 
Psycho-analysis and the Genius of Inspiration, Chicago, Quadrangle 
Books, 1965, pp. 325 - 335. 
(2) Lombroso, C., The Man of Genius, London, Walter Scott, 1891, p. 370. 
(3) Jacobson, A. C., Literary Genius and Manic Depressive Insanity, 
Medical Record LXXXII, 1921, pp. 937 - 39. 
(4) Babcock, W. L., On the Morbid Heredity and Predisposition to Insanity 
of the Man of Genius, Journal of Mental and Nervous Disorders, XX, 
1895, PP. 749 - 69. 
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Undoubtedly, the preponderance of great natural 
gifts of mind, which in themselves insure great 
renown, entails a corresponding deficiency in 
the other parts of the mental and physical 
economy, and though in many respects the man of 
genius may well be the subject of envy, he may 
in other regards, as consistently be the object 
of pity. 
Others deny any association between creativity and mental abnormality 
on the grounds that there are creative individuals who are not abnormal, 
or that there is no creative personality type and that personality 
factors predisposing one to be creative are antithetical to pathology, 
a-view much favoured by those like May and Fromm who view creativity 
as a route to psychological health. Some add that predisposition to 
abnormality sensitizes the genius to aspects of his environment of 
which others are unaware e. g. Lange-Eichbaum(l). However, although & 
genius shares some characteristics with the abnormal, he also possesses 
different characteristics - the ability to give direction to his work(2) 
and to be critical of it. 
(3) 
The Psychological Roots of Creativity 
Storr, summarizing the power of music to resolve conflicts, quotes 
from Zuckerkandl: 
Words divide, tones unite. The unity of existence 
that the word constantly breaks up, dividing thing 
from thing, subject from object is constantly 
restored in the tone. 
(1) Lange-Eichbaum, W., The problem of Genius, trans. Paul, E. and Paul, 
C., New York, Macmillan, 1932, p. 187. 
(2) Lombroso (1891) op. cit. 
(3) Jacobson (1912) op. cit. 
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Storr concludes: 
Music and other works of art have the capacity 
of reordering experience of thought in their 
own image, so that we may obtain from them 
something far more than pleasure. It is 
something more akin to experiencing life as 
a whole. In music, man does not give expression 
to something (his feelings, for example), nor does 
he build autonomous formal structures; he invents 
himself. In music, the law by which he knows him- 
self to be alive is realised in pure form-(1) 
Krausz supports this view as he writes: I regard the making of 
art objects as part of this larger process of becoming, one that is 
continuous and open-ended. 
(2) 
He quotes Dewey on the inter-penetra- 
tion of self and the world of objects and events. Instead of signify- 
ing surrender to disorder, it affords our sole demonstration of a 
t S\ 
stability that is not stagnation but is developing. ") He also refers 
to Chang Chung-Yuan: 
As we know Tao is the ontological experience by 
which subjective and objective reality are fused 
into one .... When the Chinese artist says that 
he enters the spiritual court he speaks of the 
ontological experience, the state of no thought. 
This experience leads to the underlining interfusion 
of subjective and objective realities. This inter- 
fusion initiates the process of creativity, which 
in turn establishes unit and multiplicity, the change 
in the ever-changing. The artist who has reached 
the state of oneness is supported by all the powers 
inherent in multiplicity and changes, and his work 
will be far beyond what his egoform self could 
accomplish. 
Robert Henri (1865-1929), speaking of modern art, 
expresses somewhat the same idea. (The object, which 
is the base of every true work of art, is the attain- 
ment of a state of being, a state of high functioning, 
(1) Storr, A., op. cit. 
(2) Krausz, M., Creating and Becoming, in Dutton, D. and Kraust, M. 
The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art, Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff publications, 1981, pp. 187 - 200. 
(3) Dewey, J., Art as Experience, New York, Capricorn Books, 1932, 
p. 35. 
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a more than ordinary moment of existence. ) 
In such moments activity is inevitable, and 
whether this activity is with brush, pen, 
chisel or tongue, its result is but a by- 
product of this state, a trace, the footprint 
of the state. The work of art, is indeed, the 
bi-product of the state of high functioning. 
This state of spiritual exultation is fundamentally 
creative activity, whilst skills and measurements 
are secondary. It is the manifestation of the 
ontological experience. 1 
Krausz(2) goes on to postulate an affinity between At-Oneness and 
religious experience, referring also to the works of George Santayana, 
John Dewey, Aldous Huxley, Anais Nin, Martin Buber and Abraham Maslow. 
He concludes: 
What I make conditions how I experience, and how 
I experience conditions what I make; my more 
perspicuous ways of experiencing give rise to 
yet more perspicuous art objects. It is by 
virtue of much perspicuity that I speak of self- 
development rather than mere change. However, 
my work as a painter is not merely catalytic from 
my self-development, because the autonomous emergent 
features of my painting especially when I am AT-ONE 
with them, populate and enlarge my inner world. 
(This interaction between material and creator is explored in Chapter 
Two). 
Witkin is in tune with this kind of thinking, when, in The 
Intelligence of Feeling, 
3) he sees artistic creation as the solution 
( 
of an inner sensate problem; and Gutman in a closely argued article' 
sees man's creations as objectifications of his own self. He sees 
human creativity as the: 
(i) Chung-Yuan, C., Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, 
Art and Poetry, New York, Harper Colophon Books, 1970, pp. 203 - 4. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Witkin, R., The Intelligence of Feeling, London, Heinemann, 1974. 
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highest level of manifestation of the principle 
of self-duplication which started its evolutionary 
course with the self-duplicative activity of the 
DNA molecule. We have pointed out that in this 
process of self-projection there is more involved 
than simple self-duplication. It is self-trans- 
formation, involving at the same time amplification. 
The various products of creation thus appear as 
externalisations of certain aspects of man's self - 
tools and machines of his body mechanisms, instruments 
of his sense organs and nervous system, art of his 
perceptual images, music of his emotions, language of 
his conceptualisation and structures of his functional l 
organisation as a whole, physical as well as behavioural. 
Laub-Novak sees creation as a bringing about of internal order: 
In reaction against rote discipline, some have held 
that 'Creativity' means complete subjectivity, whim, 
loss of order and discipline, and, in a word, chaos. 
As usual, human life is fullest when these two extremes 
are transcended. There is a middle way above the two 
extremes. Not merely a compromise, a different way 
altogether. It consists of finding one's own order. 
But recognise that order is already written in the 
human heart. Children love, need, and continually 
create order. Order is natural. It is interior. 
Finding the law within is riot subjectivity, neither 
is it mere external order. l2 
Hollander elaborates the same theme: 
What is man for? The answer, I believe, is search 
inward. Go inward. Search into yourself. This 
means the intellectual search, the rg ligious search 
and, from this, artistic creation. 
ý3) 
The Tanglewood Declaration of 1967 from a conference of those concerned 
in music education put out this statement: 
(1) Cutman, H., Z'he Biological Roots of Creativity, in Mooney and Razik (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity , New York, Harper and Row, 1967, pp. 29 - 30. 
(2) Laub-Novak, K., Creativity and Children, Momentum, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
February 1976, PP. 13 - 19- 
(3) Hollander, L., Loosen up! For God's sake, loosen up!, Music 
Educators Journal, Vol. 56, No. 9,1970, pp. 32 - 5. 
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The arts afford a continuity with the aesthetic 
tradition in man's history. Music and the other 
fine arts, largely non-verbal in nature, reach close 
to the social, psychological and physiological roots ýlý 
of man in his search for identity and self-realisation. 
Dudek links this in with man's search to relate to the outer world: 
The main motivation at the roots of creative exercise is 
man's need to relate to the world around him .... This 
need is apparent in the young child's interest in all 
the objects around him, in his ever-renewed exploration 
and play with them .... without the basic need 
to relate 
to the world, without openness toward the world, the 
experience will not enlarge, deepen and make more alive 
the person's relationship to the world, that is, will 
not be creative. (Schachtel 1959). 
Creativity is man's striving for self-actualisation. 
According to this definition, the created product is always 
the person himself. The principle leads to the develop- 
ment of maturity and of a happy, stable, productive and 
constructive life. Creativity and mental health are, 
therefore, intimate bedmates. Fromm, however, indicates, 
that only if one has reached a degree of inner maturity 
which reduces projection and distortion t minimum can 
one experience creatively. (Fromm 1959)/2). 
(There will be further discussion of this point later). And Cottle 
makes a similar point: 
Creativity involves the capacity to work simultaneously 
with human impulses and aspects of external reality and 
to apply one's imagination and impulse onto reality - 
through a means of expression, such as drawing ........ 
Creativity, of course, implies an expression of self. 
What we see in a child's earliest drawings is an 
expression delivered from the inside, from an inner 
darkness, which is dropped on the outside as a snowflake. 
falling on cold ground. It arrives and, in freedom, 
remains there, unmodified, an entity unneeding of temporal 
sequence in recognisable content. Later, the same 
expression undergoes natural maturation, as thought 
processes become more complex and relations with others 
more sophisticated. Children's art reveals the poignant 
interactions between a single self, still unformed, and a 
social world, still uncomprehended. While the content 
(1) Choate, R. A. (ed. ), Documentary Report of the T lewood Symposium, 
Music Educators National Conference, Washington D. C. 19689 p. 139" 
(2) Dudek, S. Z., Creativity in Young Children - Attitude or Ability, 
Journal of Creative Behaviour, Vol. 8, No. 4, (4th quarter), 1974, 
pp. 95 - 9. 
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of children's imaginations and expressions is 
always changing, the desire to create and 
establish something that is uniquely their own 
remains very much alive despite our fear that it 
may be slipping away. (1) 
Beittel, on the other hand, sees this process as distinct from 
creativity when he says: 
If there is an end to the experiences of which 
we speak, it is not creativity, not education 
through art, but more likely the continuing 
symbolic construction of the self. (2) 
However, Barron(3) looked at all the psycho-therapeutic literature and 
the creative relationship to psychological health and peace of mind 
and remembered Hooke's headaches, giddiness, indigestion and insomnia, 
Beethoven's apocalyptic rages, Swift's savage indignation, and Van 
Gogh's loneliness, Rimbaud's criminality, Emily Bronte's despair, 
Heine's physical pain and concluded that in their picture of a well- 
adjusted ego, there is warmth but no heat, spontaneity but no 
passion 
and no wilfulness, fierce self-assertion or hatred of established order. 
He links with this vision the fact that his findings show that creative 
individuals are more at home with complexity and apparent disorder 
than 
other people and more in touch with the unconscious. 
The Philosophical Roots of Creativity 
Philosophers have linked it with freedom. Briskman(4) explains 
(1) Cottle, T. J., A Simple Change in Creativity, Journal of Creative 
Behaviour, Vol. 7, No. 3 (3rd quarter), 1973, pp. 161 - 4- 
(2) Beittel, K., Mind and Context in the Art of Drawing, New York, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1972, p. 162. 
(3) Barron, F., The Psychology of Imagination, in Parnes, S. J. and 
Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinkin New York, 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 227 - 237- 
(4) Briskmän, L., Creative Products and Creative Processes in Science 
and Art, in Dutton, D. and Krausz, M. 
(eds. ), The Concept of 
Creativity in Science and Art, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publica- 
tions, 1981, pp. 129 - 155. 
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Popper's view: 
(') 
No scientific prediction (and hence, no scientific 
explanation) of the growth of science knowledge is 
possible, on the grounds that we cannot come to 
know today what we shall only come to know tomorrow. 
It follows that what Popper calls the world of 
"objective mind" (or of "theories, arguments and 
problems in themselves") is an essentially open 
world, in that it cannot contain a theory which will 
predict this appearance in that world of all future 
theories. But for Popper this world of "objective 
mind" (his "3rd World") interacts both with the world 
of mental states (his "2nd World") and with the world 
of physical states (his "ist World") - the latter inter- 
action being mediated through the "2nd World". It 
follows that both the mental world, and more importantly, 
the physical world are also open; and this rules out 
physical determinism and, in time, kicks open the door 
to the possibility of human freedom. In other words, 
for Popper the creative. potentiality of human thought, 
the possibility of genuinely creative, unpredictable 
additions to his "3rd World", opens up the door to 
human freedom. (2) 
The existential philosophers also connected the possibility of 
human freedom to the possibility of human creativity - man is free 
precisely because he both can and must create himself, as his existence 
precedes his "essence". Sartre writes: 
If existence really does precede essence there is 
no explaining things by reference to a fixed and 
given human nature. In other words, there is no 
determinism, man is free, man is freedom. (3) 
These are 'heroic' views of creativity and philosophers can afford these 
in a way that psychologists, whose interest since the early 1950s has 
been deliberately pragmatic, cannot& 
(1) Popper, Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and Classical Physics, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1950 and elsewhere, 
referred to in Bris1®an, L. op. cit. 
(2) Briskman, L., op. cit. 
(3) Sartre, J., Existentialism, translated Bernard Freckman, New York, 
A Philosophical Library, 1947. 
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A further extension of this view is that these powers once 
attributed to a transcendent Person outside the order of nature, are 
now known to be immanent in nature, especially human nature, to 
constitute, in fact, one of the givens at the hidden, unconscious 
'core' of nature; so that instead of being a rare capacity it is 
shown in some way and to some extent by almost everybody. Murray out- 
lines Whitehead's position on this: 
Whitehead adumbrated a theoretical system of 
systems in which creativity is a metaphysical 
ultimate. His conception is that of a procession 
of over-lapping and inter-dependent events, or 
actual concrete occasions, in space time. Each 
concrete occasion is a temporally bounded con- 
crescence (organisation, composition) of prehensions 
(appropriating or vectorial processes), the duration 
of each occasion being the time required for the 
composition of the prehended elements into a single 
unit. A fine micro-analysis would yield a sequence 
of occasions, or actual entities, each of which - 
with a duration, say of a fraction of a second, 
would perish at the instant of its composition and 
then be immediately succeeded by another actual 
occasion. A grosser, macro-analysis would take a 
whole act or endeavour, as the "really real thing" 
(Whitehead), the direction and quality of which has 
imposed itself on its constituent parts. 
The moving picture, here, is that of a sequence 
of discrete corpuscles of actuality, bound together, 
as it were, by a vectorial force or continuity of aim. 
Translated to the mind, this could be illustrated by 
the composition of an image which is immediately 
decomposed, only to be followed by the composition of 
another image, or with the formation of a word which 
dies as another word succeeds it, and so forth. our 
senses being less acute that certain delicate instru- 
ments, we are scarcely aware of these individual "drops" 
of mental life and are more prone to choose metaphors of 
fluid continuity, such as the "stream" of consciousness 
or the "flow" of thought. One might say that a "wave 
theory" is closer to our immediate experience than a 
"corpuscular theory". The latter, however, may prove 
more serviceable in the end. 
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Now, according to Whitehead, every actual 
concrescence is unique in some respects, and hence, 
strictly speaking, a creation, since an infinitesimal 
variation is sufficient to justify the adjective 
"unique". Thus the actual world is said to have the 
" character of a temporal passage into novelty. If we 
accept this, then every coherent series of actual 
occasions, short or long -a sentence, a paragraph, 
a ten minute conversation, or a ten-year correspondence 
between two people - is even more of a creation, since 
each of these is a unique and temporal integration of 
unique components, the creation of creations. Personally, 
I am content with this, but would prefer - at least for 
the duration of this discourse - to substitute "composition" 
for "creation", and reserve the latter term for valuable 
compositions with a high degree of novelty relative to 
sameness. %l) 
Thus, one of the most effective geniuses of this century was committed 
to the notion that creativity is of the very essence of reality. 
Murray then outlines his own theory of creation: 
Sufficient concentration within a given region of 
different mobile or mobile entities with mutual 
affinity, entities which have never been combined. 
Then, as a fifth requirement, sufficient circulation 
of these entities, which means a sufficient source of 
energy, Finally, there must be the possibility of 
favourable conditions for combination. Granted these 
seven factors, the mutual attraction, approximation, 
and association of two or more entities in other 
words, creation - is certain to occur. 
(2) 
Thus he arrives at a definition from a philosophical stand-point that 
Koestler arrives at from a psychological stand-point although he applies 
it to the story of evolution as well as to human endeavour. This theory 
of creativity does to some extent tie in with the view of music being 
essentially a collection of joins between past and future time -a 
succession of ever new events. 
(1) Murray, H. A., The Vicissitudes of Creativity, in Anderson, H. (ed. ), 
Creativity and its Cultivation, New York, Harper Row, 1958, PP. 96 - 
118. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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A New Theory of Creativity 
These quotations will serve to show how widespread this adaptation 
of the traditional view of creativity still is. Elliott(') goes on to 
define a new concept of creativity which came into prominence in the 
first two decades after World War II. Razik outlines how before 
that genius is where one finds it, creativity is where one finds it, 
and little can be done through education to affect it. 
(2) 
In the 
1930's in America came the Progressive Education Movement and teachers 
and parents observed children's natural curiosity, experimenting and 
exploration with such spokesmen as William James, John Dewey, William 
Heard Kilpatrick, Prancis Parker, Boyd Bode, George Counts and others. 
It centred on the interests of the child, emphasized democratic ways 
of behaving, made group standards important and used problem-centred 
enquiry. Psychologists such as G. Stanley Hall(3) stressed creativity 
placing emotions above intellect and intuition above reason. He also 
believed too much analysis of the process destroyed spontaneity. He 
believed in the potentiality of man and deplored time spent in school 
orderliness, standing, sitting, etc. He criticised teachers helping 
children over difficulties rather than spurring them to self-activity. 
William James also believed in potentiality and exhorted: 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Razik, T. A., Psychometric Measurement of Creativity, in Mooney and Razik, (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, P" 301. 
(j) Hall, G. S., Aspects of Childhood and Education, Boston, Ginn and Co., 1907. 
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Be patient, then, and sympathise with the type of mind 
that cuts a poor figure in examinations. It may, in 
the long examination which life sets us, come out in 
the end in better shape than the glib and ready 
reproducer, its passions being deeper, its purposes 
more worthy, its combining power less commonplace an4its 
total mental output consequently more important. `1) 
Francis Parker(2) favoured democratic education, a belief in 
relative, not absolute truth and saw curiosity, fantasy, imagination, 
intellectual courage and observation as important. The leader of the 
movement was William Heard Kilpatrick(3). He sought answers in the 
individual learner and emphasized purposeful activity, intrinsic 
motivation, planning, open-mindedness, honesty, group action and child- 
centredness. John Dewey was one of the most prolific writers and 
showed how scientific method can be applied to all fields of enquiry. 
He stressed active learning. 
The word 'creative' was applied to this movement, but the 
connection was not made between it and men of genius. In World War II 
creativity was forgotten. After it, the atomic bomb demonstrated the 
power of'science and technology and other innovations in industry and 
projects like Sputnik demonstrated what development was possible by 
having many creative people at work in a constant effort to transcend 
what had already been done with accomplishments still more novel and 
powerful. So passages like this were written by Guilford: 
(1) James, W., Talks to Teachers on Psychology, New York, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1900. 
(2) Parker, F. W. 9 How to Teach Geography, New York, Appleton-Century, 1905 (c) 1899. 
(j) Van Till. Is Progressive Education Obsolete? in Woodring, P. and 
Scanlon, J. (eds. ), American Education Today, New York, McGraw 
Hill Book Co., 1963. 
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With artificial satellites and even an artificial 
planet circling over our heads, the day of Buck 
Rogers is arriving with accelerated pace. The 
imagination of all of us is in for considerable 
stretching, just to keep up with developments of 
this kind. It is obvious that we are in a tight 
race with Russia with respect to these technological 
advances. It is almost as obvious that we are in 
competition with Russia also with respect to education, 
and in fact, in respect to other areas of social and 
economic progress. In many respects our adversaries 
have shown more initiative and imagination than we 
have. It is unlikely that our potential intellectual 
resources are inferior to those of Russia. We may 
well ask ourselves, therefore, what we are doing that 
is wrong and how we may promote bett use of the 
intellectual resources that we have. 
U 
Efforts must be made to identify creative people and cultivate them 
and schemes like those at Esalen Institute on the Pacific Coast and the 
Creative Education Foundation in New York and the Synectic Group in 
Massachusetts were founded, while aid was forthcoming from the Carnegie 
Corporation and the Richardson Foundation and the US Office of Education. 
Creativity could no longer be left to the chance occurrence of genius; 
neither could it be left to the realm of the wholly mysterious and the 
untouchable. Men had had to be able to do something about it; creativity 
had to be the property of many men; it had to be something identifiable; 
it had to be subject to the effects of efforts to gain more of'it. 
And so materials for developing creative ability were produced like 
(Can'You 
Imagine? 2ý 9 Invitations to Thinking and Doing, Invitations 
(i) Guilford, J. P., Creativity ItiaMeasurement and Development, in Parnes, 
S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, 
New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962,1962, pp. 156 - 67. 
(2) Myers, R. E. and Torrance, E. P., Can you Imagine? Boston, Ginn & Co., 1965. 
(3) Myers, R. E. and Torrance, E. P., Invitations to Thinking and Doing, 
Boston, Ginn & Co., 1965. 
29 
to Writing and Speaking Creatively(') and ImaRi/Craft Recorded 
Materials. 
(2) 
Numerous tests of creative abilities were created, 
notably by Guilford and Torrance, (although it is not yet proved 
whether children who rated high on these tests became creative adults). 
So the softer view of creativity gave way to a hard and more 
realistic one closely connected with hardware and survival, as are 
machines of war and industrial production. Research into creativity 
became legitimised as a properly serious concern of the military, 
government and industry. 
The crucial impetus to the research was given by Guilford's 
parting address as president of the American Psychological Association in 
1950(3) in which he pointed out that only 186 of 121,000 topics 
listed in Psychological Abstracts dealt with creative imagination. 
By the time of. the first national conference on creativity sponsored 
by the National Science Foundation at the University of Utah in 1956 
the number had doubled. By 1962 when Scientific Creativity (edited 
by Taylor, C. W. and Barron, F. ) was printed with a summary of three 
biennial Utah-NSF Conferences approximately 400 references appearing 
since 1950 were available for citation. In 1964 the comprehensive 
bibliography published by the Creative Education Foundation listed 515 
items most of which had appeared since 1960. In 1965 4176 references 
were listed. Courses multiplied and research programmes started, 
(1ý Myers, R. E. and Torrance, E. P.,, Invitations to Write and Think Creatively Boston, Ginn & Co., 1965. 
(2ý Ounnin$ton, B. F., and Torrance, E. P., Imagi/Craft Recorded Materials, 
Boston, Ginn & Co., 1965. 
(3) Guilford, J. P., Creativity, American Psychologist, 5,1950, 
pp. 444 - 454. 
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especially at the University of Buffalo, University of Minnesota 
(with Paul Torrance), University of Utah, Malacester College, Wayne 
State University, Drake University and the University of California 
(with Frank Barron). Adult education centres started courses and 
businesses as well, such as General Electric, US Steel, General Motors, 
Westinghouse and Bell Telephone. In 1967 the Creative Education 
Foundation launched the professional journal, The Journal of Creative 
Behaviour. Osborn claimed that 100,00 copies of his book Applied 
Imagination had been sold and that 1,000 courses on creative problem- 
solving had been inaugurated: 
Until recently the world took it for granted 
that a person was creative or non-creative 
and nothing could be done about it. But new 
scientific research has proved that creative 
ability can be deliberately and measurably 
developed .... A course in creative problem- 
solving can almost double the average person's 
ability to think up good ideas .... We have 
to be even more productive of good ideas than 
our enemies. (1) 
It is interesting that Frank Barron who would be seen in Elliott's 
view to belong to this group of thinkers reverses the traditional 
concept of God when, at the beginning of his article, he writes: 
By his imagination man makes new universes 
which are "nearer to the heart's desire". The 
sorcery and charm of imagination, and the power 
it gives to the individual to transform his 
world into a new world of order and delight, 
makes it one of the most treasured of all human 
capacities. Indeed, when we imagine divinity, 
we impute to it the power to have imagined us and 
by an act of will to have created us. Ever since 
man became conscious of himself, imagination has had 
in it something of mystery and magic, and has seemed 
a process which cannot be completely understood. (2) 
(1) Osborn, A. F., Developments in Creative Education, in Parnes, S. J. and 
Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 19 - 39. 
(2) Barron, F., The Psychology of Imagination, in Parnes and Harding, 
A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners 
Sons, 1962, pp. 227 - 237. 
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Here the divine and the human again feature and man now appears to make 
God in his own image rather than man being made in God's image as in 
the traditional concept. Man is now supreme. (Despite the mystery 
that he says still surrounds it he goes on to outline eight years of 
research into a structured imagination and original thought, although 
he says that the mystery is not greatly diminished). 
Development of the New Concept 
The new concept, according to Elliott has two main versions: 
According to the first of these, a problematic 
situation is defined as one for which no adequate 
response is available in terms of existing know- 
ledge, methods and techniques, and creativity is 
taken to be the capacity to resolve situations of 
this kind. The, second version identifies creativity 
with getting novel ideas and making something of them. 
By "making something of" an idea is meant either 
solving some existing problem by means of it, or 
putting it to some other acceptable purpose, or just 
making it available to others who actually do or might 
well find such employment for it. These may seem 
very similar but the second recognises that someone 
might hit on a valuable idea during a free play of 
fancy Lather than under the pressure of a need to 
solve some problem and that the value of the novel 
idea may riot lie chiefly in its usefulness for problem- 
solving. (1 
The decline in the old concept is seen as a result of the decline of 
belief in the myth that gave it its being; but the danger now is that 
the old concept in relation to artistic creation will be misconstrued 
in an effort to assimilate art and science and accommodate the old 
concept within the new one. In the quotations already given can be 
seen an attempt to view artistic creation as one aspect of problem- 
solving. Is it an attempt to solve the artist's inner problems? Or 
(1) Op. cit. 
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problems of manipulating materials? (All this however may be unknown 
to the artist himself. There is more discussion of this in Chapter 
Two). 
In fact, in the mid 1950s there were some attempts to move away 
from the movement of the 1920s and 1930s and pre-war years that 
favoured science and technology but were hostile to the introspection of 
the arts. People had tended to be regarded as objects, that may or 
may not have problems. Scientists were not interested in the finer 
shape of human thought and feeling but what people can be seen to do, 
exemplified in the behaviourist, Skinner. 
(l) 
But now articles appeared 
in the mid-1960s like Kagan's(2) and books like Liam Hudson's Human 
Bein(3) which attempted to combine this approach with the rich hinter- 
land of intuitive judgment, ethical assumption and personal commitment 
on which all forms of rational activity draw. 
The Relationship between Artistic and Scientific Creativity 
Many writers have addressed themselves to this subject and 
attempted to tease out the problems in various ways. Mackinnon 
distinguishes between the two kinds of creativity: 
Artistic creativity, represented in our studies 
by the work of poets, novelists and essayists, 
results in products that are clearly expressions 
of the creator's inner states, his needs, per- 
(1) Skinner, B. S., Beyond Freedom and D1 nity, London, Cape, 1972. 
(2) Kagan, J., On the Needs of Relativism, in Hudson, L. The Ecology 
of Human Intelligence, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970. 
(3) Hudson, L., Human Beinars, St. Albans, Triad/Paladin, 1978, p. 7. 
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ceptions, motivations and the like. In 
this type of activity the creator externalises 
something of himself into the public field. 
In scientific creativity, the creative 
product is unrelated to the creator as person, 
who in his creative work acts largely as a 
mediator between externally defined needs and 
goals. In this kind of creativeness, the 
creator represented in our studies by industrial 
researchers, physical scientists, and engineers 
simply operates on some aspect of his environment 
in such a manner as to produce a novel and appropriate 
product, but he adds little of himself or of his style 
as a person to the resultant. 
(l) 
He goes on to say: 
It would be an over-simplification to assert that 
the Type 1 creator creates a project or form made up 
of elements which did not exist for himself while 
Type 11 creator creates a novel product from already 
existing elements, but such a statement would probably 
not be far wrong, 
Here we seem to be back with Elliott's two versions of creativity. 
Funk and Whiteside(2) see developmental theory divided between 
those who look largely at 'physiognomic' properties which are concerned 
exclusively with dynamic and affective qualities like Gardnerk3j and 
those whose concern is 'technical-geometric' which is essentially static 
and limited to measurable properties of stimuli like Piaget. 
(4) 
Gardner maintains that participation in the arts is a more universal 
accomplishment than participation in the sciences and one that is achieved 
(1) Mackinnon, D. W., The Nature and Nurture of Creative Talent, American 
Psycholorist, Vol. 17, No. 7, July 1962, pp. 484 - 495. 
(2) Funk, J. and Whiteside, J., Developmental Theory and the Psychology 
of Music, Psychology of Music, Vol. 9, No. 2,1981, pp. 44 - 53. 
(3) Gardner, H., The Arts and Human Development, New York, Wiley, 1973. 
(4) Flavell, J., The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, Princeton, 
Van Nostrand, 1963. 
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well before adolescence. Werner(l) examined both and saw the artist 
as largely concerned with physiognomic processes and the scientist 
with technical geometric, However, Wohlwill(2) and Gibson(3) in 
their view of perception and conception being continuous produced 
theories applicable to the perceptual processes of the artist and the 
most abstract thought of the scientist. 
Sayers sees two distinctions between scientific and artistic 
creativity: 
The first is that any invention or creative act 
will necessarily tend to supercede an act of earlier 
date. This may be true of mechanical invention and 
scientific formulae: we may say, for example, that 
the power-loom has superceded the hand-loom, or that 
Einsteinian physics has superceded Newtonian physics 
and mean something by saying so. But there is no 
sense whatever in which we can say that Hamlet has 
superseded Agamemnon .... The later 
in date leaves 
the earlier achievement unconquered and unchanged; 
that which is at the summit remains at the summit 
until the end of time. (This point will be returned 
to in the discussion of originality] 
The second suggestion is that, once an invention 
has been brought into being and made public by a 
creative act, the whole level of human understanding 
is raised to the level of that inventiveness. This 
is not true, even within its own sphere of application. 
The fact that every schoolboy can now use logarithms 
does not lift him to the intellectual level of the brain 
that first imagined the method of logarithmic calculation. 
But the absurdity of the suggestion becomes glowingly 
obvious when we consider the arts. If a ruthless educa- 
tion in Shakespeare's language could produce a nation 
of Shakespeare's, every Englishman would at this moment 
(1ý Werner, H., Comparative 
Science Editions, 1961. 
of Mental Development, New York, 
(2) Wohlwill, J., From Perception to Inference; a Dimension of Cognitive 
Development, Cognitive Development in Children: 5, Monographs of 
the Society for Research in Child Development, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1970, originally 190, pp. 73 - 93. 
Gibaon, E., Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development, 
New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969. 
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be a dramatic genius. Actually all that such 
an education can possibly do is to improve a little 
the general apparatus of linguistic machinery and 
so make the way smooth for the appearance of the 
still rare, still incalculable genius. Genius is, 
in fact, not subject to the "law" of progress, and 
it is beginning to be extremelx doubtful whether 
progress is a "law" at all. k1) 
Dewey sees the distinction between artistic and scientific thus: 
The thinker has his aesthetic moment when his ideas 
cease to be mere ideas and become the corporate 
meanings of objects. The artist has his problems 
and thinks as he works. But his thought is more 
immediately embodied in the object. Because of 
the comparative remoteness of his end, the scientific 
worker operates with symbols, words and mathematical 
signs. The artist does his thinking in the very 
media he works in, and the terms lie so close to the 
object ttaý he is producing that they merge directly 
into it. 2 
Agha highlights another difference. He sees the romantic artist 
as working alone with a flash of inspiration but sees this concept dying 
with the industrial revolution: 
which meant the introduction of team work, 
division of labour, mass-production in 
manufacturing and in all other fie1d , 
including the field of creativity. 3) 
However, through factor analytic procedures (which are dealt with later 
in the characteristics of the creative person) Lowenfeld and Beittel(4) 
discovered in the visual arts the same factors as Guilford and his team 
had found in the sciences. 
(1) Op. cit, pp. 33 - 4. 
(2) Op. cit. P" 355. 
(3) Agha, M. F., The Mechanics of Creativity, in Smith, P. (ed. ), Creativity - 
An Examination of the Creative Process, New York, Communication Art 
Books Hastings House, 1959, P" 83" 
(4) lowenfeld, V. and Beittel, K., Interdisciplinary Criteria of Creativity 
in the Arts and Sciences, in Research in our Education Yearbook 
NASA, 1959, pp. 35 - 44. 
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Creativity as a Universal Attribute 
As the new concept of creativity emerged people began to see that 
the words used were similar to those being used by educationalists 
about children. It became apparent that it might be possible for 
education to provide the vast numbers of people needed for creative 
developments in the future. In a few years public opinion about 
creativity had changed so that it became the potential property of all 
people. So we have statements like Addison'ss 
It 5reativv is not a word used about music 
at all: it is human beings who are, in varying 
degrees, creative. All music is, or has been, 
created by wonderfully made humans. It is only 
when a teacher realises this that he can tap the 
source f power that lie within every pupil we ýlj 
teach. 
Evans under the heading Creative expression by adults in the same 
vein writes: 
Most people at some time in the safety of their 
bathroom indulge in a form of singing. Relations 
and neighbours might vary in the name they give 
this vocal exploration, but the fact remains that, 
relieved of the inhibitions caused by the external 
environment and stimulated by the physical process 
of towelling, a great many people indulge in some 
form of bathroom vocalising. If the atmosphere 
of the bathroom extravagansa could be taken on to 
the primary classroom of this land, a musical 
revolution would thrust itself upon us overnight. 
ý2ý 
And Paynter declares: 
It will be clear that, for imagination and 
inventiveness to flourish successfully. the 
opportunities for decision-making 
(1) Addison, R., Children (even musical ones) make Music, Music in 
Education, Vol-39, No. 372,1975, pp. 60 - 3. 
(2) Evans, K., Creative Singing, London, Oxford University Press, 1971. 
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and for drawing upon one's inner resources must 
be genuine. This is creativity and, of course, 
it cannot be exploited at second hand. At one 
end of the scale it covers that rare quality, 
original genius. But a high degree of origina- 
lity is only one aspect of creativity. Also 
included is the ordinary, everyday inventive- 
ness which grows from a combination of necessity, 
awareness and imagination. In this sense, 
creativity is something we all possess 911 employ, 
to some extent, every day of our lives . 
t1 
(Feminists will also be glad to read this, for Maslow comments that 
most studies of creativity have been of essentially male or masculine 
definitions and male and masculine products. He advocates a research 
field into feminine creativity because it is less involved with products, 
less involved in achievement, more involved with the process itself. )(2) 
I must add here that Vernon claims that there is no evidence that 
the increase in self-initiated learning in the classroom produces more 
artistic or scientific geniuses. Nevertheless he adds: 
Perhaps they become more tolerant, open-minded, 
adaptable, very cultured and aesthetically 
sensitive; perhaps they are even happier, more 
fully developed personalities, but we just don't 
know ... above the 99th percentile 
fn the popula- 
tio7 high creative talent is not so much a matter 
of acquiring skills as of some inner drive which 
we do not understand, though we are beginning to 
learn about it through such work as McKinnon's 
and through thg sycho-dynamic psychologist's 
explorations . (33 
(1) Paynter, J., The Role of Creativity in the School Music Curriculum, 
in Burnett, M (ed. ), Music Education Review I, London, Chappell, 
1977, PP. 7-8. 
(2) Maslow, A., The Creative Attitude, in Mooney and Razik (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, p. 46. 
(3) Vernon, P. E., Psychological Studies of Creativity, Journal of Child 
Psycholopy and Psychiatry, Vol. 8,1967, pp. 153 - 64. 
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(This approaches the first version of creativity already described. ) 
Paynter(l) goes on to stress the role of the imagination - what 
Witkin(2) calls The Intelligence of Feeling. Indeed Elliott sees the 
new concept as but a part of an existing concept of imaginativeness - 
Under the new concept to proceed imaginatively is ipso facto to be 
creative. 
(3) 
Indeed imagination is one of a number of qualities that 
have been equated with creativity, and there is much writing about 
its nature. 
A definition by Andrews runs: the process by which items of 
experience are combined to form new products. 
(4) 
? lannery refers 
to R. C. Collingwood's definition of imagination as human consciousness 
which encounters sensuous images and likens this to aesthetic conscious- 
ness: 
An image is each sight, sound, motion, smell 
and taste I encounter in the world .... An image is a concrete, sensuous entity. I must 
have sensory contact with some part of my 
environment to get an image. An image is not 
a symbol; it is the real thing .... If you 
are able to think in images that process could 
be called 'imaging' or 'imagining'. (5) 
Sinnott describes its results thus: 
Hence must have come the use of fire, 
communication by written symbol, the 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) op. cit. 
(4) Andrews, E. G., The Development of Imagination in the Pre-school 
Child, University of Iowa Studies Character 3 (4), 1930, pp. 1- 44. 
(5) Op. cit. 
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invention of the wheel and bow, domestication 
of animals and many more. They were all 
novelties that could not have appeared 
unless there had been someone who could 
imagine a situation never yet experienced, 
who could picture in his mind something he 
had not seen .... But how, in turn, can we 
distinguish between the constructive processes 
of creative imagination and that image-forming 
which is such an important part of all mental 
life from childhood to old age .... Imagination 
of this simple kind seems to be a characteristically 
human trait. Indeed, it is necessary if reason is 
to be fruitful, for most reasoning processes require 
assumptions, if nothing more and these are construc- 
tions of the imagination. 
The imaginative process doubtless did not come 
into being suddenly, but probably arose when men 
began to contemplate the possibility of achieving 
one goal rather than another. Perhaps when he first 
recognised the significance of the concept 'if', it 
was born. At any rate, its development seems to 
have gone hand in hand with rationality. These 
primitive forms of imagination, we can agree, are 
potentially creative though often not actually so. 
They have led, however, at the higher levels qf men's 
minds to what seems a truly creative process. tl) 
Writers have distinguished between forms of imagination. Roe(2) 
describes three modes of thinking - visual imagery, verbal imagery 
(divided into auditory or auditory-motor) and imageless thinking. 
Biologists and experimental physicists are primarily visual; theoreti- 
cal physicists use verbal or other symbolic images. Psychologists 
and anthropologists are in the verbal group. She adds too that the 
type of images influenced the vocation of the person. 
Seashore(3) distinguishes several types of musical imagination - 
the 'sensuous', the 'intellectual', the 'sentimental', the 'impulsive', 
(1) Sinnott, E. W., The Creativeness of Life (1959), in Vernon (ed. ), 
Creativity, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, pp. 108 - 113- 
(2) Roe, A., A Study of Imagery in Research Scientists, Journal of 
Personality X1X, 1951, pp. 459 - 70. 
(3) Seashore, C., Psycholo gy of Music, London, Dover, 1967 1st published 
1938. 
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the 'motor'. A person may be mainly one of these types but a 
musician is more usually an integration of two or more. He 
described a 'balanced imagination' in which this integration is 
well developed. 
Agnew in her two papers(1) 
(2) 
points to more intense auditory 
images in musicians and indicates that it had developed through 
practice and training. The auditory imagery of composers was 
spontaneous and there was also evidence of visual and kinaesthetic 
imagery as well. 
Griffiths(3) differentiates imagination, a mode of thinking 
concerned with fantasy and day-dreams from imagery, a type of sensory 
experience in which images arise independent of external stimulation. 
Gerard says that: 
Imagination is more than bringing images into 
consciousness. That is imaging or at most 
hallucination. Imagination, creative imagina- 
tion, is an action of the mind that produces a 
new idea or insight. (4) 
He differentiates between memory, reasoning and imagination and sees 
the imaginative solution as the one that relieves tension and if it is 
a really important imaginative insight, brings a restructuring of the 
universe that persists from then on in mankind. He claims that both 
(1) & (2) Agnew, M., A Comparison of the Auditory Images of Musicians, 
Psychologists and Children, Psychological Monographs XXXI, 
1962, pp. 268 - 78 and The Auditory Images of Great Composers, 
Psychological Monographs XXXI, 1922, pp. 279 - 87- 
(3) Griffiths, R. A., Study of Imagination in Early Childhood, 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965- 
(4) Gerard, R. W., How the Brain creates Ideas, in Parnes, S. J., 
and Harding, H. F., (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, 
New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 115 - 125. 
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scientists and artists express their personality through it and that 
artists mould the world as well as scientists. (The nineteenth 
century, as we know it, is largely an invention of Balzac. ) He says 
that ordinary people have flashes of inspiration but the survival of 
the idea depends on the courage to do the testing. He claims that 
machines can be given the functions of reasoning, memorising and hard 
work but they cannot have built into them the attributes of the 
arrival of the new (observation, attention and ordering of experience. ) 
Bartlett differentiates three types of imagination which he 
distinguishes from flights of fancy by the idea that in imagination 
there is a sense of a whole: 
In imagination the bond is to be found in the 
whole imaginative structure considered in its 
completeness. A plan or programme is at work 
which cannot be found by any amount of analysis 
of any separate bit of the material dealt with. 
(This is similar to Sayers writing about 'The Idea' in 'The Mind of the 
Maker'. 
(2) 
His first type of imagination is 'assimilative imagina- 
tion' which is characterised by a 'resonance of feeling' with the 
objects of imagining. The imagination is 'directed without effort of 
analysis on the whole situation' and there is complete absence of 
criticism so that the changes made in the object are a product of 'those 
deep lying tendencies which are the basis of his psychological life, 
and which work always, though he may not know what they are doing'. 
His second type is 'higher' and is termed 'creative interpretation'. 
(1) Bartlett, R. C., Types of Imagination, Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, III, 1928, pp. 78 - 85. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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The resonance of feeling is still present but the 'lack of criticism' 
is gone and the individual 'does not quite lose himself'. The nature 
of the criticism is not, however, rational and has 'no reference to 
any supposed objective purpose or centre of the work which is being 
interpreted, but only to the personal expression of the interpreter'. 
His third type 'constructive imagination' contains critical analysis 
and resonance of feeling has little or no part. It is characterised 
by 'the adumbration of a scheme; the articulation of a plan; the 
collection of material; the sorting and criticism of the material, 
and its relating to the central plan. The plan shapes all that 
follows, though at the same time the plan itself grown, changes, may 
even become very different from what it was at the beginning. This 
form of imagination may be interspersed with periods of assimilative 
imagination or creative interpretation and these may mark the high 
points of the work'. He sees the favouring of a particular type of 
imagination as related to temperament but sees the products of the 
third kind as being the most original because 'they breathe a certain 
uncompromising aggressiveness'. (Later it is possible to see a link 
between these types and various phases in creative development. ) The 
idea of imagination being a link between the outer world and the 
feeling world is further developed by Dewey(') and Polanyi2) 
( 
" 
Gordon relates feeling to imagination thus: 
(1) Op. cit. p. 351. 
(2) Polanyi, M., The Creative Imagination, in Dutton, D. and Krausz, M. 
The Concept of Creativity on Science and Art, Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publications, 1981, pp. 91 - 107. 
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The process of becoming conscious of our 
desiderata is the very heart of imaginative 
creation. It is making our objects and our 
aims concrete, the reduction of a vague unrest 
to specific purpose, a clarification of our 
goal. (1) 
(This links with later writers dealing with creation as the solution 
to a sensate problem. ) 
The Role of Memory 
In a later article she links it with memory which she defines 
as the whole mind viewed as the consumer of experience. 
When a stimulus is met there begins a 
spontaneous act of appropriation and breaking 
up and reworking of the object. Parts are 
eliminated and the rest made as available as 
possible for our life designs. This is the 
very essence of imagination. And when further, 
we are recognisant of the sources of the materials 
on which we work, this is the very essence of 
memory. (2) 
She discusses twelve outstanding features of memory: 
% 
i All memory is creative. 
ii Memory is both productive and reproductive. 
iii In the classical view of memory we do not 
have a complete act of remembering unless 
there is repetitiono 
iv) It is possible to reproduce without 
recognition of it. 
v) It is possible to have the subjective 
experience of recognising something that 
is really new. 
(1) Gordon, K., Imagination and Emotion, Journal of General 
Psychology 1V, 1937, pp. 121 - 138. 
(2) Gordon, K., Memory viewed as Imagination, Journal of 
General Psychology XVII, 1937, Pp. 113 - 24. 
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vi Memory is selective. 
Vii) There is distortion of memory. 
viii It is of considerable theoretical 
interest that adults cannot recall 
the earliest years of their life. 
ix) Memory is greatly helped by verbal 
expression. 
x) It is, however, possible to remember 
without words. 
xi) The very existence of substance memory 
makes it hard to conceive the basis of 
memory in mechanical terms. 
xii) Methods of memorising help to determine 
what is remembered. 
She also notes that there is a parallel between factors favourable 
to memory and principles of artistic composition. 
Rossman(l) distinguishes between reproductive imaginations 
'the simple recall of past experiences' (practically the same as 
memory), constructive imagination which 'reproduces the constructive 
arrangements of experience' and creative imagination which 'forms 
arrangements which did not have a previous existence. ' 
Ribot(2) in an article as early as 1900 discusses the relation 
between creative imagination and imagination that merely represents 
the old. The creative imagination: 
has its origin and principal source in the 
natural tendency of images to transform them- 
selves into acts - more simply expressed, in 
the motor elements that inhere in the image. 
(1) Rossuran, J., The Psychology of the Inventor: A Study of the 
Patentee, Washington D. C., Inventors Publishing Co., 1931, 
P. 91. 
(2) Ribot, T., The Nature of Creative Imagination, International 
Monthly, 1900 (1) pp. 648 - 75 and (ii) pp. 1- 25. 
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He discusses how hearing involves tendencies to reproduce what is 
heard through speech (I would add music as well) and vision is 
associated with movement and less accommodative, for the mental image 
calls for responses similar to those called forth by the corresponding 
actual perception. 
The imagination is in the intellectual order 
the equivalent of the will in the order of 
movement, both being complex operations, 
goaldirected, spontaneous and needing to have an 
external manifestation to have any value. 
The intellectual side of it involves two 
complementary processes: dissociation - the 
simplification of acquired images, the heighten- 
ing of some details and reduction of prominence 
of others -a stage preparatory to the creation 
of new images and association - the joining of 
mental states, one tending to evoke the other. 
In the latter he distinguishes between association by contiguity which 
merely reproduces the environment and by resemblance either direct or 
by using a mediating idea or affect which is the basis of analogical thinking, 
so important in the creative process. He discusses the affective 
side which, although not always present, he claims, is the actual 
source of aesthetic creation, which can be sparked off by positive 
emotions and negative ones. He gives examples of fear as a source of 
religious creation, depression for literary works and desire for 
mastery over other minds as a general impetus. It also influences the 
association process. He sees a principle of unity behind each creation - 
an idea or affect around which the factors arrange themselves. If 
this element is weak the creation is disorganised; if too strong, it 
has an obsessive quality - both tending to weaken products. He 
discusses the unconscious side of creation and says that as the outcome 
of the process becomes conscious the inspiration is sudden and felt to 
come from a quarter outside the self. 
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This introduces the whole area of the place of inspiration in 
artistic creation. Stephen Spender describing its role in his poetic 
creation links it with memory: 
It is perhaps true to say that memory is the 
faculty of poetry, because the imagination 
itself is an exercise of memory. There is 
nothing we imagine which we do not already know. 
And our ability to imagine is our ability to 
remember what we already experienced and to 
apply it to some different situation. Thus 
the greatest poets are those with memories 
so great that they extend beyond their strongest 
experiences to their minutest observations of 
people and things far outside their own self 
centredness. (The weakness of memory is its self 
centredness, te ce the narcissistic nature of 
most poetry. ) 
Fantasy and Imagination 
Pickard in dealing with the centrality of imagination to creativity 
makes a distinction: 
No creativity is possible without imagination. 
But imagination is not concerned with some 
underworld of ego-centric realities. It 
, enables 
individuals to envisage at the level 
of mental constructs what other younger 
individuals must know in concrete translations. 
Imagination is an integral part of intellectual 
development. In both logical and creative 
thinking it enables the individual to move 
beyond the immediate. It is a way of 
representing construction and reconstruction. 
According to Piaget the formal operational thinker 
is capable of 'delighting in what is not, (1950). 
The younger non-operational thinker indulges in (2) 
phantasy not imagination which he lacks (Piaget 1951). 
(1) Spender, S.,. The Making of a Poem (1946), in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, p. 72. 
(2) Pickard, E., The Development of Creative Ability, Windsor, National 
Foundation for Educational Research Publishing, 1979, p. 81. 
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Despite this distinction, imagination and fantasy have been used 
interchangeably. Singer') differentiates early fantasy characterised 
by verbal role-taking from later internalised fantasy chiefly of a 
visual imagery type; but he does also equate it with daydreams and 
imaginative play and the resulting images thereby produced. Some 
people see fantasy as more rooted in unconscious needs while imagination 
is freer to work at the will of the person. Pickard writes: 
It 5maginatio] has been confused with phantasy 
which has its role and value but lacks an ordered 
relationship with reality. Phantasy is egocentric 
in that it is controlled by the need and wishes of 
the child (Loyexfeld 1969). It is subjective 
assimilation. l2) 
And Storr in refuting Freud's view of the creative process writes: 
When we have finished-reading War and Peace or 
left the theatre after a performance of John 
Gabriel Borloran we feel that our appreciation 
of life has been deepened, and our understanding 
of people extended. This is why Freud's designa- 
tion of creative ability as an evasion or escape 
from life will not hold up. All art depends upon 
phantasy; but it is phantasy used to come to týs 
with life, not phantasy used to escape from it. 
ýJ/ 
Sayers writes vehemently against the psychologists: 
It is here that we reach the great watershed that 
divides Imagination and Fantasy activities often 
confused by psychologists. "The subject" they 
say "invents things about himself", as though 
there were but one kind of invention. In fact, 
the two things have almost nothing in common, 
except that the personality is the raw material 
for both. They can exist side by side in the same 
child, and are distinguished by him immediately and 
infallibly. 
(1) Singer, J. L., Imagination and Writing Ability in Young Children, 
Journal of Personality 29,1961, PP. 396 - 343. 
(2) Op. cit., p. 24. 
(3) op. cit. 
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Fantasy works inwards upon its author, blurring 
the boundary between the visioned and the actual, 
and associating itself ever more closely with the 
Ego, so that the child who has fantasised himself 
a murderer ends by becoming a Loeb or a Leopold. 
The creative Imagination works outwards, steadily 
increasing the gap between the visioned and the 
actual, till this becomes the great gulf fixed 
between art and nature. Few writers of crime- 
stories become murderers - if any do, it is not as 
a result of identifying themselves with their 
murderous heroes ...... 
It is hard to persuade psychologists that 
this distinction between Imagination and Fantasy 
is fundamental - chiefly because of their rooted 
refusal to receive the writer's testimony on their 
behalf .... The same thing may be said of 
Imagina- 
tion and Fantasy: the personality is the' raw material 
of both, the only difference is what becomes of it. 
The stronger the creative impulse, the more powerful 
is the urge aw from any identification of the Ego 
with the created character. 
Creative Imagination is thus the foe and 
antidote to fantasy-a truth recognised by psychologists 
in practice, but frequently obscured in their writings 
by a muddled use of the two terms as though they were 
interchangeable. Evidence of a habit of fantasy in 
a child is no proof of creative impulse: on the 
contrary. The child who relates his fantasied 
adventures as though they are facts is about as far 
removed from creativeness as he can possibly be; these 
dreamy little liars grow up (if into nothing worse) into 
the feeble little half-baked poets who are the irrita- 
tion and despair of the true makers. The child who is 
creative tells himself stories, as they do, but objectively; 
these usually centre about some hero of tale or history, 
and are never confused in his mind with the ordinary day- 
dreams in which he sees himself riding rough-shod over the 
grown-ups or rescuing beloved prefects from burning build- 
ings. Even if he does dramatise himself and make "the 
bard the hero of the story", this is pure dramatisation, and 
can be carried on parallel with his consciousness of real 
life, without ever at any point meeting it. It is not 
that the one kind of fancy develops into the other; they 
are completely and consciously independent. Accordingly, 
the first literary efforts of the genuinely creative commonly 
deal, in a highly imitative manner, with subjects of which 
the infant author knows absolutely nothing, such as piracy, 
submarines, snake-infested swamps, or the love-affairs of 
romantic noblemen. The well-meant exhortations of parents 
and teachers to "write about something you really know 
about" should be (and will be) firmly ignored by the young 
creator as yet another instance of the hopeless stupidity 
of the adult mind. Later in life, and with increased 
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practice in creation, the drive outward becomes 
so strong that the writer's whole personal experience 
can be seen by him objectively as the material for his 
work. 
I am not arguing with the authorities about this; 
I am telling them, because it is a thing that they often 
find very foxing. The child who dresses up as Napoleon, 
and goes about demanding the respect due to Napoleon, is 
not necessarily a little paranoiac with a Napoleon 
fixation; he is just as likely to be an actor. (1) 
She is supported by Fernberger(2) who distinguishes four kinds of 
thinking: fancy (the new arrangement of concrete images without 
direction), revery (the rearrangement of verbal images without direction), 
creative imagination (directed rearrangement of old concrete images), 
reasoning (directed rearrangement of verbal images). He claims that 
artist and engineer both use creative imagination but the difference is 
in the goal and images used. (This is discussed again when the products 
of creative thinking are examined). 
The Role of Curiosity 
Another element in creating is curiosity. Maw and Maw(3) see 
it as, an: , 
aspect of creativity and problem-solving ...... 
It is related to or is a part of motivation, set, 
perception and interest and .... it may have a 
genetic origin. 
(1) Op. cit., pp. 116 - 7. 
(2) Fernberger, S. W., Thinking, in Fernberger, S. W., Elementary Psychology, 
New York, Crofts, 1936, pp. 227 - 58. 
(3) Maw, W. and Maw, E. W., The Differences between the Scores of 
Children with High Curiosity and Children with low Curiosity in a 
Test of General Information, Journal of Educational Research 57, 
1963, PP. 76 - 19. 
Ot, r 4. 
uý! fv 
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Berlyne(l) distinguishes perceptual curiosity, elicited by novel stimuli 
which reward the organism, from epistemic curiosity generated by the 
perception of conflicting solutions to a problem. 
Arnold(2) sees that childrens' curiosity needs encouraging along 
with his fantasies if he is adequately to attempt the preparation stage 
in the creative process. In a later article 
(3) 
he also lays great store 
by the questioning aspect of the creative process (which he regards as 
the first stage) and outlines how parents and teachers inhibit children's 
innate desire to question and remarks how little part questions play 
in adult conversation. 
Pielstick and 'Woodruff(4) postulate a third aspect (very relevant 
for musical work) that evoked by manipulative stimuli (reinforced by 
Torrance . )(5) But Walker 
(6) 
criticises the Manhattanville Music 
Curriculum Project for using creativity interchangeably with curiosity, 
quoting a reference to: 
(1) Berlyne, D. E., A Theory of Human Curiosity, British Journal of 
Psychology 45,1954, pp. 180 - 91. 
(2) Arnold, J. E., Creativity in Engineering, in Smith, S., (ed. ), Creati- 
vity- An Examination of the Creative Process, New York, Communication 
Arts Books Hastings House, 1959, PP- 33 - 46. 
(3) Arnold, J. E., Education for Innovation, in Parnes, S. J. and Harding, 
H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, Charles 
Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 127 - 138. 
(4) Pielstick, N. L. and Woodruff, A. B., Exploration Behaviour and 
Curiosity in two age and ability groups of children, Psývcholo; rical 
Reports 5,1959, PP. 729 - 737. 
(5) Torrance, E. P., Guiding Creative Talent, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 
1962. 
(6) Walker, R,, Innovation in the Music Classroom ii - The Manhattanville Music Curriculum Project, Psychology of Music, Vo1.12, No. 1,1984, 
pp. 25 - 33. 
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'man's propensity to probe the unknown, to 
experience the world imaginatively and to form 
impressions from his contact with the elements 
in his environment (p.! )'. 
Walker also mentions later references to removing 'inhibiting' factors 
in the teaching situation. He comments: 
Creativity is confused with a process of 
exploration and the utilisation of this process 
as a tool with which to generate interest in 
music. If one can say that creativity means 
the process and the product of a Mozart conceiving, 
writing and completing his Symphony in G minor No. 40, 
then it is something more than mere curiosity and 
exploration of sound. But this is a much more 
complex argument than there is space for here. The 
important point is although the writers use the word 
creativity they do go on to specify in some detail 
what they conceive the process and its relevance to 
a number of aspects of music be. For instance, 
they advocate 'free exploration of sound in the class- 
room'; the inevitable noise is called 'creative 
fall-out' (p. i). This is not necessarily far removed 
from the kind of situation one imagines composers like 
J. S. Bach, Beethoven and Chopin to be involved in as 
they improvised, that is, tried out their musical ideas 
in sound, before committing themselves to paper. 
There must have been a good deal of 'creative fall-out' 
in the process. Indeed Beethoven's notebooks would 
tend to confirm this. If this is creativity then it 
clearly has validity not only in the world of musical 
artists but possibly in education, if one wants to 
provide situations for children which resemble those 
of the artist in acts of 'creating' music. 
The Role of Originality 
This is another important component in creativity. Guilford 
defines it as: 
the production of unusual, far-fetched, remote or 
clever responses .... measured in terms of certain 
population that is culturally homogeneous. 
1 
(1) Guilford, J. P., Intellectual Factors in Productive Thinking, in 
Mooney and Razik (eds. ), Exploration in Creativity, New York, 
Harper and Row, 1967, pp. 95 - 106. 
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Torrance accepts this with the proviso that the response is: 
relevant to the task, shows intellectual 
strength or represents some breakaway from 
the obvious, the commonplace and banal. (i) 
This aspect is very important in so-called tests of creativity. 
Indeed the Thesaurus of Eric Descriptors defines creativity as: 
The attribute of constructive originality 
often manifested in the ability to discover 
new solutions to problems and find new modes 
of artistic expression. (2) 
Hallman(3) lists several elements in originality - newness, 
unpredictability (they have new configurations), uniqueness (they are 
incomparable), surprise. He questions whether originality requires 
a tangible object. And Whiting(4) differentiates between 'creative 
thinking' and 'original thinking', the latter involving the production 
of new, but not necessarily useful ideas, the former combining useful- 
ness and originality. 
However, Sayers takes a passage from her book Nine Tailors and 
shows how she drew on The Book of Job, Isaiah, Milton's At a Solemn 
Musick, Keats's The Eve of St Agnes, Browning's The Statue and the Bust, 
the angels in the roof of March and Needham Market parish churches and 
Tennyson's The Holy Grail. She concludes: 
(1) Torrance, E. P., Nurture of Creative Talents, in Mooney and Razik (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, 
PP. 185 - 195. 
(2) Thesaurus of Eric Descriptors, 9th edition, 1982, Oryx Press, 
P. 56. 
(3) Halten, R. J., The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Creativity 
in Gowan, J. C., Demos, G. D., Torrance, P. E. (compilers), Creativity 
Its Educational Implications, New York, London, Wiley, 1967, 
pp. 61 - 31. 
(4) Whiting, C. S., Creative Thinking, New York, Reinhold, 1958, p. 168. 
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But what is important and not always understood 
in these days, is that a reminiscent passage of 
this kind is intended to recall to the reader all 
the associated passages, and so put him in touch 
with the sources of power behind and beyond the 
writer. The demand for "originality" - with the 
implication that the reminiscence of other writers 
is a sin against originality and a defect in the 
work-is a recent one and would have seemed quite 
ludicrous to poets of the Augustan Age, or of 
Shakespeare's time. The traditional view is that 
each new work should be a fresh focus of power 
through which former streams 9f beauty, emotion, 
and reflection are directed. `1ý 
Jenny Fowler outlines what originality means for a composer: 
Someone has asked for a piece for violin and piano. 
I think of the sound of a violin, the sound of a 
piano. Stale. There are instruments which have 
been constantly 'worked over'. It is a bit like 
the "big bang" development of the universe. First 
the middle, strongest and most resonant sounds are 
explored, then the edge are expanded; composers 
pushing out constantly to the edges of register, to 
the peripheral sounds of whispers and grittiness. 
Sometimes whole pieces are made solely from outer- 
most edges :I think of a piece for piano by 
Michael Finnissy ("Grainger"). It takes place 
entirely in the top octave and bottom octave of the 
piano - the player stretched out, reaching to the 
limits of his own reach, to the limits of the known 
keyboard. Sometimes whole concerts take place at 
the edges of the sounds made by an instrument, 
particularly when an adventurous player, willing to 
explore new methods of sound production, attracts 
new pieces. There are times when one longs for a 
"normal" sound in the middle range! - probably an 
element of bad programme-planning here. I have no 
doubt that there are plenty of new, exciting sounds 
still to be found on pianos and violins : developments 
with electronics, still new methods of production. (That is the amazing thing about the standard instru- 
ments in the "classical" tradition - the extent to 
which they have been able to expand and develop : 
meeting the demands of so many composers with quite 
different aims. ) ... 
People sometimes ask why composers are always in 
search of new sounds. Perhaps we are also suspected 
of implied criticism of what has gone before. ("What 
was good enough for Beethoven" .... As also : 
(1) Op. cit., pp. 94 - 6. 
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"What was wrong with C major then? ". 
Why always seek the new? We have to do battle 
against the inertia of the human mind which is biased 
towards travelling along known paths in known directions. 
Ask anyone to think up a bit of music and it so easily 
comes out as yet another version of the familiar. Even 
in the great composers' notebooks, this is sometimes true 
of the first attempts. One's own expectations like 
everybody else's, - are formed from the known. Somehow 
one has to trick the imagination into making a step - 
see a vision outside itself - communicate the excitement 
- have something to say. 
Of course, playing with new sounds, does not 
necessarily mean that a composer has something new to sayl 
But it is one way of stimulating the imagination into a 
new direction. There are lots of others : combining 
known patterns into unknown simultaneity or juxtaposition; 
hearing music from another culture remote in distance or 
time; using ideas from other art forms; creating a 
conscious and ri rous grid to force the construction out 
of other moulds 
how 
difficult it was for composers to 
escape that soft, seductive, all-embracing cushion of 
romantic harmony, and what efforts they made to struggle 
from its embrace! )...... 
Looking back from a perspective of about 50 years, 
some of the "steps" of a composer's imagination, seeming 
huge at the time, tend to dwindle. That composer will 
suddenly seem very well-rooted in his past. But that 
step, though small, was never inevitable. Out of the 
million possible directions that one was taken; not the 
other 999,999. (1) 
But in the-same article she deals with another view of originality - 
that of being new to the composer: 
When I look back over past work, I am sometimes surprised 
by observing the constant recurrence of certain ideas - 
almost obsessions. It always seemed to me that I was 
creating a completely new piece, beginning from scratch, 
each time. The vision of each new piece comes complete 
with the feeling that it is unique; carries with it the 
heady excitement of the new. That is what one tries to 
convey. 
This isn't entirely an illusion. Each solution 
could have, jeen something else. One. exercises choice 
all along the way. 
(1) Fowler, J. My own Ears, NMA , Victorian Ministry for the Arts, 1985, PP. 3-6. 
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I find it odd that so many writers on music sound 
such a pessimistic note about the future ...... 
(loss of direction; all paths dried up; complete 
fragmentation; cul-de-sac, cul-de-sac .......... 
) 
It reminds me of the sad thought that came to 
me when I was about eight years. old. I was secretly 
day-dreaming about becoming a composer (not very 
hopefully :I knew that composers were German, and 
that they lived a long time ago). It suddenly 
seemed that perhaps all the combinations of notes 
possible, had already been written. Surely Bach 
by himself, must have explored every permutation 
and combination? I started to work it out, and 
was relieved to find that the possibilities of note 
following upon note, or combined with other notes, 
were infinite. No doubt I was right to feel humble, 
and wonder if anyone could say something that Bach 
hadn't already said, but my pessimism had been rather 
naively literal. 
It is always possible to imagine "something other". 
Almost by decizýition, only a non-creator can talk about 
cul-de-sacs. 11 
Hausman makes this claim: creativity occurs on condition that a 
new and valuable intelligibility comes into being , 
(2) 
which embodies 
many of the elements explored later in this ýh-sis, Hausman investigates 
the problems definitions may run into, either by reducing creativity to 
natural events or by treating it as wholly unintelligible and mysterious. 
Although the structure to be intelligible must have some link with the 
past, it must have coherence despite the fact that its structural 
constitution contrasts with all that was intelligible before it came 
into being. The concept of value will be examined later but he makes 
the points that judgements of value change but that the notion of value 
excludes works produced only to be different eccentricities. He also 
adds to his definition the notion of spontaneity as well as directed 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Häusman, C. H., Criteria of Creativity, in Dutton, D. and Kausz, M., 
The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art, Boston, Martinus, 
Nijhoff Publications, 1981, pp. 75 - 89. 
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control and for this reason excludes the child's learning his 
tables as creative. He then summarises; 
The criteria of creativity are: 
1. created outcomes have intelligible 
structures that are irreducible, 
2. the structures of created outcomes 
are unpredictable and inherently and 
usually instrumentally valuable, 
3. and the acts that lead to creative 
outcomes include an element of 
spontaneity so that although they 
are directed and are controlled they 
are discontinuous. 
The Four Areas of Creativity 
It is with such writing about originality that we come to very 
important distinctions in the definitions of creativity. These 
distinctions have so far been undifferentiated here. Research into 
creativity has followed four areas - the creative products, the 
creative process, the characteristics of people who produce creative 
products and environmental factors that favour creativity. The last 
of these does not affect the definition but creativity has been defined 
in terms of all of the first three. The creative products approach 
is favoured by those taking responsibility for the consumer's or society's 
welfare such as administrators of a business enterprise or of a public 
institution, the creative process by those who are themselves creative 
individuals e. g. novelists, painters, musicians, the characteristics 
of people who produce creative products by those who are responsible 
for picking people to fit particular positions such as personnel 
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managers and environmental factors that influence creativity by those 
responsible for the continuing care and cultivation of personnel such 
as teachers and managers or those involved in explaining changes taking 
place in persons because of cultural or physical surroundings such as 
sociologists, cultural historians and anthropologists. 
Rossman defining 'invention' makes five uses of the word which 
could also be used of 'creation': 
1. The thing invented; 
2. The quality and property of the invention; 
3. The mental process; 
4" The ability to invent; 
5" The historical fact that the invention 
has been made. (l) 
In 'creation' the first two have been telescoped and also to some 
extent combined with 5. It-is nonetheless possible in the literature 
on creativity to see these three strands present in those concerned 
with the created product. 
Hallman links them all together when saying that the creative 
act has five major components: 
1. It is a whole act, a unitary instance 
of behaviour; 
2. It terminates in the production of 
objects or of forms of living which 
are distinctive; 
3. It evolves out of certain mental 
processes; 
4. It co-varies with specific personality 
transformations; 
5. It occurs within a particular kind of 
environment. (2) 
Despite these links it is still useful to look at the various areas 
separately. 
(1) Op. cit., p. 11. 
(2) Hallman, R. J., The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Creativity 
in Gowan, J. C., Demos, G. D., Torrance, P. E. (compilers), Creativity : 
Its Educational Implications, New York, London, Wiley, 1967, 
pp. 16 - 31. 
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The Creative Product 
First of all creativity has been defined as the making of novel 
products. Bruner presents a succinct definition in this way. 
According to him the hallmark of creativity is that the created work 
produces: 
effective surprise; the work must be novel and 
original, it must take us beyond common ways of 
experiencing the world and it must be of some 
value .... The triumph of effective surprise is that it takes one beyond the common ways of 
experiencing the world. Or perhaps this is 
simply a restatement of what we have been mean- 
ing by effective surprise. If it is merely that, 
let me add that it is in this sense that life most 
deeply imitates art or that nature imitates science. 
Creative products have this power of re-ordering 
experience and thought in their image. In science 
the reordering is much the same from one beholder 
to another. In art, the imitation is in part self- 
imitation. It is the case too that the effective 
surprise of the creative man provides a new instrument 
for manipulating the world - physically as with the 
creation of the whee']J Qr symbolically as with the 
creation of e= m2 . 
Later he outlines three types of this - 'predictive surprise', 
'the kind of surprise that yields high predictive value' like scientific 
formulae, 'formal surprise' usually found in Logic and Mathematics and 
possibly Music ('the ordering of elements') and 'metaphoric effectiveness' 
'connecting domains of experience previously apart'. He adds (thus 
agreeing with later accounts of unconscious activity): 
I would propose that all of the forms of effective 
surprise grow out of combinatorial acttýjty -a 
placing of things in new perspectives. 
(1) Bruner, J., On Knowing - Essays for the Left Hand, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 22. 
(2) Op. cit., p. 30. 
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Brislanan(l)argues strongly for the priority of the product: 
In other words, a) the creativity of the product 
has logical priority over b) the creativity of 
the person and his or her psychological processes, 
so that we cannot identify b) independently of a). 
And this means that we equally cannot explain a) 
when making reference to b). So if we do want to 
explain the creativity of some scientific or artistic 
product, we shall, it appears, have to make reference 
not to b) but to the objective relation to prior 
scientific or artistic achievements. 
He adds the further argument: 
We shall not be able to describe, let alone under- 
stand, the creative process unless we make reference 
to the intermediary products which "function" so to 
speak as 'tools" in the creative process itself .... Not only are we unable to identify a psychological 
process as creative in the absence of an identification 
(or evaluation) of its resultant product but we are 
unable to identify any purely psychological process at 
all as the creative process. For any such process 
which we are likely to call "creative" will involve an 
ineliminable interaction between the creator's psycholo- 
gical state and his own products, with the latter having 
a genuine feedback upon, and thus themselves actually 
helping create the former. 
(This problem of the interaction of the creator and medium is further 
explored in Chapter Two when a linear view of the process is opposed 
to one of more subtle interaction between artist and medium ") He 
sums up his definition: 
A creative, scientific or artistic, product has, I 
suggest, the following characteristics: First, 
relative to the background of prior product, it is 
a novel product, second it puts this novelty to a 
desirable purpose by solving a problem, such 
problems being themselves relative to this back- 
ground and emerging from it. Third, it does so 
in such a way as to actually conflict with parts 
of this background, and necessitate its partial 
modification, and to supplant and improve upon 
parts of it. Finally, this novel, conflicting 
problem solution must be favourably evaluated: 
(1) Op. cit. 
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it must meet certain exacting standards 
which must in themselves be part of the 
background it partially supplants. Any 
product which meets all four of these 
elements I shall call a 'transcendent 
product' for it may be said to transcend 
a background of prior product against which 
it emerged. 
Stein defines the creative product similarly: 
The creative work is a novel work that is 
accepted as tenable or useful by a group in 
some point in time ... By 'novel' I mean 
that the creative product did not exist 
previously in precisely the same form. It 
arises from a reintegration of already 
existing materials or knowledge, but when 
it is completed, it contains elements that 
are new. (1) 
There is a sense in which all products are new, not exactly the 
same as any other - even a child's colouring in of the outline of a 
house but I do not think Stein means that. However, Korzenik writes 
of this problem over originality (which will be discussed again later): 
By contrast, Guilford's factor of originality 
appears to be inappropriate because young 
children's picturing involves exploitation of 
given sensory knowledge of the world without 
the firm knowledge of the social conventions 
of picturing. Originality, deviation from 
convention such as 'boundary pushing' and 
'boundary breaking' (Eisner (1965)) are more 
applicable to adult art than to the art of the 
young child. (2) 
There is a-danger in stressing novelty. Elliott(3) sees it as 
one of the dangers of applying the new concept of creativity to artistic 
creativity. The traditional concept allows creativeness to be ascribed 
(1) Stein, M. A., Creativity and Culture, in Mooney and Razik (eds. ), 
Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, 
p. 109. 
(2) Korzenik, D., Creativity : producing solutions to a problem, 
Studies in Art Education, Vol. 17, No. 2,1976, pp. 29 - 35" 
(3) Op. cit. 
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to beautiful objects regardless of whether they are innovative: 
Although Eliot has contributed more than Yeats 
to the language of twentieth century poetry 
many artists would want to say that Yeats is 
the greater and more creative poet .......... 
ate. Here is an instance where the new concept serves art worse the 
traditional concept. (In music the same comparison could be made of 
Haydn and Mozart and it links with the Sayers quotation on p. 34. ) 
Meyer(') makes a very closely argued case for the evaluating of 
compositions along the line of information theory that requires the 
unexpected for musical meaning. He says that: 
musical meaning arises when an antecedent 
situation, requiring an estimation of the 
probable modes of pattern combination, 
produces uncertainty about the temporal- 
tonal nature of the expected consequence. 
He goes on to describe how music must be evaluated syntactically, 
writing: 
Yet in so far as the intricate and subtle inter- 
connections between musical events, whether 
simultaneous or successive, of a complex work 
involve considerable resistance and uncertainty - 
and presumably information - value is thereby 
created. 
He adds that greatness also involves the interaction of syntactical 
relationship and associative-characterising and from this analysis 
declares Beethoven's 9th Symphony to be a greater work than the more 
sensuous Afternoon of the Faun by Debussy. Many may dispute this 
conclusion but it does tie in with the discussion in Part Two of the 
development of childrens' compositions and how with increasing maturity 
they develop the capacity for introducing musical surprises in an 
(1) Meyer, L., Music - The Arts and Ideas, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1967, p. 11. 
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established style - speculating in a musical style. 
Other writers, although primarily concerned with the process, do 
see the interpersonal aspect of the creative process in the comJnunica- 
tion between the creative individual and as his audience as important 
(e. 
g. Deweylý and Kris 
ý2ý 
The Creative Person 
The next definition centres round the person who produces novel 
products. Guilford expounded this view to the full: 
In its narrow sense creativity refers to the 
abilities that are most characteristic of 
creative people. Creative abilities determine 
whether the individual has the power to exhibit 
creative behaviour to a noteworthy degree. 
Whether or not the individual who has the 
requisite abilities will actually produce 
results of a creative nature will depend up9n 
his motivational and temperamental traits. i3) 
He bru t the intellectual aspects of the problem into focus in 
his theoretical model of the structure of the intellect. He divided 
intellectual factors into five operations - cognition (in which 
knowledge is discovered), memory (a retention of knowledge), divergent 
thinking (the production of the best or only solution) and evaluation - 
into five kinds of content - figural (e. g. size, form, colour, texture, 
things we see or hear), symbolic (letters, digits, conventional signs), 
semantic (verbal meanings or ideas), behavioural (wh4t he calls social 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Kris, E., Psychoanalysis and the Study of Creative Imagination, 
Bulletin of New York Academy of Medicine, XXIX, 1953, pp. 334 = 51. 
(3) (Milford, J., Creativity (1950), op. cit. 
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intelligence concerned with desires, intentions and thoughts, although 
he said he has done little research into thin area) - and into six 
products - units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, 
implications. This he drew as a three-dimensional figure giving 
150 ways of intellectual functioning. He claimed to be able to 
identify at least 50 of these by tests. He went on to identify the 
creative abilities which he listed as: 
1. Sensitivity to problems; 
2. Fluency, which can be divided into word fluency 
(identified by L. L. Thurstone) (the ability to produce 
words each fulfilling the same letter requirements); 
ideational fluency (ability to produce quickly units of 
meaningful words in response to a problem), associational 
fluency (ability to produce words with relation to a given 
word) and expressional fluency (the ability to put words 
into organised phrases or sentences); 
3. Flexibility (the ability to change the meaning or re- 
interpret something) which he divided into spontaneous 
flexibility (flexibility when it was demanded) and adaptive 
flexibility (flexibility in response to a problem); 
4. Originality; - 
5. Elaboration. 
(He found two abilities - to synthesise and analyse - not supported by 
his research. ) He then linked these abilities to his intellectual model 
such as ideational fluency being the using of divergent thinking opera- 
tions to produce semantic unity and elaboration being the use of diver- 
gent thinking operations to produce semantic classes, word fluency - the 
using of divergent thinking abilities to produce symbolic units and 
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expressional fluency - the using of divergent thinking abilities to 
produce symbolic systems. He concluded that most creative abilities 
fell into the divergent thinking operations although there were some 
exceptions. He listed semantic redefinition and symbolic redefinition 
as being in the convergent thinking operations and sensitivity to 
problems as being in the evaluation operations area. He also concluded 
that cognitive abilities were basic. Without having information there 
was no intellectual performance of any kind. Learned information was 
of no value later unless it was retained. Evaluative abilities were 
needed if there was to be any self-criticism, which there should be 
if the creative thinker was to complete his job. He claimed that IQ 
tests had concentrated on a very few factors in the structure of 
intellect. For example, the IQ for verbal intelligence concentrated 
on verbal comprehension - the ability to cognise semantic units. 
He 
added that there is nothing of divergent thinking or transformations 
involved. He concluded that there was, therefore, not necessarily a 
correlation between IQ and creativeness and also that creativeness was 
a product of both heredity and the environment. In the latter he 
exhorted teachers to include more tasks involving divergent thinking 
in the curriculum, although he made the point that it is not clear 
that developing childrens' creative ability in art, for example, will 
necessarily affect their creative ability in other areas. (In this 
he differed from the view of Lowenfeld and Read. ) For the musician, 
it is clear that musical composition is in the figural area and that 
most of the operations and the products will be involved in it. All 
these factors will operate in the thinking of the children about music 
as well. 
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His original survey was of the scientist, technologist, including 
the inventor. But he concluded: 
Some of the hypotheses mentioned here may 
apply also to areas of creative endeavour 
other than science, technology and invention. 
The The factorial conception of personality 
leads to new way of thinking about creativity 
and creative productivity. According to this 
point of view creativity represents a pattern 
of primary abilities, patterns which vary with 
different spheres of creative activity. Each 
primary ability is a variable along which 
individuals differ in a continuous manner. 
Guilford's- thesis has been developed by many writers. Hilgard(l) 
talks of the limitations of factor analysis because it is limited by 
what the tester includes in his battery and the people he finds to test. 
He supports Gough 
(2) 
who list five factors: 
Intellectual confidence; enquiringness of 
mind; cognitive flexibility; aesthetic 
sensibility; sense of destiny. 
These last two are additional to Guilford. Aesthetic sensitivity is 
a deep seated preference for an appreciation of elegance of form and 
of thought, of harmony wrought from complexity, and of style as a medium 
of expression. Sense of destiny includes something of resoluteness 
and certainty of one's worth and validity of one's own future and 
(naturally) of egotism. (Here can be seen another attempt to merge 
Elliott's two versions of creativity). 
(1) Hilgard, E. P., Creativity and Problem-Solving, in Anderson, H. (ed. 
), 
Creativity and its Cultivation, New York, Harper Row, 1958, 
pp. 162 - 180. 
(2) Gough, G., Imagination - Undeveloped Resource, Proceedings of the First Conference regarding Development of Personnel Management, 
Los Angeles, University of California Institute of Industrial 
Relations, 1957, PP. 4- 10. 
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Barron in a survey of creative scientists and artists lists the 
following characteristics of creative people: 
Creative people are especially observant and they 
value accurate observation (telling themselves the 
truth) more than people do. 
They often express part-truths, but this they do 
vividly; the part they express is the generally 
unrecognised; by displacement of accent and 
apparent disproportion in statement they seek to 
point to the usually unobserved. 
They see things as others do but also as others do 
not. They are thus independent in their cognition 
and they also value clear cognition. They will set 
a great personal pain to testify correctly. 
They are motivated to this value (independent sharp 
observation) both for reasons of self-preservation 
and in the interests of human culture and its future. 
They are born with greater brain capacity, they have 
more ability to hold many ideas at once, and to compare 
more ideas with another - hence to make a richer 
synthesis. 
In addition to unusual endowment in terms of cognitive 
ability, they are more vigorous and have available to 
them an exceptional fund of psychic and physical 
energy. Their universe is thus more complex and in 
addition to usually leading more complex lives, seeking 
attention in the interest of the pleasure they obtain 
upon its discharge. 
They have more contact with most of the unconscious - 
with fantasy, revery, the world of imagination. 
They have exceptionally broad and flexible awareness 
and the self is strongest when it can regress (admit 
fantasies, naive ideas, impulses in consciousness and 
behaviour) and yet return to a high degree of rationa- 
lity and self-criticism. The creative person is both 
more primitive and more cultured, more destructive and 
more constructive, crazier and saner, than the average 
person. When the distinction between subject (self) 
and object is mostly secure, the distinction can with 
most security be allowed to disappear for a time (as in mysticism and in deep love). This is based 
on true sympathy with the not-self, or with the 
opposite of those things which comprise defensive self- 
--definition. The strong self realises that it can 
afford to allow regression, because it is secure in the 
knowledge that it can correct itself. The objective 
freedom of the individual is at a maximum when this 
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capacity exists, and creative pQ t ntial is 
directly a function of freedom. `1) 
Although this definition is linked with a definition of the creative 
person it will be seen in Chapter Two as having much in common with 
the characteristics of the creative process. 
Lange-Eichbaum distinguishes between talent and genius. 
he says: 
cannot be anything absolute, cannot be 
anything firmly established once for 
all ...... On the contrary genius must 
be a valuation, a denomination of value or 
an experience of value. L11 types of 
individualy7 can be raised to the rank of 
genius, all conceivable varieties and grades 
of talent, or half-talent or no talent at 
all ...... No one is primarily a genius; 
he becomes a genius ...... Genius is the 
consummation of sociolo $i al, religious and 
psychological factors. l2) 
Genius 
But talent he adds, is an inborn endowment. Talented people can more 
readily become geniuses but not necessarily. Society decides a 
genius by means of fame: the living recognition on the part of 
numerous persons that something has at some time been peculiarly 
impressive. Hence is raised the nature/nurture question and also the 
issue that person and product are also closely linked. 
Creative Ability 
Against these definitions is the view that creativity is not an 
ability that can be applied in any sphere. The Gulbenkian Report 
The Arts in Schools refutes the idea that there is: 
(1) Barron, 'F., The Psychology of Imagination, in Parnes, S. J. and 
Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 227 - 237. 
(2) Lange-Eichbaum, E., The Problem of Genius, New York, Macmillan, 
19329 p. 187. 
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a separate mental faculty responsible for 
creative work whose absence or presence in 
a person can be measured. A second mis- 
conception associated with this is that 
some people have this faculty or capacity 
for gygative thinking and that others do 
not. l 
The report concludes that creativity is not a general capacity but is 
seen in relation to specific activities - writing, painting, composing, 
philosophy or whatever. Creativity in one sphere does not guarantee 
it in another. So it must be learned in every medium. The report 
also criticises talk about creativity as a mental capacity not 
linked inextricably with what a person does or produces: 
Talk about different degrees of creativity 
has to be related to the criteria by which 
these products and activities can be 
assessed in the public. form by those who 
have the knowledge and ability to make 
informed judgements about them. 
White agrees with this and also refutes the idea that there is: 
Some sort of inner source of mental energy which 
can be dammed up or, alternatively set free to 
flow into different cklannels of intellectual or 
aesthetic activity. 
(2 
In this he attacks Lowenfeld and Read who saw free activity in art 
lessons as a way of promoting creativity in any discipline. Read, 
quoting Jaensch observes: 
Once the creative process is freed in. one 
direction 
.... once the shackles of school 
passivity are broken at one point, a kind 
of inner liberation, the awakening of a 
(1ý Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, The Arts In Schools, London, 
1981, p. 31. 
(2) White, J. P., Creativity and Education: a philosophical analysis, 
The British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 16 (2), 1968, 
pp. 123 - 37. 
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higher activity sets in. Above all, to the 
eidetic sphere of development, as well as to 
the mentality of the artist, there belongs a 
peculiar structure of the mental powers, 
particularly of thinking; and the arousing 
and vivifying of these powers benefits all 
subjects t ught, even the most rigorously 
logical. (lj 
While it is undoubtedly true that the faculty needs specific skills 
and experience in a specific discipline to find its realisation in 
created products (which will be discussed more fully in Chapter Two) 
it would seem that there are common faculties in creative people in a 
number of spheres, faculties like originality imagination, divergent 
thinking and so on. 
The DES document The Curriculum from 5-16 seems to straddle these 
two approaches. It defines an area of learning and experience called 
'aesthetic and creative' which it says: 
is concerned with the capacity to respond 
emotionally and intellectually to sensory 
experience; the awareness of degrees of 
quality; the appreciation of beauty and 
fitness of purpose. It involves the 
exploration and understanding of feeling 
and the processes of making, composing and 
inventing. Aesthetic and creative experience 
may occur in any part of the curriculum, but 
some subjects contribute particularly to the 
development of pupils' aesthetic awareness and 
understanding because they call for personal, 
imaginative, affective and often practical, 
responses to sensory experience. Art, crafts, 
design, some aspects of technology, music, dance, 
drama and theatre arts, in particular, promote 
the development of the imagination an the 
creative use of media and materials. k2) 
(1ý Read, H. E., Education throughout Art, London, Faber and Faber, 
p. 59. 
(2) Department of Education and Science, The Curriculum from 5 to 16, 
Curriculum Matters 2, London, HMSO, 1985, pp. 16 - 17. 
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This would seem to imply that there is some generalised creative 
capacity that is linked with the imaginative and the affective. How- 
ever, later, is added: 
Primary age children can begin to consider the 
importance of the choice of medium in creating 
a particular effect, while older pupils may 
examine the relationship between aesthetic and 
fitness for purpose in design. 
Laub-Novak takes up the same idea: 
In speaking to and reading the lives of creative 
writers, scientists, theologians, artists, I 
find marked similarities in the way creative 
people proceed. To take an idea, an image and 
force all detail into a preconceived order is to 
make the work rigid. One would fail then to 
respond to interior contradictions, suggestions, 
new lines of thought, images, colour and form. 
Each decision on how to proceed must be perceived 
clearly-evaluated and re-evaluated. Our perception 
needs to be open, flexible. Not set solely upon one 
solution, but able to perceive multiple solutions 
to a problem. Finally we transcer} conscious acts. 
Then a truly creative act emerges. ` 
This leads to the next area of definition. 
The Creative Process 
If Guilford and his followers are concerned primarily with the 
abilities or nature of the creative person, others sees the process as 
supremely important. Indeed, the-American Patent Office in its legal 
definition of an invention once defined it as a process which creates: 
( 
It is the giving birth to a new idea capable of physical embodiment, 
2) 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Merwin, H. C., Patentability of Invention, Boston, Little, Brown 
and Co., 1883, p. 10. 
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Torrance defines creative thinking as: 
the process of sensing gaps or disturbing 
missing elements, forming hypotheses concern- 
ing them; testing these hypotheses and communi- 
cating the results, possiblylrodifying and 
restesting the hypothesis. '1 
However this would seem to have more to do with scientific and problem- 
solving situations than artistic ones (although it does link with 
Witkin's idea of a sensate problem). 
Pickard sees it like this: 
Creativity which is a way of knowing involves 
the knower in the reinterpretation of ideas 
and events as he has come to know them. It 
requires that reality be transformed in some 
way. In order to change something we must 
first understand it if our action is to have 
meaning and we are to grasp the implications 
of the changes we make. An important step, 
therefore, in all our transformations of 
reality is that of our understanding and 
interpretation of subjects and events, for 
according to our construction of reality so 
we shall set about reconstructing- it. (2) 
(She therefore rules out the possibility of young children being 
creative as they have insufficient grasp of reality, a point which is 
discussed later in Chapter Two. ) She continues: 
A creative transformation is a process. 
Apprehension of the issue or problem is a 
first step in the process though it may well 
be preceded by less conscious activity ..... 
A creative process does not guarantee a 
creative outcome. A process may fail to 
produce a conclusion or it may lead to a 
conclusion that is not recognised as creative 
either by the individual responsible for the 
process or by society at large. - 
(1) Torrance, E. P., Guiding Creative Talent, op. cit. P. 76. 
(2) Op. cit. Pp. 14 - 17. 
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Such a definition leaves room for a wider definition of creativity 
as Tyson suggests: 
How valid is it to talk of creativity in human 
relationships, for example? A housewife and 
mother, providing a happy supportive back- 
ground for her family, may be being creative, 
although it may not be possible to a$sgss what 
ll appears to be an intangible product. 
Fromnd2defines what he calls his second type of creativity - not 
that of creating something new like a symphony or poem but creativity 
as a character trait - the ability to see (or to be aware) and to 
respond. He sees it operating within the self and in relation to 
others and concludes: 
Let me say again that creativity in this sense does 
not refer to a quality which particularly gifted 
persons or artists would achieve, but to an attitude 
which every human being shares and can achieve. 
Education for creativity is nothing short of educa- 
tion for living. 
Thus he sees the creative potentialities as an interacting process, 
unlike Rogers, Maslow or Guilford who have more of a sense of communica- 
tion, energy, stimulae flowing outwards. 
Cottle takes up the point of the uncertainty of the outcome of 
the creative process: 
For although the creative act is not one in 
which there is total conscious control of 
technique creativity does require an ability 
to start with certain ideas and to be able to 
assess and perhaps change goals and ideas as the 
work in progress. Often, too, it requires one 
to be able to work yJ hout knowing where one's 
project is heading. l 
(1) Tyson, M., Creativity, in Foss (ed. ), New Horizons in Psychologyr, 
Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1966, pp. 167 - 182. 
(2) Fromm, E., The Creative Attitude, in Anderson, H. (ed. ), Creativity 
and Its Cultivation, New York, Harper Row, 1958, pp. 44 - 45. 
(3) op. cit. 
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Mackinnon also stresses the adaptiveness necessary in the process. 
It fulfils three conditions: It involves a response or an idea that is 
novel or, at the very least, statistically sicrnificant. 
(1) 
It must be 
adaptive to reality : 
It must serve to solve a problem, fit a situa- 
tion or accomplish some recognisable goal .... 
It involves the sustaining of the original 
insight, an evaluation and elaboration of it, 
a developing of it to the full. Creativity 
from this point of view, is a process extended 
in time and characterised by originality, 
adaptiveness and realisation. It may be brief, 
as in musical improvisation, or it may involve 
a considerable span or years as was required by 
Darwin's creation of the theory of evolution. 
Bruner's definition also includes both process and product for 
he claims it demands: 
a high degree of motivation and persistence, 
passion and decorum, commitment and detach- 
ment; it demands intellectual and emotional 
openness and flexibility and fluency in think- 
ing. The created object (idea) is the product 
of such a process and its creation requires 
that the raw material, the initial inspirational 
sources, be transformed. This means that the 
artist (scientist) selects, changes, fashions 
the initial material by a process of will and 
decision, into a 'final articulated form which in 
the end bears little resemblance to the raw 
material, and is finflýy detached from the maker's 
personal motivation. 2 
Inherent in this type of definition is the notion that creativity is, 
at least to some degree, an innate gift, talent and temperamental 
disposition. Thus his definition combines much of the previous 
thinking. 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Quoted in Dudek, S. Z., Creativity in Young Children - Attitude or 
Ability, op. cit. 
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Roger's definition also takes up this point: 
My definition, then, of the creati, 
that it is the emergence in action 
relational product, growing out of 
of the individual on the one hand, 
events, people or circumstances of 
other . (1) 
He has, however, already stated: 
ve process is 
of a novel, 
the uniqueness 
and the materials, 
his life on the 
Creativity is not in my judgement, restricted 
to some particular content. I am assuming 
that there is no fundamental difference in the 
creative process as it is evidenced in painting 
a picture, composing a symphony, devising new 
instruments of killing, developing a scientific 
theory or creating new formings of one's own 
personality as in psychotherapy. 
This links back to the Laub-Novak quotation cited earlier on p. 70. 
Marsh introduces the term discovery: 
Creativity is not possible without discovery, for 
when an individual thinks or acts creatively, he 
is discovering something previously unknown to 
him. As a child explores a given musical problem, 
he may think in ways that are new to him, and, in 
so doing, make discoveries, or find solutions which 
he may then apply to further musical expression. (2) 
Discovery is also one of the fundamental activities in the 
Manhattanville Music Curriculum Project. 
(3) 
As the basic position 
regarding the nature of the student was obtained from the works of 
Bruner, Holt, Piaget, Parnes and others it is not surprising that: 
inductive, deductive and intuitive reasoning, 
the discovery-orientated strategies and the 
obvious concern for the development of analy- 
tical, judicial and creative thinking were all 
consistent with decisions regarding the nature 
of the learner. 
(1) Rogers, C., Towards a Theory of Creativity (1959), in Vernon (ed. ), 
Creativity, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, p. 139- 
(2) Marsh, M. V., Explore and Discover Music, Ontario, Collier - 
Macmillan Ltd, 1970, p. 4- 
(3) Manhattanville Music Curriculum Project, New York, Media Materials 
Inc, 19959 PP. 15 - 16. 
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Discovery is further defined as 'creative discovery' and distinguished 
from 'clever observation' which is defined as 'recognition of factors 
which, while they may evoke a personal response are basically external' 
Walker, however, questions these claims: 
The argument is detailed and intricate but 
not entirely convincing, for how can one 
discover entirely from personal experience 
the intrinsic values of a historical work 
of art? If one cannot, then where in the 
scheme of things does an education for an 
appreciation for such works of art come? 
In the detailed content of cycles and 
strategies it appears that one should 
explore a particular aspect of musical 
language and then listen to recordings of 
works which exemplify this. But this comes 
after extensive examination of the works com- 
pleted by students in the exploring process. 
This exploring is in fact a problem-solving 
situation in the manner expounded by Bruner. 
Thus concept under tanding is the primary goal 
of the curriculum 1J. 
Although this type of learning situation may be seen as a modern 
development, Froebel in 1879(2) suggested that educators took their cues 
from the early learning activities of children. He urged then: 
to comprehend the earliest activity of the 
child, the impulse to spontaneous and personal 
activity, to encourage the impulse to self- 
culture and self-instruction through self- 
shaping, self-observation and self-testing. 
He considered knowing, feeling and willing as the three activities of 
the mind. He advocated the involvement of the child with as many 
sensory experiences as possible - sound (song and rhythmic bodily 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Froebel, P. trans. Barnard, H., Papers on Froebel's Kindergarten 
with suggestions of Principles and Methods of Child Culture, 
Syracuse, New York, C. W. Bardeen, Publisher, 1879. 
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movement), modelling, drawing, painting, printing. He believed that 
nothing is more contrary to nature than to forbid a young child the 
use of its hand. 
Although these methods may seem a modern development in music 
education, it is interesting to read this passage from Yorke Trotter: 
The aim of the teacher should always be to 
develop the innate feeling for music in the 
child. This can best be brought about by 
causing the pupil to do things himself. One 
of the best means of developing the feeling is 
to cause the pupil to finish a theme, as soon 
as sufficient material has been given. The 
teacher sings or plays a phrase, the pupil at 
once sings an answer to it. From the answer 
the teacher learns if the first principles of 
musical construction are in the child's mind. 
If the answer is a suitable response to what is 
given, the tonalitive principle of key centre 
is present. It will be found that the principle 
of reiteration appears when a certain stage is 
reached. The child will reproduce the material 
that appears in the question, not generally as 
mere repetition, but as development. The length 
of the phrase that is offered depends on how much 
the child can hold in his mind. Obviously, a very 
young child can only assimilate a very short phrase; 
an older child can understand long phrases; and will 
be able to sing complete melodies without modulation 
to different keys. In every case the answer must 
be given without premeditation. It must be the 
intuitive expression of the pupil's feelings. 
Answers made by consideration of the various factors 
of the given theme are of no service in developing 
musical feeling. Unles there is spontaneity, there 
can be no good results. 
. 
1) 
It is clear from this that he has considerable experience in this work 
and this conclusion echoes the findings of other people working in 
creating music with children that will be discussed later. It is 
interesting to note too that he recommends an intuitive response and 
(i) Trotter, Y., Principles of Musicianship, London, Bosworth & Co Ltd, 
Published at the beginning of the century, p. xc. 
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the suspense of critical faculties in common with the American writers 
on creativity of some 50 years later. 
Dewey in the early 20th century was also advocating deflective 
enquiry', and the process rather than the product as educationally 
more sound, for the use in inquiry of doubt, of tentative suggestion, 
of experimentation will help deal with the problems in the future. 
School subjects may be used as: 
presenting problems to be solved by personal 
reflection and experimentation, and by 
acquiring definite bodies of knowledge leading 
later to more specialised scientific knowledge. 
This involves again the linking of artistic creation with problem- 
solving techniques (although it is clear that some musicians are unhappy 
about this). 
Bronowski(, 2) however, distinguishes among discovery, invention 
and creation by pointing out that Columbus discovered the West, Bell 
invented the telephone and Shakespeare created Othello. A fact is 
discovered, and a theory invented, but only a masterpiece is created - 
for creation must involve the whole mind. 
Koestler's 
(3) 
definition of creativity also centres round the 
creative act, which for him is the bringing together of simultaneously 
activities occurring at several levels of the mind distant from one 
another. The mind is conceived as a pyramid in which habits or skills 
(1) Dewey, J., How We Think, in The Middle Works 1899-1924, Vol. 6, 
Illinois, Southern Illinois Press, 1910-11, p. 312. 
(2) Bronowski, J., The Creative Process, Scientific American 199: 3, 
1958, pp. 58 - 66. 
(3) Koestler, A., The Act of Creation, London, Hutchinson, 1964. 
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at various levels and distances from one another can suddenly come 
into contact. The term 'bisociative' refers to the sudden integration 
of two dissimilar hierarchically ordered habits or skills in the pyramid. 
So there are three groups of definitions of creativity available 
in terms of product, ability or process. They are interrelated in 
most writings but in all cases creativity is concerned with people 
not equipment or activities. Activities and equipment can only be 
said to be creative in so far as they help people display or develop 
their own creativity. It is clear from this discussion that creativity 
is an umbrella term that includes within it several different concepts 
which have common to them terms like imagination, fantasy, curiosity 
and originality. Elliott concludes: 
Even the present confusion of the concept, 
once we have charted its contributory features, 
can be seen as a fair reflection of our 
human situation. If the concept yokes 
together real or apparent incompatibles, 
by doing so it presents us with problems 
which we have to face in any case in life. 
We have to decide concerning the relative 
values of the arts and sciences; we have 
to choose between or find a way of reconcil- 
ing achievement in the recognised disciplines 
and the cure of the soul; how far to seek 
innovation; how far to e content with success 
in a stable convention. 
ý1) 
He stresses the importance of the individual teacher discovering what 
creativity (or creativeness) means for him and the degree of importance 
he attaches to it. 
Mooney goes to great length to show that these three approaches 
and a freedom of examining the environment that facilitates creativity 
are at heart a unity, drawing a picture of a living being as having 
four essential conditions: 
(1) Op. cit. 
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1. 'Out' 'his belonging to the universe as a 
whole' (the environment), 
2. 'In', 'his being integrative of the whole' 
(the person), 
3. 'Out and in and out and in again and again', 
'his continual coming to be through give and 
take, incoming and outgoing' (the process), 
4. 'Fit', 'his continued fitting of specific incomings 
and outgoings, his rendering potentialities actuqL}) 
in concrete sequential instances' (the product). 
He follows this fourfold unity through into the works of artists, 
applying it in music to the elementary conditions: 1) harmony, 
2) melody, 3) rhythm, the fitting of which makes, 4) a song. 
Summary 
Elliott sees two concepts of creativity - the traditional one and 
the more modern. The traditional is linked with the idea of the 
creation myth, of God creating something out of nothing with the 
traditional view of the artist's having God-given ability. (Some 
people see this as setting humans apart from animals. ) The 
traditional view was modified by Nietszche who places man in God's 
role. Creativity thus becomes self-realisation which is interpreted 
in various ways - as a form of therapy, as a working out of neuroses 
(Freud) as a solution to a inner sense to problem (Storr and Witkin), 
as part of the drive to self-duplication (Gutman), as a bringing 
about of an internal order (Laub-Novak), as a means of relating to 
the outer world (Dudek), as an expression of one's own personality 
(Maslow and Cottle). The modern concept of creativity came about 
(1) Mooney, R. L., A Conceptual Model for Integrating Four Approaches 
to the Identification of Creative Talent, in Parnes, S. J., and 
Harding, H. F., (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, 
New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 74 - 84" 
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through the linking of the trends in the Progressive Education 
Movement with society's need for inventors in the field of science 
and technology. Its characteristic is that creativity is the 
potential property of many people and that it consists in the having 
of novel ideas arising from a problem with no known solution or from 
a free play of fancy. Some writers see the traditional concept of 
creativity relating to artists and the modern to scientists and see 
dangers in trying to equate or confuse these two forms of creativity. 
They do, however, have in common features like imagination, fantasy, 
curiosity, discovery and originality. There has been much modern 
research into creativity - on the creative products, the creative 
process, the characteristics of people who produce creative products 
and environmental factors that favour creativity. Definitions of 
creativity centre on one of these. There is a problem in defining 
'novel' products and a question mark over whether children can be 
original and whether artists really need to be original or can be just 
beautiful. Creative characteristics include amongst others divergent 
thinking abilities. There is a dispute about whether creativity is a 
general capacity or can only be applied to specific areas. A definition 
centred on the processes includes the idea of transforming reality in 
some way and may include problem-solving. Thus there are two concepts 
of creativity and three interlinked areas of definition. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE. PROCESSES. OF CREATIVITY 
Introduction 
In this letter of Tchaikovsky we see him battling with the nature 
of the creative process: 
You ask if, in composing this symphony I had 
a special programme in view. To such questions 
regarding my symphonic works I generally answer: 
nothing of the kind. In reality it is very 
difficult to answer the question. How interpret 
these vague feelings which pass through one during 
the composition of an instrumental work, without 
reference to any definite subject? It is a purely 
lyrical process. A kind of musical shriving of 
the soul, in which there is an encrustation of 
material which flows forth again in notes just as 
the typical poet pours himself out in verse. The 
difference consists in the fact that music possesses 
far richer means of expression and is a more subtle 
medium in which to translate tý} e thousand shifting 
moments in the mood of a soul. 1) 
There has been much research into how this process with which 
Tchaikovsky is grappling operates. Ribot(2) attempts to express this 
by distinguishing two types of imagination - sensorial which has its 
origins without, and affective which begins within and includes music. 
Other writers such as Poincare and Henry James see it as a one flash 
experience at the moment of illumination. 
Jung combines the two by seeing the person and the process as 
distinct: 
(1) Tchaikovsky, P., Letter (1878), in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970. 
(2) Ribo. t, T., Essa on the Creative Ima ination, Chicago, Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1906, p. 220. 
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Every creative person is a duality of 
contradictory attitudes. On the one 
side he is a human being with a personal 
life, while on the other side he is an 
impersonal creative process. (1) 
Other descriptions of the process try to marry these two elements - 
the affective and the structural. 
It does also seem important for creative people to understand 
something of their own creative process, a view expounded by Taylor. 
(2) 
However, it must be said that there are some people who believe that 
the following description of the stages in a linear model is unsuccess- 
ful and that the process must be seen as a whole e. g. Sanford. 
(3) 
(More will be said of this after the linear model has been discussed. 
) 
The Linear Model 
Carl Wallas(4) produced the first general description of the 
creative process. He took the German physicist, Helmholtz's writings 
as a basis. Helmholtz identified three stages: 
a) a stage of laborious preparation or loading 
up of ideas during which he makes himself 
familiar with all the "turns and complexities' 
of the problem that he can think of while 
away from his desk, 
(1) Jung, C. G., Psychology and Literature, in Chiselin, B., The Creative 
Process, New York, Mentor Books, 1952, p. 220. 
(2) Taylor, A. I,, The Nature of the Creative Process, in Smith, P. (ed. ), 
Creativity: An Examination of the Creative Process, New York, 
Hastings House, 1959, pp. 51 - 82. 
(3) Sanford, N., Will Psychologists study Human Problems? American 
Psychologist, XX, 1965, pp. 192 - 202. 
(4) Wallas, G., The Art of Thought (1926), in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, pp. 91 - 2. 
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b) a resting stage leading up to: 
ca condition of freshness in which the 
happy thought occurs. (1) 
And this is Helmholtz's description at a banquet in 1891 of how his 
most important new thoughts came to him: 
in all directions .., happy ideas come 
unexpectedly without effort, like an 
inspiration. So far as I am concerned, 
they have never come to me when my mind 
was fatigued, or when I was at my working 
table ... They come particularly readily 
during the slow ascent of wooded hills on a 
sunny day. 
01 From this and from the mathematician on Poincare, 
(2) 
Wallas identifies 
four stages - Preparation in which the problem is investigated fully in 
all directions; the second stage when he is not consciously thinking 
about the problem, which he calls Incubation; the third consisting 
of the appearance of the happy idea, which he calls Illumination. 
He added a fourth stage not included in Helmholtz but in Poincare - 
Verification. But he continues: 
In the daily stream of thought these four 
stages constantly overlap each other as we 
explore different problems. 
Hutchinson(3) identifies four similar stages which he called the 
stages of preparation or orientation, the stage of frustration, the 
period or moment of insight, the stage of verification, elaboration or 
evaluation. The stages and their interrelatedness have been verified 
by experimental work in a variety of ways. These include interviews, 
introspective reports, questionnaires, observations of individuals 
(1) Helmholtz, H. Von, Vortrag und Reden, 5th Aufl., Braunschweig, F. 
Vieweg und Sohn, 1896, Vol. 1, p. 15. 
(2) Poincare, Science et Methode, Paris, Flammarion, 1908, P. 314. 
(3) Hutchinson, E. D., How to think creatively, New York, Abingdon 
Cokesbury, 1949, p. 237" 
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in specially designed situations, analyses of work sheets, and general 
knowledge of and experience with creative individuals. 
Patrick 
(1) (2) 
studying poets and non-poets, painters and non- 
painters and Eindhoven and Vinacke(3) suggested that the process is 
the same in people in professions generally regarded as requiring 
creativeness and in non-professionals, although there were differences 
in technique, speed and attack. Lowenfeld(4) too saw (see p. 68) 
creativeness as a faculty which, if developed in childhood, will 
transfer to any sphere and extolled the Russian idea of allowing a 
young child's creativity to develop freely before channelling it 
into political ends. 
Mackinnon saw five stages: 
1. A period of separation during which one 
acquires the skills and techniques and 
the elements of experience which make it 
possible for one to pose a problem to 
oneself. 
2. A period of concentrated effort to solve 
the problem, which may be suddenly solved 
without delay or difficulty, but which 
perhaps more often involves so much 
frustration and tension and discomfort 
that out of sheer self-preservation one 
is led to, 
(1) Patrick, C., Creative Thought in Poets, Archives of Psychology 
Vol. 26,1935, PP. 1- 74. 
(2) Patrick, C., Creative Thought in Artists, Journal of Psycholot! LV, 
19379 pp. 35 - 73. 
(3) Eindhoven, T. E. and Vinacke, W. E., Creative Processes in Painting, 
Journal of General Psychology, XLVII, 1952, pp. 139 - 64. 
(4) Lowenfeld, V., Creativity: Education's Stepchild, in Parnes, S. J. 
and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, 
New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 9 -17. 
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3. A period of withdrawal from the problem, a 
psychological going out of the field, a 
period of renunciation of the problem or 
recession from it, 
4. A period of in-sight accompanied by 
exhilaration, glow and elation of the "ah 
ah" experience. Mater in the article he 
sees this as 'the meaning of serendipity, 
the finding of valuable or agreeable things 
not sought for!, 
5. A period of verification, evaluation and 
elaboration of the insights which one has 
experienced. (1) 
It can be seen that he has added a period of skill acquisition and the 
idea of a problem to the process and sees the incubation stage (his 
withdrawal) as an escape from the tensions it creates which are 
resolved in the insight. 
Sparshott sets out five stages based on Robert Graves and 
T. S. Eliot: 
First comes the original formulation of a 
problem or conceiving of a theme (preceded 
possibly by the poet finding himself excited, 
troubled or sensitised). Second comes a 
period of random search not directed by the 
will, unconscious incubation, and so on. 
Third comes the flash of insight, a relief 
from the suspense or tension, a sense of how 
things will go together. Fourth comes the 
deliberate elaboration of this insight; and 
fifth is the criticism and refinement of the 
elaborated solution. (2) 
Here elaboration and verification are divided. However, it must be 
added that Sparshott cast considerable doubt as to the accuracy of 
this view of the creative process, putting forward Collingwood's 
account of artistic expression: 
(3) 
(1) Mackinnon, D., Identifying and Developing Creativity, Journal of 
Secondary Education, Vo1.38,1963, pp. 166'- 174. 
(2) Sparshott, F. E., Every Horse Has A Mouth: A Personal Poetics, in 
Dutton, D. and Krausz, M. (eds. ), The Concept of Creativity in 
Science and Art, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publications, 1981, 
PP. 47 - 73. 
(3) Collingwood, R. G., The Principles of Art, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1938. 
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Here there is no determinate in first stage, no 
known structured message to be encoded. There 
is only an encoding that is at the same time of 
deciphering. The creative process is a passage 
from unclarity to clarity, the imparting of 
structures to inchoate feeling. But this is 
seen not as a passage from beginning to end, as 
though the clarification were brought about by 
the successive application of even finer filters, 
but as the arrival of an absolute beginning. So 
there is and there is not a process: there is, 
because the artist has progressed from unclarity 
to clarity, and what he has clarified is in an 
unexplained sense the 'same feeling' that he began 
with, but there is not, because the end has the 
status of an absolute beginning in the light of 
which earlier stages are of no account, sublated, 
aufgehoben, or something. And what is transmitted 
from artist to public is supposed to be in a code 
or to admit of decoding because the artist's 
encoding was also a deciphering and all paths of 
transmission are magically bi-passed. This is 
strange stuff indeed, but the strangeness may be 
demanded by the nature of the case. Attempts to 
apply information theory to art seem to fail just 
because they see no need for such oddness. They 
simply take it for granted that a work of art is 
the encoded version of the pre-exist4ng message 
that the artist wishes to transmit. lJ 
This view is included here for completeness. Less simple ways of 
viewing the process are dealt with after looking at the stages in detail. 
Sparshott sees the whole process as a 'giving birth to beauty' - the 
triggering experience being insemination, the initial formulation being 
conception, the incubation period being gestation, the moment of 
intuition being the moment of birth and the phases of elaboration and 
criticism being the yielding of nature to nurture and the infant grasp 
of movement and speech and social skills. He sees our adoption of 
this model as much religious as evidentual, giving art the status of 
the birth of a new being and sees its roots in the 18th century notion 
of a genius who is less of a fabricator than the place where an autonomous 
and natural evolution takes place. (This links with the divine myth 
definition of creativity in Chapter One. ) 
(1) Sparshott, op. cit. 
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Rossuran broke down the process in a study of over 700 
productive inventors into seven stages (and they are very similar 
to those outlined by Osborn). 
(1) 
1. Observation of a need or difficulty, 
2. Analysis of the need, 
3. Survey of all available information, 
4. Formulation of objective solutions, 
5. Critical analysis of the solutions 
for their advantages and disadvantages, 
6. The birth of the new idea - the invention, 
7. Experimentation to test out the most 
promising solution, and the selection and 
perfection of the final embodiment by some 
or all of the previous steps. (2) 
The list is very similar to Wallas but for the reference to 
incubation in the Wallas list. However, reading Rossuran more 
fully shows that there is an incubation period with intermittent 
recurrence of the idea during it, as will be noted by Patrick later 
in a more detailed look at this period. 
Guilford(3) infers from this type of analysis that the process of 
problem-solving and creative production are similar. Indeed, Vinacke 
defines a 'creative situation' as one in which realistic thinking and 
(1) Osborn, A. F., Developments in Creative Education, in Parnes, S. J. 
and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative ThfnkiTR, 
New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 19 - 24. 
(2) Rossman, J., The Psychology of the Inventor, Washington D. C., 
Inventors Publishing Co., 1931, P. 57. 
(3) Guilford,. J. P., Intellectual Factors in Productive Thinking, 
in Mooney and Razik (ede. ), Explorations in Creativi , 
New York, Harper and Row, 1967, p. 97. 
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imagination are combined. It: 
resembles a problem situation as soon as 
the effort commences to achieve the final 
product or to convert the feelings, images, 
plots etc. into a tangible medium. (1) 
He goes on to see the instigating factor as a personal need for self 
expression or self-realisation, the creation being governed more by 
autistic factors than realistic demands and the goal being not the 
solution to a problem but the satisfaction of the internal needs of 
the creator. The creator, however, differs from the dreamer in that 
he: 
must be guided by the nature of the medium 
with which he is dealing, by the demands 
inherent in relating one part to another, 
and by the tangible organisation of the final 
externalised product. 
Dewey writes that a complete act of thought has five more or 
less logical stages: 
aa felt difficulty, 
b its location and definition, 
c) the suggestion of a possible solution, 
d} the development by reasoning of the 
suggestion, 
e) further observation and experiment leading 
to acceptance and rejection. (2) 
But he has been misused by some authorities for he is not describing 
a lengthy creative process but rather logical steps in thinking. He 
therefore omits the need to rest before illumination and the time order 
(1) Vinacke, E. W., Creative Thinking, in Vinacke, E. W., The Psrchlo 
of Thinking, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1952, pp. 238 - I. 
(2) Dewey, J., How We Think, New York, Heath & Co., 1910, p. 224. 
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of the different stages. All of his steps may occur in one stage of 
the process, as in preparation. In that stage one may get an idea, 
follow it up, or reject it. 
Stein prefers a three-fold division of the process into: 
1. Hypothesis formation, 
2. Hypothesis testing, 
3. Communication of the results. ' 
Motivation 
Rossman(2) lists a number of suggested motives: the Gestalt view 
as a desire to complete a configuration viewed as incomplete; needs 
arising from the subconscious; self-expression; necessity; the 
instinct of workmanship; the behaviourist view of stimulus and 
response; chance; imitation (the correspondence of man-made things 
with things in nature); the inventive faculty which he divides into 
reproductive (memory), constructive (invention of symbols or words) 
and creative (governed by emotions, desires). 
Kris(3) saw it in psychoanalytical terms, that the artist was 
trying to solve a personal problem. This clearly links with Freud. 
It is refined by Witkin(4) who sees the driving force as a sensate 
problem. It links with Hutchinson(5) who distinguishes the systematic 
(1) Stein, M., Creativity as an intra-personal and inter-personal 
process, in Parnes, S. J., and Harding, H. F. (ed. ), A Source Book 
of Creative Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, 
PP. 85 - 92. 
(2) Op. cit., PP. 197 - 215. 
(3) Kris, E., Psychoanalysis and the Study of Creative Imagination, 
Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 1953, pp. 334 - 51. 
(4) Witkin, R., The Intelligence of Feeling, London, Heinemann, 1974. 
(5) Hutchinson, E. D., How to Think Creatively, New York, Abingdon 
Cokesbury, 1949, p. 237. 
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thinking and 'creative insight' which are extreme ends of a scale with 
the varying factor being 'the degree of psychic frustration'. 
Greenacre takes issue with the attitudes that the artist's product 
is a result of the narcissism of the artist and sees the artist as 
carrying on'a collective love-affair' with the world and the art 
products as having: 
the character of the love gift to be brought 
as near perfection as possible and tg1iýe 
presented with pride in his giving .l1 
Gowan 
(2) 
lists among others that it is the function of the child's 
oedipal response to the affectional approach of the opposite sexed 
theory so that boys who were close to their mothers and girls who were 
close to their fathers will become more creative than others. (Such 
a theory also explains why there appear to be more creative men than 
women, ) 
Ribot(3) sees the origin of the creative process in mans' needs, 
appetites, tendencies, desires including those for individual preserva- 
tion (resulting in food getting, housing etc. ), individual and social 
expression (resulting in military, commercial, industrial inventions 
and in its disinterested form, aesthetic creation), sexual fulfillment 
(with effects on art and everyday life), and the need of knowing and 
explaining leading to myths, religion, philosophical systems, hypothesis. 
He concludes: 
(1) Greenacre, P., The Childhood of the Artist: Libidinal Phase Develop- 
ment and Giftedness, in Ruitenbeck, H. M., The Creative Imagination, 
Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965, Pp. 161 - 91. 
(2) Gowan, J. C., What makes a gifted child creative? Four Theories, in 
Gowan, J. C., Demos, C. D., Torrance, P. E. (compilers), Creativity: Its 
Educational Implications, New York, London, Wiley, 1967, pp. 9- 15. 
(3) Op. cit., P. 315. 
I 
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Every want, tendency or desire may, then, become 
creative, by itself or associated with others, 
and into these final elements it is that analysis 
must resolve "creative spontaneity". This vague 
expression corresponds to a sum, not to a special 
property. Every invention, then, has a motor 
origin; the ultimate base of the constructive 
imagination is motor. 
He goes on to include one more element: 
But needs and desires by themselves cannot create - 
they are only a stimulus and a spring. Whence arises 
the need of the second condition - the spontaneous 
arrival of images. 
This may be what writers call inspiration. 
Other drives have already been suggested in the section on 
definitions. Maslow(') and Rogers(2) favour the drive for self- 
actualisation. Sinnott sees in it: 
a searching ...... for something still inchoate, 
unformed, wh4. o is seeking, so to speak, to reach 
expression. ) 
Stein writes of a: 
state of disequilibrium - one might say 
homeostasis is disturbed or that there is a 
lack of closure, or, from a hedonistic point 
of view, that the individual experiences a 
lack of satisfaction with the existing state 
of affairs ...... The creative person has a 
lower threshold, a greater sensitivity for the 
gaps or the lack of closure that exists in the 
environment. The sensitivity to these gaps in 
any one case may stem largely from forces in týe 
environment or from forces in the individual. i4) 
(1) Maslow, A. H., Creativity in Self-actualising People, Lecture for 
Creativity Symposium, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 
February 28,1958. 
(2) Rogers, C., Towards a Theory of Creativity+in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
-1970, pp. 
137 - 151- 
(3) Sinnott, E. W., The Creativeness of Life, in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, pp. 107 - 115. 
(4) Stein, M. A., Creativity and Culture, in Mooney and Razik (eds. ), Explora 
tions in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, p. 110. 
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Taylor(l) says that capacity to be puzzled is an important character- 
istic of a creative person. The ability 'to know when you don't 
know' may be a crucial ability. 
Ghiselin also seen the creative person as working from a sense 
of dissatisfaction with the established order to the attainment 
of a new one: 
The creative process is the process of 
change, of development, of evolution, in 
the organisation of subjective life. 
(2) 
The creative person works 'from the unrealised towards realisation', 
a process that involves the will in the preparation and revision stage 
and the unconscious in between (but the unconscious processes 
"are 
induced and focused by intense conscious effort'). The completion 
of the work is evaluated by determining whether 'it will serve 
to 
organise experience in a fresh and full and useful way'. 
Elsewhere he rejects the view that creativity is an expression 
of a neurosis: 
Creation is not the exploitation of any 
fixation, hidden or overt. It is always 
to some extent an assault on fixation. Ot is the result o] the need to transcend 
the life that is defined in established 
configurations, whether conscious or 
unconscious. (3) 
Patrick(4) starts with the idea of a want and shows how in the 
(1) Taylor, C. W., A Tentative Description of the Creative Individual, 
in Parnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative 
Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 169 - 85- 
(2) Chiselin, B. (ed. ), Introduction to The Creative Process, New Tork, 
Mentor Books, 1952, pp. 11 - 13. 
(3) Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process and its Relation to the Identifi- 
cation of Creative Talent, in Thylor, C. W. (ed. ), The 1955 University 
of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Creative Talent, 
Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1956, pp. 195 - 203- 
(4) Patrick, C., How Creative Thought is Related to Thinking, American 
Psychologist, IV9 19499 p. 266. 
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preparation stage ideas related to past experience and the problem 
occur but do not fulfil the want; even the original idea in its 
original form fails to meet the want and is superceded by irrelevant 
ones-, but the pre-solution idea as it recurs is modified in different 
mental sets and finally recurs in a form to terminate the unfulfilled 
want; illumination occurs and the solution is reached, which is then 
revised to compare with accepted standards involving processes of 
perception and judgement. 
Indeed when it comes to the problem of motivation writers are 
almost equally divided between those who see the starting point of 
the creative drive as some sort of problem - in the case of the arts an 
emotional or 'sensate' problem - and those who maintain that a certain 
level of security is necessary before taking the risk of creative work 
and therefore the problem must have been worked through before the 
creative process can even start. For example, Tumin sees a certain 
degree of 'status-assurance' as necessary for creative life, which he 
calls a 'self-consummating experience' as opposed to 'instrumental 
actions' which are primarily orientated towards end results. He writes: 
For those individuals - the rare few-who break 
through to individuality and creativity without 
status assurance, the creative life serves as a 
compensation for, the equilibration, if you wish, 
of the imbalance presented in the status-life. 
Most individuals, however, cannot and will not dare 
take the challenre of the creative life until they 
reach a cois4derable amount of status-safety and 
assurance. l1 
Wertheimer adopts a problem-solving model and identifies two kinds 
of links between the beginning of the thought process and the solution 
of the problem. In one the links arise from the forces in the structure 
(1) T= in, M., Obstacles to Creativity, in Parnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, Charles 
Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 105 - 113. 
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of the objective situation and personal interests play no role or only 
a minor one. In the other the individual's personal needs are the 
source of the problem, but even here one must gain access to the 
objective structural requirements and the problem may remain unsolved 
. 
if one focuses only on his own needs. The person does need to have 
certain characteristics: 
An attitude is implied on his part, a willingness 
to face problems straight, a readiness to follow 
them up courageously and sincerely, a desire for 
improvement, in contrtsý with arbitrary, wilful 
or slavish attitudes. 1 
He identifies various types of problem-solving situations - one which 
is in a chain of events, one which leads only to the realisation that 
all that exists is not 'in good order' and a third (in some instances 
of artistic creation) where the goal to be achieved comes first and 
the individual may proceed 'from above as he tries to concretise it 
in all its parts'-or attempt to get the central idea clearer or get 
the parts more clearly in focus; but even in these he sees the critical 
elements being 'determined by the nature of the inner structural require- 
ments'. He illustrates it from Galileo's discovery of the law of 
inertia and Einstein's thinking that led to the theory of relativity. 
Inspiration 
But it is not entirely clear where inspiration fits into the scheme, 
although it has been mentioned earlier. It is a dilemma that Stephen 
Spender puts succinctly: 
Inspiration is the beginning of a poem and it 
is also its final goal. It is the first idea 
(1) Wertheimer, M., Productive Thinking, New York, Harper, 1945, p. 224. 
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which drops into the poet's mind and it is 
the final idea which he at last achieves 
in words. In between this start and this 
winning post, tee is the hard race, the 
sweat and toil. l) 
Writers sometimes take the initial idea from without, sometimes 
within. -iowe11(2) writes: 
Sometimes the external stimulus which has 
produced the poem is known or can be traced. 
It may be a slight sound, a thought or an 
emotion. Sometimes the conscious has no 
records of the initial impulse, which has 
either been forgotten or springs from deep, 
unrealised memory. But whatever it is, 
emotion, apprehended or hidden, is a part of 
it for only emotion can rouse the subconscious 
into action. 
Jenny Fowler gives a composer's account of inspiration and its 
role in the creative process: 
So, in the beginning there is an idea, a plan: 
partly map, partly seed. It has to be flexible 
enough to allow things to happen. As one makes 
progress into the piece, so one constantly returns 
to the beginning to allow that first page to carry 
the right implications. Through writing the piece, 
one modifies the original plan, so for a long time 
there is constant interaction between the plan-in- 
advance and the piece as it actually emerges. 
I suppose the necessity for this interaction 
arises because one starts with an idea for some 
suitable ground rules, and also an idea of the piece 
as a-whole. The final reconciliation between these 
two things requires an "elegant solution" (to borrow 
the language of mathematics). I find that the 
"solution" needs to be forged anew for each new piece, 
and this means that even a piece of modest scope seems 
to generate a seemingly disproportionate amount of 
effort, and also that it is very difficult to tell in 
advance how long the creation of the piece will take, 
(3) 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Lowell, A., The Process of Making Poetry, in Ghiselin, B. (ed. ), 
The Creative Process, New York, Mentor Book, 1952, p. 110. 
(3) Fowler, J., My Own Ears, NMA4, Victorian Ministry for the Arts, 
1985, pp. 3-6. 
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Stages in the Process : Preparation 
This leads to an examination of the stages the creative process. 
The linear model will be examined first. The first stage of Wallas 
includes the first three of Rossman's, the first two of Mackinnon'e and 
is part of Stein's first stage. 
Wallas sees this stage as including: 
the whole process of intellectual education ...... the whole traditional one of logic, the mathemati- 
cal forms which are the logic of the modern 
experimental sciences and the methods of systematic 
and continuous examination of present and recorded 
phenomena which are the basis of .... "observational" 
sciences as well as the "problem attijucýe" or habit 
of setting the mind a clear question 
M. 
Taylor 
(2) 
takes Wallas's description but calls the preparation stage 
'exposure' and stresses the need to absorb life experiences without 
conscious awareness of how useful they might be and without a need to 
categorise each experience. This is particularly relevant to later 
discussions on how to prepare children for creativity and create a bank 
of sound experiences upon which to draw in later life. (It explains 
Mlackinnonb division of this phase into two. ) It is clearly these 
experiences on which Mozart is drawing in this passage from his letters: 
When I am as it were completely myself, entirely 
alone and of good cheer - say, travelling in a 
carriage, or walking after a good meal, or during 
the night when I cannot sleep; it is on such 
occasions that my ideas flow best. Whence and 
how they come, I know not; nor can I force them. 
Those pleasures that please me I retain in memory, 
and am accustomed, as have been told, to hum them 
to, myself. If I continue in this way, it soon 
(1) Wallas, G., The Art of Thought, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1926, 
P. 314. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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occurs to me how I may turn this or that 
morsel to account, so as to make a good 
dish of it, that is to say agreeably to 
the rules of counterpoint, to the pecuýiari- 
ties of the various instruments etc. 
1 
It is interesting to note how even at this stage there is a combination 
of inspiration and experience of compositional skills. 
Stephen Spender describes his preparation in an account of the 
creation of a poem: 
The method which I adopt, therefore, is to 
write down as many ideas as possible, in 
however rough a form, in notebooks (I have 
at least twenty of these on a shelf beside 
my desk, going back over fifteen years). 
then make use ofsQme of the sketches and 
discard others. 
(2) 
Aaron Copland writes: 
Every composer begins with a musical idea a 
musical idea, you understand, not a mental, 
literary or extramusical idea ... The idea 
itself may come in various forms. It may 
come as a melody .... or .... as a melody 
with accompaniment.... or, on the other hand, 
the theme may take the form of a purely 
rhythmic idea.... Now the composer has the 
idea. He has a number of them in his book, 
and he examines them in more or less the way 
that you, the listener would examine them if 
you looked at them. He wants to know what he 
has .... Every composer 
keeps in mind the 
possible metamorphoses of his succession of 
notes. First he tries to find its essential 
nature, and then he tries to find what might be 
done with it - how that e sential nature may 
momentarily be changed. 
'3) 
(1) Mozart, W. A., A letter (1789), in. Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, P. 55.6. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Copland, A., Music and Imagination, New York, Mentor Books, 1952, 
pp. 23 - 5. 
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And again Roger Sessions: 
The process of execution is first of all 
that of listening inwardly to the music 
as it shapes itself: of allowing the music 
to grow, of following both inspiration and 
conception wherever they may lead. A phrase, 
a motif, a rhythm, even a chord may contain 
within itself, in the composer's imagination, 
the energy which produces movement. It will 
lead the composer on, through the force of its 
own momentum or tensiqn to other phrases, other 
motifs, other chords. 1) 
Seashore describes this as 'auditory imagery' (the capacity to hear 
music in recall). This is fed by imagery through the other senses: 
'visual' 'tactile' and especially 'motor'. He adds: 
It is clear that the mental image and particularly 
the auditory and motor images, o erates in music 
in the following three ways: 1) in the hearing of 
cll of music; and 3) in the music; 2) in the r(2) 
creation of music. 
Jenny Fowler writes of this: 
I have been using the word "vision". It is 
strange that our language doesn't have a word 
for aural imaginings. All the words : 
"revelation", "insight", even "imagination" 
itself, stem from the visual sense. Only 
"inspiration" is different, and comes from 
breathing. Is there a linguist who could 
tell me of any language has an equivalent word 
based on sound? Why do we lack a word? 
Talking of vision and inspiration sounds a 
little old-fashioned. But those words can, of 
course, cover anything which stimulates a new 
direction of thought, including reaction against 
the idea of composition as "self-expression". 
(1) Sessions, R.. The Composer and his Message, in Chiseling B. (ed. ), 
The Creative Process, New York, The New American Library, 1955, 
pp. 45 - 9. 
(2) Seashore, C., Psychology of Music, London, Dover, 1st published 
1938,1967, p. 169. 
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Even so, we need a word. Wanted a word to convey 
both the vivid, direct experience of music in the 
mind, and the sense of excitement and cl1 covery. 
As in "insight", what about "insound"? (1J 
It can be seen how in these statements this stage involves both an 
initial idea and the retrieval of information from the memory - but 
retrieved in such a way as to make new connections or in a new form. 
(However, it must be added that Piaget agrees with Erikson that there 
are two possible interpretations of memory - one that consists of 
considering memories as stocked or accumulated in the unconscious 
where evocation would remove them at will and a second which admits 
that every operation of the memory includes a reorganisation. Piaget 
favours the second of these and this would make every moment of recall 
a creative act of a kind. ) 
In the case of Stephen Spender's poem the idea came from the environ- 
ment-a scene observed. All the musicians quoted refer to an original 
musical idea but other composers have taken extramusical ones. In 
conversation with a composer it transpired that an idea for a piece had 
come from a many-branching plant which gave her the idea for the overall 
plan of the piece, for example. 
The Incubation Phase 
Some writers leap over the next of Wallas's stages largely because 
it is not amenable to scientific experiment. Wallas describes it as 
largely an unconscious process or partly conscious and how during it 
nothing should be allowed to interfere with these processes which he 
(1) Op. cit. 
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describes as 'unconscious and involuntary (or foreconscious and fore- 
voluntary). ' Voluntary abstaining from conscious thought may take two 
forms - conscious mental work or relaxation from conscious work. The 
first is time-saving and he says that it is often possible to get more 
results by beginning several problems in succession, and voluntarily 
having them unfinished while we turn to others, than by finishing our 
work on each problem at one sitting. It may require physical exercise 
and he calls industrious passive reading a dangerous substitute. 
In many descriptions of it there is an element of confusion, madness, 
dreaming. Hutchinson(l) sees sometimes the appearance of mild psycho- 
neurotic symptoms as the creator strives to realise his goals which 
will help restore his balance. Because of these he sees relaxation 
as being essential, either planned or enforced. Tchaikovsky writes: 
Generally speaking the germ of a future 
composition comes suddenly and unexpectedly. 
If the soil is ready - that is to say, if the 
disposition for work is there - it takes root, 
with extraordinary force and rapidity, shoots 
up through the earth, puts forth branches, leaves, 
and, finally, blossoms. I cannot define the 
creative process in any other way than by this 
simile. The great difficulty is that a germ 
must appear at a favourable moment, the rest 
goes by itself. It would be vain to try and 
put into words the immeasurable sense of bliss 
which comes over me directly a new idea awakens in 
me and begins to assume a definite form. I forget 
everything and behave like a madman. Everything within 
me starts pulsing and quivering; hardly have I begun 
the sketch ere one thought follows another. In the 
midst of this magic process it frequently happens 
that some external interruption wakens me from my 
sonnambulistic state; a ring at the bell, the entrance 
of a servant, the striking of the clock, reminding me 
that it is time to leave off. Dreadful, indeed are such 
interruptions. Sometimes they break the thread of 
inspiration for a considerab} time; so that I have to 
seek it again-often in vain. ` 
1 
(1) Op. cit. p. 237. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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Mozart writes similarly: 
All this fires my soul, and, provided I am 
not disturbed, my subject enlarges itself, 
becomes methodised and defined, and the whole, 
though it be less, stands almost complete and 
finished in my mind, so that I can survey it, 
like a fine picture or a beautiful statue, at 
a glance. Nor do I hear in my imagination 
the parts successively but I hear them as it 
were all at once (gleich alles zusammen). 
What a delight this is I cannot tell. All 
this inventing, this producin , takes place 
in a pleasing, lively dream. 
(1) 
There is general agreement that conscious effort alone cannot produce 
creative achievements but authors use different terms to describe the 
nonconscious factors. Wallas 
(2) 
in line with those like Ghiselin(3) 
who are not psychologists and psychoanalysts uses the terms unconscious, 
involuntary and fringe-consciousness, which does not seem to have 
the 
same meaning for them as it does for the psychoanalysists. Hadamard(4) 
terms them sub-conscious which he defines as being one of the superficial 
layers of the unconscious. Psychoanalysts like Kris 
(5) 
and Kubie(6) 
prefer preconscious . There are others e. g. Dashiell(7) and 
Woodworth(8) 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Op. cit. 
(4) Hadamard, J., An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in the 
Mathematical Field, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945, 
P. 143. 
(5) Kris, E., Psychoanalysis and the Study of Creative Imagination, 
Bulletin of New York Academy of Medicine, XXIX, 1953, PP. 334 - 51" 
(6) Kubie, L. S., Neurotic Distortions of the Creative Process, Lawrence, 
Kansas, University of Kansas Press, 1958, p. 37. 
(7) Dashiell, J. F., Fundamentals of General PsYcholoRY, New York, 
Houghton Mifflin, 1931, pp. 562 - 68. 
(8) Woodworth, R. S., Psychology, New York, Henry Holt, 3rd ed., 1934, 
P. 517. 
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who do not use or question the use of these terms and relate the 
phenomena of the creative process to experimental psychology's research 
into the phenomena of successful recall. 
The automatic involuntary quality has been experienced by many 
creative people - Spencer, Nietzsche, Gauss, Poincare, 
Henry James and 
others. Poincase(1) struggled for days with the problem of functions 
to no avail. One night, unable to sleep, he says that the ideas came 
in crowds, colliding, sometimes interlocking and finally making some 
stable combinations from which he discovered the existence of Puchsian 
functions. Shortly afterwards on a geological excursion with no 
thought of mathematics in his head, a profound insight came to him that 
the transformations he had used were identical with those of non- 
Euclidean geometry. Schiller describes this phase thus: 
The reason for your complaint lies, it seems 
to me, in the constraint which your intellect 
imposes upon your imagination. Here I will 
make an observation and illustrate it by an 
allegory .... Apparently 
it is not good and 
it hinders the creative work of the mind - if 
the intellect examines too closely the ideas 
already pouring in, as it were at the gates. 
Regarded in isolation, an idea might be quite 
insignificant and venturesome in the extreme, 
but it may acquire importance from an idea 
which follows it; perhaps in certain colloca- 
tions with other ideas, which may seem equally 
absurb, it may be capable of furnishing a 
serviceable link. The intellect cannot judge 
all these ideasunless it can retain them until 
it has considered them in connection with the 
other ideas. In the case of a creative mind, 
it seems to me, the intellect has withdrawn 
its watchers from the gates, and the ideas rush 
in pellmell and only then does it review and 
inspect the multitude. You worthy critics 
or whatever you may call yourselves, are ashamed 
or afraid of the momentary passing madness which 
is found in all real creators; the longer or 
(1) Op. cit. 
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shorter duration of which distinguishes the 
thinking artist from the dreamer. Hence 
your complaints of unfruitfulness, for you M 
reject too soon and discriminate too severely. 
(This is a point taken up by Osborn(2) in which he outlines the principle 
of deferred judgement, saying that quantity of ideas breeds quality in 
both individual and group creation-) In these descriptions the 
boundaries that block the inner personal region from consciousness are 
permeated and the artist goes deep into a subjective experience, Stein 
writes that: 
this permeability may be self-induced by a process 
that the psychoanalysts call "regression in service 
of the ego" (Hartmann 1958), by selecting specific 
working environments, by taking oranges, drinking 
liquors or it may occur when the person is distracted 
or devoting himself to activities other than those 
that are specifically relevant to his creative work. 
ý3ý 
He illustrates this with Schiller keeping rotten apples in his desk, 
Milton, Descartes, Leibniz and Rossini lying stretched out and Mozart 
finding it easier to work after exercise. 
The artist perhaps goes deeper into other areas of consciousness 
than the scientist at this stage. Zervos writes of Picasso: 
His only wish has been desperately to be himself, 
in fact he acts according to suggestions which 
come to him from beyond his own limits. He 
sees descending upon him a superior order of 
exigencies; he has a very clear impression 
that something compels him imperiously to 
(1) Quoted in Ball (ed. ), The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, New 
York, Random House, 1938, P" 193" 
(2) Osborn, A. F., Developments in Creative Education, in Parnes, S. J. 
and Harding, H. F., (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, 
New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 19 - 39" 
(3) Stein, M., Creativity as an Intra-personal and Inter-personal 
Process, in Parnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book 
of Creative Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, 
pp, 85 - 92. 
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empty his spirit of all that he has only 
just discovered, even before he has been 
able to control it, so that he can admit 
other suggestions. Hence his torturing 
doubts. But this anguish is not a 
misfortune for Picasso. It is just this 
that enables him to break down all his 
barriers, having the field of the possible 
free to him, and opening up o him the 
perspectives of the unknown. 
'l) 
In this as in many other accounts the feelings are so strong that it 
is accompanied by the impression that some outside agent has whispered 
productive ideas to them, like Socrates' 'demon' . Koestler sees 
the resolution in terms of 'underground games': 
The period of incubation represents a reculer 
pour mieux sauter. Just as in the dream the 
codes of logi-ca-il-reasoning are suspended, so 
'thinking aside' is a temporary liberation 
from the tyranny of over-precise verbal 
concepts of the axioms and prejudices ingrained 
in the very texture of specialised ways of 
thought. It allows the mind to discard the 
straitjacket of habit, to shrug off apparent 
contradictions, to unlearn and forget and to 
acquire, in exchange, a Brea er fluidity, 
versatility and gullibility. 2) 
Maslow sees it as a return to what he calls primary processes (as 
opposed to the secondary processes of reason and logic) - coming out 
of the deeper self-creativity, being: 
a kind of intellectual play which is a kind 
of permission to be ourselves to fantasy, 
to let loose, and to be crazy, privately. 
(3) 
(1) Quoted in Read, H., Art Now, New York, Pittman, 1948, p" 109. 
(2) Koestler, A., The Act of Creation, London, Hutchinson, 1964, 
p. 210. 
(3) Maslow, A. H., Emotional Blocks to Creativity, in Parnes, S. J. and 
Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 93 - 103. 
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He sees it as necessary for this to be a voluntary act made possible 
by not being afraid of the unconscious. (It must also be added that 
Helmholtz(l)saw no work, either subconscious or unconscious going on 
in the resting interval and speaks of the recovery from fatigue of 
the preparatory labour and of the freshness of attack upon the 
problem .) 
Tchaikovsky writes vividly of the experience: 
If that condition of mind and soul which we call 
inspiration lasted long without intermission no 
artist could survive it. The strings would 
break and, h instrument be shattered into 
fragments-. 2 
This highlights a distinction Patrick makes when she says: 
the chief difference between the incubation of 
the mathematician and the poet is that for the 
first it is more an intellectual experience, 
for the latter an emotionally toned experience. 
There is a difference of content in that the 
mathematician incubates an idea, while the poet 
generally incubates a mood. (3) 
Sayers sees it as a kind of childbirth: 
The resistance to creation which the writer 
encounters in his creature is sufficiently 
evident, both to himself and to others - 
particularly to those others who have the 
misfortune to live with him during the 
period when his Energy is engaged on a job 
of work. The human maker is, indeed, 
almost excessively vocal about the perplexi- 
ties and agonies of creation and intracta- 
bility of his material. Almost equally 
evident, however, though perhaps less readily 
explained or described, is the creature's violent 
(1) Op. cit., p. 15. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Op-cit. 
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4 
urge to be created. To the outsider, the 
spectacle of a writer "taken ill with an 
idea" usually presents itself as a subject 
for seemly mirth; the "Spring poet" is the 
perennial butt of the plain man, just as, 
on the stage, any reference to child-birth 
is a signal for hoots of merriment, especially 
from the male members of the audience. In 
both cases, the ridicule is largely defensive- 
the nervous protest of the negative and chaotic 
against the m sterious and terrible energy of 
the creative. 
11) 
Stein makes a similar point: 
The number and variety of hypotheses that the 
creative individual entertains may give one 
the impression that the process is haphazard or 
disorganised. As one studies the hypotheses, 
however, one discovers common threads. One 
also finds that the creative individual, 
orientated towards the future, himself senses 
a feeling of direction and possesses some 
conception of the characteristics of the final 
product he is seeking. The hypotheses do not 
come forth in a logical and systematic fashion. 
Logic and systematisation occur late. (2) 
He cites Einstein: 
Before the discovery that the crucial point, 
the solution lay in the concept of time, 
more particularly in that of simultaneity, 
axioms played no role in the thought process - 
of this Einstein is sure .... But, even 
afterwards, the final five weeks, it was not 
the axioms that came first. "No really productive 
man thinks in such a paper fashion", said Einstein. 
But he adds later: "During all the years there 
was a feeling of direction, of going straight 
toward something concrete. It is, of course, 
very hard to express that feeling in words; but 
it was decidedly the case, and clearly to be 
distinguished from later consideration about the 
(1) Sayers, D., The Mind of the Maker, London, Methuen, 9th edition, 
1947,1st published 1941, p. 113. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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rational form of the solution. Of course, 
behind such a direction there is always 
something logical; but I have it in a kind 
of survey, in a way visually. (Wertheimer 
1945). 
Stein goes on to describe the feeling of depression, anxiety and 
inadequacy that may accompany this stage due to momentary lack of 
direction and the relaxation of inner-personal regions, allowing old 
tensions to rise to the surface. 
Patrick summarises certain characteristics common to this phase: 
In the first place, no active work is done 
on the idea and mood that is incubated. 
, 
The subject thinks of other topics. In 
the second place, the idea or mood that is 
incubated recurs spontaneously; in the 
third place, the idea or mood is more 
clearly defined at the end of the stage 
than it ws at the beginning, for it has 
modified. 
ýl) 
Woodworth doubts the existence of unconscious work, claiming that the 
process is more one of forgetting: 
In the preparatory period the necessary cues 
have been assembled along with much irrelevant 
material which is an interference as long as it 
possesses recency value. When this recency 
value has evaporated with the lapse of time, 
and when the individual makes a fresh attack, 
the whole matter is clear. This theory is 
at least as probaýle as the theory of 
subconscious work(2. ). 
This view contrasts with other writers and is linked with Helmholtz's 
view of this time as one'of resting. 
Other writers see the importance of different mental sets in the 
development of the idea. Ruger on puzzle-solving states: 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. P. 97. 
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the general assumption which the subjects 
make concerning the nature of the special 
problem in hand will often be set off 
accidentally and become thoroughly 
entrenched without being subjected to 
criticism .... The assumptions thus 
uncritically set up in some cases limited 
the movements made by the subject to a 
certain portion of the puzzle, and 
consequently in some instances rendered 
the solution impossible .... These fixed 
assumptions, which have an inertia about 
them, were broken up in several ways .... 
In some cases the puzzle was solved almost 
immediately in coming back to them later in 
the day. The particular set of conscious- 
ness had been broken up by this chang9 and 
new points of view were now possible. ) 
This links with Koestler and his idea of bisociation and is further 
substantiated by Platt and Baker 
(2) 
0 
Wallas sees a linking stage between the incubation phase and the 
flash of illumination. This he terms 'intimation': 
when our fringe consciousness of an 
association train is in a state of rising 
consciousness which indicates that th935ully 
conscious flash of success is coming. 
This he claims is the moment when the process is again coming under the 
control of the will: 
If this feeling of intimation lasts for an 
appreciable time, and is either sufficiently 
conscious, or can by effort of attention be 
made sufficiently conscious, it is obvious 
that our will can be brought directly to 
bear on it. We can at least attempt to 
(1) Ruger, H. A., The Psychology of Efficiency, Archives of Psychology, 
15,1910, P. 88. 
(2) Platt, N., and Baker, R., The Relation of the Scientific Hunch to 
Research, Journal of Chemical Education, 1931,8, Pp. 1960 - 2002. 
(3) Op. cit., P. 97. 
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inhibit, or prolong, or divert, the brain- 
activity which intimation shows to be going 
on .... We can attempt to 
hold on to such 
a train on the chance that it may succeed. 
He discusses the danger of putting thought into words too soon and the 
inappropriateness on occasions of the intervention of the will. 
It is indeed at the stage of Illumination with 
its fringe of Intimation that the thinker should 
most consciously realise that the rules of his 
art will be of little effect unless they are 
applied with artistic delicacy or apprehension. - 
He elaborates on the role of emotion in Intimation: 
It is easier to retain an affect indirectly 
by concentrating attention on the sensation 
which may be stimulated by it than by 
attending directly to the affect itself the 
association of an affect with an image being 
particularly helpful. Precise language may 
inhibit thought whereas language with emotional 
associations may lead to new and vivid thoughts. 
The feeling of the universal significance of some 
clearly realised sensory image is an Intimation .... 
so important in poetry that sensitiveness to it 
almost constitutes the special poetic gift. 
The Illumination 
The incubation period has been likened to a gestation period leading 
to child-birth in the subsequent illumination and its burst of creativity. 
The birth of an idea in a work of creation is often accompanied by 
alternating states of pain and joy. The successful completion of the 
act of creation is experienced on the satisfaction of being free from 
a heavy burden. Mozart completes his description: 
Still the actual heaving of the tout ensemble 
is after all the best. What has been thus 
produced I do not easily forget, and this is 
perhaps the bgsý gift I have my Divine Maker 
to thank for. 1 
(1) Op. cit. 
110 
Hindemith confirms this: 
What is musical vision? We all know the 
impression of a very heavy flash of lightning 
at night. Within a second's time we see a 
broad landscape, not only in general outline 
but with every detail .... compositions must 
be conceived the same way. If we cannot, in 
the flash of a single moment, see a composition 
in its absolute entirety with every pertinent 
detail in its proper place, we are not genuine 
creators. (1) 
Koestler describes the intuitive leap of illumination: 
The moment of truth, the sudden emergence of a 
new insight is an act of intuition. Such 
intuitions give the appearance of miraculous 
flashes or short circuits of reasoning. In 
fact they may be likened to an immersed chain, 
of which only the beginning and the end are 
visible above the surface of consciousness. 
The diver vanishes at one end of the chain and 
comes ý}pat the other end, guided by invisible 
links. `) 
He describes the process as one of combining two different sets of 
rules, living on two different planes, and bisociation or the moment 
of illumination as the bisociative click. 
(3) 
Loane illustrates this well in a musical composition by 12/13 
year olds; 
All this said, however, the new techniques did 
not come out of the blue, nor were they 
entirely unprepared. Each is in some way an 
extension of a technique already familiar, or 
perhaps the result of putting together of two 
(1) Hindemith, P., 
_A 
Composer's World, New York, Doubleday and Co. 1952, 
PP. 70 - 1. 
(2) Op. cit., p. 211. 
(3) Koestler, A., The Three Domains of Creativity, in Dutton, D. and 
Krausz, M. (ed. ) The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art, 
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publications, 1981, pp. 1- 17. 
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previously learned but previously separate ideas. 
Thus the flute player already had the performance 
skill of adjusting intonation by adjusting barrel 
position. In describing the composition of 'Midnight 
Delirium , she recalled 
having been reminded to adjust 
her intonation in this way, during a wind band 
rehearsal. And she had the composition skill of 
employing an unexpected note to increase tension. 
We might say that she has put the two together by 
a leap of understanding that she could use her 
barrel-twisting technique to make a note inexpected 
in a new way - sliding flat. She thus creates some- 
thing new (at least to herby putting together two 
things which had previously been apart, a process ( 
perhaps close to Koestler's notion of 'bisociation'. 
Ribot(2) emphasizes how the creative act involves the totality 
the individual, the condition of his body, his emotions, his perception 
and his conscious as well as unconscious metal processes, willing and 
dreams. Koestler emphasizes this point: 
Habit and originality, then point in opposite 
directions in the two way traffic between 
conscious and unconscious processes. The 
condensation of training into habit, and the 
automisation of skills constitute the downward 
stream, while the upward traffic consists in 
the minor, vitalising pulses from the yngerground, 
and the rare major surges of creation. 
Thurstone(4) suggests that it is the manner of insight that sets 
creative work apart from ordinary problem-solving. He describes how 
it usually occurs in a state of relaxed and dispersed attention and 
advocates research into which kinds of mental work are best done under 
conditions of tension and concentration and which under conditions 
of relaxation. Elsewhere he says that the: 
(1) Loane, B., Thinking about Children's Compositions, British Journal 
of Music Education, Vol-1, No. 3, November 1984, pp. 205 - 31. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3ý Op. cit. p. 211. 
(4) Thurstone, L., Creative Talent, Re orts from the Ps chometric Laboratory, No. 61, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950, p. 10. 
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creative act is characterised by the manner of 
insight which is oýtgn preceded by non-verbalised 
prefocal thinking. 1) 
He advocates research into what happens before the moment of insight, 
believing that the rapport the creative individual has with his 
preconscious thinking can be studied experimentally. 
Sinnott sees the unconscious as operating in a similar way to 
the conscious in its rearranging and organisation of the facts and 
final solutions to problems: 
Thus the unconscious mind is able to solve 
problems and to lay at least the foundation 
for the construction of a poem or work of art. 
These are new creations. They might have been 
produced by the conscious mind and often have 
been, through sheer force of mental labour; 
bat the reason that such a frontal attack often fails seems to be that free assn iati n 
present in the unconscious, is blocked In various 
ways and the really creative new relationships 
therefore are not seen. 
One must recognise the operation in the 
unconscious of such an organising factor, for 
chance alone is not creative just as the organism 
pulls together random, formless stuf into the 
patterned system of structure and function in the 
body, so. the unconscious mind seems to select and 
arrange and correlate these ideas and images into a 
pattern. The resemblance between the two processes 
is close. The concept is worth considering that the 
organising power of life, manifest in mind as well as 
body - for the two are hardly separable - is the truly 
creative element. Creativity thus becomes an attribute 
of life. 
(2) 
All this discussion, however, Ghiselin sees as futile, describing it 
(3) 
as a picturesque substitute for an avowal of ignorance. 
(1) Thurstone, L., The Scientific Study of Creative Talent, Reports 
from the Psychometric Laboratory No 81, Chicag+o,, University of Chicago Press, 1952, p. 6. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process and its Relation to the Identifi- 
cation of Creative Talent, in Taylor, C. W. (ed. ), The 1955 University 
of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Creative Talent, 
Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1956, pp. 195 - 203. 
113 
GuilfordNrites in this stage of illumination of the role of 
fluency (which involves the recall of various possibilities from the 
memory), flexibility (the ability to roam widely over a very broad 
class of possibilities, elaboration, redefinition) and insight. All 
have been described in the descriptions given above. 
Youtz(2) confirms some of these by experiments into how past 
experience can inhibit the subject in his efforts by restricting his 
choice. He mentions two allied phenomena-mechanisation or rigidity, 
'the continued use of a method which was previously successful but 
which is no longer the most efficient or effective', and 'functional 
fixedness', the inability to see a tool in a new use. Experiments 
showed that both of these were increased by stress or frustration and 
that confirmed Osborn's contention that the judicial process should 
be reserved until after the tentative solutions have been achieved, 
since unsatisfactory results will be discouraging and this stress may 
inhibit any further progress in thinking up new ideas. Praise also 
reduced rigidity, as it reduced stress. Both were also decreased 
by a allowing more time. He also shows how the introduction of a mild 
threat of the type you aren't concentrating, I'm afraid', 'You can do 
better than this' or 'Can't you do it a little faster? ' affected the 
performance especially the time taken to do a task. Both Youtz's 
areas of investigation clearly have implications for the way in which 
creativity is nurtured in education. He also adds that it in a whole idea 
(1) Guilford, JP., Intellectual Factors in Productive Thinking, in 
Mooney and Razik (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity, New York, 
Harper and Row, 1967, pp. 101 - 4. 
(2) Youtz, R. P., Psychological Foundations: Applied Imagination. in 
Parnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative 
Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 193 - 215. 
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rather than a partial one that is more likely to occur in both the 
incubation and preparation sta? es and that details are added and 
changed during revision. (This is clearly seen in the writings of 
Mozart. ) Dashiell(l) reinforces Sinnott's point that the processes 
involved in incubation suggest that'rational processes' can go on 
without awareness. He describes the moment of illumination as 
containing the successful recall of material in which the poet or 
novelist is already saturated. This, he says, is dependent on the 
absence of interfering associations set up by excessive concentration 
on the recall. In this he is supported by Sinnott 
(2) 
, who makes 
the 
point about these flashes of inspiration that they rarely come unless 
an individual has immersed himself in a subject. He must have a rich 
background of knowledge and experience. (Indeed Wallas makes this 
part of his first stage .) 
However, Youtz sees the final solution being more than mere 
experience: 
When the solution of a problem is broken 
into its component parts and each given as a 
separate experience, such experiences are 
not sufficient to bring about the solution 
of the problem. Thus a selected presenta- 
tion of the experience is not enough. The 
parts must be combined in a certain way and 
a "direction" seems to be a factor which aids 
the combination. "Trial and error" may be 
present in attempts at the solution, but is 
inadequate to explain the sudden appearance 
of the successful solution, when such a 
solution requires productiye rather than 
reproductive experience. 3) 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) OP. 'cit. 
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Verification 
Wallas's stage four, Rossman's stage seven, Stein's stage two 
and MacKinnon's stage five involves the working out of the idea. 
Wallas writes: 
It is normally, as Poincare points out, fully 
conscious and men have worked out much the same 
series of mathematical and logical ruling for 
controlling verification by conscious effort 
as those whi h are used in the control of 
preparation. (1) 
Of this stage Kaplan writes: 
Fantasy becomes art only when it is externalised 
and controlled by the responsible, realistic, 
and logical ego .... imagination must submit 
its 
work to the scrutiny of critical faculties. The 
artistry lies in the care and judgement with which 
the critical task is performed, as much as in the 
richness of the creative materials available for 
criticism. Without both, the work is either as 
formless and unintelligible as the so-called 'art' 
of the insane, or as mechanical and sý} p rficial 
as the formulas of the skilful hack. `2) 
Stein also adds that during this stage the artist has to consider also 
the role of the audience. He quotes from Freud about the 
failure of some groups of people to express their novel ideas in a 
way acceptable to others: 
The hysteric is undoubtedly a poet, though he 
represents his phantasies essentially by 
mimicry, without considering whether other 
people understand or not. The ceremonials 
and prohibitions of obsessional patients 
force us to conclude that they have created 
(1) Op. cit., Wallas, G., The Art of Thought (1926) in Vernon (ed. ), 
Creativity, op. cit. 
(2) Kaplan, A., Freud and Modern Philosophy (1957), quoted in Stein, M., 
Creativity as an Intrapersonal and Inter-personal Process, 
op. cit. 
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a private religion for themselves; and 
even the delusions of the paranoiac show 
an unwelcome external similarity and 
inner relationship to the systems of our 
philosophers. We cannot get away from 
the impression that patients are making in 
an asocial manner, the same attempts at a 
solution of their conflicts and an appease- 
ment of their urgent desires which, when 
carried out in a manner acceptable to a 
large number of persons, are called poetry, 
religion and philosophy. (1) 
Born postulates the existence of a 'culture conscience' which 
operates upon the initial impulse on the unconscious. It is similar 
to the psycho-analytic concept of super-ego but differs in that it 
includes the artistic heritage of the past. He sees it as having 
four functions: 
1. Neutralisation, which refers to the 
catholicity of the sublimated concept, 
2. Universalisation, freeing it from 
subjective expression, 
3. Manifestation, its conversion into a 
visual image, 
4. Organisation, the arrangement of visual (2) 
images according to aesthetic standards. 
He sees this as the conscious part of the process of creation which 
he sees as encompassing both the conscious and unconscious process, 
the unconscious providing the inspiration and the basic principles 
of design, while the conscious provides formative processes. This 
seems to relate to my later analysis of childrens' compositions in Part 
Two. The first appearance of expressive quality in children's work 
(1) Freud, S., The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (1931), quoted in 
Stein, M., Creativity as an Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Process, 
op. cit. 
(2) Born, W., The Unconscious Processes In Artistic Creation, Journal 
of Clinical Psycho-Pathology and Psycho-Therapy VII9 1945, 
pp. 235 - 72. 
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is in the attempt to express themselves. Later in what I have 
found in the growth of the imitative phase a greater ability to be 
governed by the needs of musical forms and structures emerges. This 
could be seen as the emerging of the culture conscience which includes 
a grasp of the vernacular of musical language. (This grasp precedes 
and is a necessary pre-requisite of the growth of the imaginative 
phase. ) Thus the period of musical growth dealt with in this thesis 
is the period of the building up of this 'culture conscience' which 
is to be so important in later life in the evaluation stage. (It 
is also of relevance to the section on musical skills in Chapter 
Three. ) 
Tchaikovsky writes of the verification phase: 
Yesterday when I wrote to you about my methods 
of composing I did not sufficiently enter into 
that phase of work which relates to the working 
out of the sketch. This phase is of primary 
importance. What has been set down in a moment 
of ardour must now be critically examined, 
improved, extended or condensed, as the form 
requires. Sometimes one must do oneself 
violence, must sternly and pitilessly take part 
against oneself, before one can mercilessly erase 
things thought out with love and enthusiasm. I 
cannot complain of poverty of imagination, or 
lack of inventive power; but, on the other hand, 
I have always suffered from my want of skill in 
the management of form. Only after strenuous 
labour have I at last succeeded in making the 
form of my compositions correspond, more or less, 
with their contents. Formerly I was careless 
and did not give sufficient attention to the 
critical overhauling of my sketches. Consequently 
my seams showed and there was no organic union 
between my individual episodes. This was a very 
serious defect, and I only improved gradually as 
time went on; but the form of my works will never 
be exemplary, because, although I can modify, I 
cannot radically alter the essential qualities of 
my musical temperament. ` 
(1) Op. cit. 
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Here is the artist working at the embodiment of his feelings into 
form by constant interraction with his medium. 
Hindemith writes of this stage: 
Not only will he (the composer) have the gift of 
seeing.... the complete musical form .... he will 
have the energy, persistence and skill to bring 
this envisioned form into existence, so that even 
after months of work not one of its details will 
be lost or fail to fit into his photo-mental 
picture. This does not mean that any F Sharp 
in the 612th measure of the final piece would 
have been determined in the very first flash of 
cognition. If the seer should in his first 
flash concentrate his attention on a particular 
detail of the whole, he would never conceive the 
totality, but if the concept of this totality 
strikes his mind like lightning the P Sharp 
and all the other thousands of notes and other 
means of expressj. or fall into line almost without 
his knowing it. 1 
He goes on to describe the importance of this vision and how skill, 
although important in its working out, is no replacement for it. 
Jenny Fowler writes of the tension between the original idea and 
the working out: 
To be too general is not useful : what is 
interesting is the detail, and the specific 
applications of a general idea. Yet one 
really needs the reference of a score, or 
the memory of a well-known work, to talk 
about details. Again, I don't find it 
interesting to write about, or read of, the 
"blueprint" of a piece - the composer's 
solution to the problem of arriving at a flexible 
map on which to base the piece. What is important 
is the detail derived from the map. The most 
important thing is to consider all the choices 
made by the composer, and ask why he made that 
choice and not another. And the second ot 
important thing is to ask "does it work? " 
(25 
(1) Op. cit. P. 71. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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Dewey describes the process: 
As the painter places pigment on the canvas, 
or imagines it placed there, his ideas and 
feelings are also ordered. As the writer 
composes in his medium of words what he wants 
to say, his idea takes on for himself perceptible 
form .... the physical process develops 
imagination, 
while imagination }s conceived in terms of the 
concrete material. i) 
Sayers writes of the relation between medium and creator: 
None of this delight will, however, be gained 
unless the playwright is devoured with a real 
love for material form-unless, in the writing 
of the play, his Energy has imaginatively 
moved upon the stage in the way I have tried 
to explain, and conceived its idea in material 
terms of flesh and blood and paint and canvas. 
For the true freedom of the Energy consists in 
its willing submission to the limitations of 
its own medium. The attempt to achieve 
freedom from the medium ends inevitably in loss 
of freedom within the medium, since, here as 
everywhere, activity falls und r the judgement 
of the law of its own nature. 12) 
She cites drama that is really literature as an example and concludes: 
The business of the creator is not escape from 
his material medium or to bully it, but to 
serve it; but to serve it he must love it. 
If he does so, he will realise that its service 
is perfect freedom. This is true, not only 
of all literary art but of all creative art. 
Ross writes of the working out stage: 
We should conceive of that process Zb_y which feeling 
becomes form) as involving interraction between 
impulse and medium. Gradually a form emerges 
from such interraction that resolves the feeling 
impulse, and which may be used to reach it. Each 
subject-reflexive action in the medium would, hopefully 
refine the representational form until the maker 
felt either that he had achieved a satisfactorily 
reciprocal of the impulse, or that, for one reason 
or another, no further refinemgnt were possible and 
the action should be stopped. l3) 
(1) Dewey, J., Art as Experience, New York, Minton Balch and Co, 1934, 
p. 75. 
(2) Op. cit. pp. 52 - 3. 
(3) Ross, M., The Creative Arts, London, Heinemann, 1978, P. 87. 
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Evaluation 
At this point comes Dewey's final stage 'judgement of the 
selected solution; part of Wallas's stage four and Mackinnon's 
stage five. It would seem also that part of the evaluative 
procedure might include an assessment of the communication. 
Stein writes: 
In the course of communicating his ideas the 
creative person needs to abstract or eliminate 
certain aspects of his work which are completely 
of himself This relates to the Tchaikovsky 
quotation] In the final stages of communication 
the individual must, as Mead would say, bear in 
mind the others with whom he is communicating. 
The extent to which this occurs varies with the 
area of work. Thus, it is more prevalent in 
science than in art. But in either case there 
is a process of evaluation in which completely 
autistic factors, or the difficulties that were 
experienced in the arriving at a solution are 
eliminated. (1) 
The result is often that the perceivers think it 'simple' and wonder 
why they never thought of it. 
Patrick summarises the whole process very clearly: 
This experiment in artists reveals four stages 
of creative thought, namely preparation, 
incubation, illumination and verification. 
Preparation is the period when associations 
are shifting rapidly and the subject is 
receiving new ideas. Incubation is the 
spontaneous occurrence from time to time of 
a mood or idea with more or less modification, 
while the subject is thinking of other topics. 
It may range from a few minutes to several 
years. We find that it occurs in miniature 
within the experimental period Lwhich ranged 
from 15-20 minute], and on a broader scale 
in the regular work of artists. LThe fact 
that it can occur on a small scale is inter- 
esting in the light of how we ask children to 
compose Illumination occurs when the mood 
or idea, which has been incubating, is sketched 
(1) Stein, M., Creativity and Culture, in Mooney and Razik (eds. ), 
Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, 
P, 114. 
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for the first time. An emotional reaction is 
frequently present, although not necessarily, 
and parts of the picture often seem to come 
automatically and spontaneously. Verifica- 
tion or revision is the last stage. These 
stages may overlap with each other, as 
incubation may occur with preparation and 
revision may start bgfQre all the objects 
have been sketched. `1J 
But as she indicates evaluation occurs throughout the process. 
Indeed there is some debate about whether the process does have 
general characteristics or 'stages'; but even if the 'stage' model 
is held, there is a belief that'the stages are not discrete but over- 
lap and interact within another. Indeed evaluation only seems to go 
into abeyance during the incubation phase when it appears detrimental 
to the free flow of ideas, e. g. Osborn's principle of deferred judge- 
ment. 
(2) 
Indeed in Rossman's stages the odd-numbered ones all 
involve evaluation. His list of steps resembles the TOTE pattern 
proposed by Miller, Galanter and Pribram(3) where the letters stand 
for test, operate, test and then exit from the pattern. So Rossman's 
steps would become TOTOTOTE. 
Indeed Vinacke, although he adopts 'Dallas's model, writes: 
It is necessary to conceive of creative thinking 
in terms of dynamic, interplaying activities, 
rather than more or less discrete stages. he 
phases may be repeated and their order of 
appearance not fixed] Hence ...... it appears that they are inter-weaving activities occurring 
(1) Patrick, C., Creative Thought in Artists, op. cit. 
(2) Osborn, A. F., Applied Imagination, New York, Scribners, 1957. 
(3) Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., Pribram, K. H., Plans and the 
Structure of Behaviour, New York, Holt, 1960. 
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in highly individualised and varied patterns, 
A particular creative situation is but one 
temporary period in which all four processes 
are drawn together i elation to a particular 
object of creation. 
1 
Cough disputes Wallas's theory saying that: 
the very orderliness and symmetricality of 
this formulation which on first reading seems 
so attractive is what constitutes its inherent 
weakness. Imaginative thinking seems in truth 
to be much more characterised by disarray, 
complexity, ferment and turmoil. Processes 
overlap, ebb and flow, and intermix to an extent 
scarcely compatible with notions of fixed stages 
and sequences. 2 
After much discussion Briskman describes the creator ass 
a) critically interacting with prior products, 
with a tradition, so as to put himself 'in 
touch' with the problem and standards for 
acceptable solutions; b) generating blindly, 
but not randomly, a hopefully potential 
solution or fragments of such a solution - 
blindly, because these are generated without 
fore-knowledge of success; not randomly, 
because the generation is itself already under 
the plastic control of relevant problem, back- 
ground of prior products, and relevant standards; 
c) critically interacting with this initial 
product so as to select or reject it, either 
in part or in its entirety, such a selection 
procedure being again under the plastic control 
of the problem, the background, and the relevant 
standard; d) generating blindly, but not randomly, 
further hopefully potential solutions or fragments, 
this time under the plastic control of not only the 
initial problem, the background, and the relevant 
standards but also under the plastic control of 
what he has already done, of his initial effort; 
T repeat a critical selection); f) repeat 
d (i. e. blind, but not random, generation etc. ) 
.... until, hopefully one has managed to generate 
(1) Vinacke, W. E., Creative Thinking, in Vinacke, q. E. The Psycholopy 
of Thinking, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1952, pp. 238 - 61. 
(2) Gough, H. G., Imagination-Undeveloped Resource, in Parnes, S. J. and 
Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 217 - 226. 
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or assemble a product which either meets the 
initial job specification or else meets some 
improved job specification - this improved 
job specification being in itself the out- 
come of the above process. 
(l) 
He emphasizes that the control exercised by the problem, relevant 
standards and the background of prior products must not be too 
rigid or the solution will be blocked. He sees the experience of 
frustration causing the creator to loosen his control but adding: 
in other words the plasticity of the control 
is crucial to the possibility of creativity, 
but so is the control itself. 
Stein almost takes the process further than the other descriptions 
by stressing the necessity of a feedback from a group of people: 
By accepting the product and regarding it as 
creative the group indicates that it accepts 
and implicitly approves of the needs which 
initially motivated the creative person to 
deviate from the accepted patterns and to 
probe the unknown. In the process of 
accepting the creative product the group 
manifests similarity and identification 
between its own wishes and those of the 
creative individual (Lee 1950; Sachs 1951) 
and that it has, in a sense, joined the 
individual in the creative process and 
become co-creator (Kris 1952). For the 
group the creative product has fulfilled 
or given expression to certain needs. The 
creative product "says" things that the groip 
has wanted to say but has been unable to . 
l2 
He recommends more research into the part played by intermediaries such 
as members of scientific and professional organisations, art and drama 
critics, curators of museums, literary agents and so on. 
(1) Briskman, L., Creative Product and Creative Process in Science and 
Art, in Dutton, D. and Krausz, M. (eds. ), The Concept of Creativity 
in Science and Art, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publications, 1981, 
pp. 129 - 155. 
(2) Stein, M., Creativity as an Intra-personal and Inter-personal 
Process, op. cit. 
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Vinacke also sees criticism by others as part of the verifica- 
tion process but sees it only as genuine extension when two require- 
ments are met: firstly: 
when the critic knows something about the 
general field of which the object is an 
exemplar and secondly when he has made 
the effort to familiarise himself wit lýhe specific object under consideration. 
Anderson outlines three sources of evaluation: 
1. External evaluation which is expanded by Iassweli(2) 
in which he discusses society's role in the perception 
of novelty and referred to Stein's definition that a 
novel work must be tenable or useful of satisfying by 
a significant group at some point in time. All sorts 
of questions are raised about how many people, which 
people and so on. 
2. Internal locus of evaluation. Rogers says: 
, Perhaps the most fundamental condition of 
creativity is that the source of locus of 
evaluative judgement is internal. The 
value of his product is, for the creative 
person, established not by the praise or 
criticism of others, but by himself .... 
This does not mean that he is oblivious to, 
or unwilling to be aware of, the judgement 
of others. It is simply that the basis of 
this valuation lies within himself, in his 
own organismic reaction to and appraisal of 
his product. If to the person it has the 
"feel" of being "me in action", of being an 
actualisation of the potentialities in him- 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Lasswell, H. D., The Social Setting of Creativity, in Anderson, H. (ed. ), Creativity and Its Cultivation, New York, Harper Row, 
1958, pp. 203 - 221. 
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self which heretofore have not existed and 
are now emerging into existence, then it is 
satisfying and creative, and no outside 
evaluation can contain that fundamental fact. 
Many other writers like Maslow and May share his view. 
3. Mutual dyadic or participating evaluation: 
a process of participation, of two way 
communication, mutuality, inter-weaving 
of desires, goals, purposes, through 
spontaneous', meaningful change in inter- 
acting with others. 
This is seen in the socially - integrative behaviour put 
forward by Anderson. 
(2) 
It encompasses both preceding 
views. Much literature on creative psycho-therapy 
emphasizes this view. 
This model of a process constantly involving evaluation is 
confirmed by Newell, Shaw and Simon who sees inherent in the problem- 
solving process, processes they call "solution generating" and a 
second class called 'verifying processes'. They examine actual 
examples of successful problem-solving programmes to see just what is 
involved in these and how the programmes reduce the problems to a 
manageable size. They do this partly by the use of computer programmes 
and claim that at present their methodology is more important than 
their findings. They claim that the programmes: 
perform work that is considered difficult, 
and even mildly creative, when it is done 
by humans. Although these programmes fall 
considerably short of the highest levels of 
(1) Rogers, C. R., Toward A Theory of Creativity, in Anderson, H. 
(ed. ), 
Creativity and Its Cultivation, New York, Harper Row, 1958, 
pp. 69 - 82. 
(2) Anderson, H., Creativity . co Personality 
Development, in Anderson, H. 
(ed. ), Creativity and its Cultivation, New York, Harper Row, 1958, 
pp. 119 - 141. 
126 
creativity of which humans are capable, 
there is every reason to suppose that they 
are qualitatively of the same genus as 
those more complex human problem-solving 
processes. We have predicted that within 
ten years the computer will discover and 
prove important mathematical theorems, 
and compose music that is ; eararded as 
aesthetically significant. 1) 
Laub-Novak writes: 
In speaking to and reading the works of 
creative writers, scientists, theologians 
and artists I find marked similarities in 
the way creative people proceed. To take 
an idea, an image and the force all the 
detail into a preconceived order is to make 
the work rigid. One would fail then to 
respond to inner contradictions, suggestions, 
new lines of thought, images, colour, form ... 
Each act, each decision on how to proceed 
must be perceived clearly-evaluated and 
re-evaluated. Our perception needs to be 
open, flexible. Not set upon one solution 
but able to perceive multiple solutions to the 
problem. Finally we transcend our conscious 
acts. Then a truly creative act emerges .... 
Art involves the whole person, not just a 
fraction of our consciousness. Creation is 
an act; an action that calls upon all our 
awareness, all our talents, our concentration 
our patience, our discipline. It is not a 
fraction of our life. It applies to our every 
activity, every choice, decision, perception. 
We too often live our lives, half alive; we 
may learn to relive our lives with accuracy, 
excellence, fidelity, intensity ...... intensity in the small the ordinary. 
Intensity in creative knowing and acting ..... Creative work demands a ritual of time, of 
serious work, of quiet hours. Order and 
discipline are not nasty words. They can 
release the best in us. We can't live 
without order-and discipline. The question 
is where to find order. Mere imitation is a 
disaster in art, in teaching and in child care. 
For each person some traditions are fruitful, 
some not. The perception to sort out exterior 
forms and bring them into connections with our 
(1) Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., and Simon, H. A., The Process of Creative 
Thinking, in Gruber, H. E., Terrell, G., Wertheimer, M. (eds. ), 
Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking, New York, Atherton 
Press, 1962, pp. 63 - 119. 
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own interior life, traditions, values, rhythms 
and talents is to live an artful life. It is 
no easy task .... To be in touch with one's 
own imagination, instincts and private vision 
while still in elementary school is really to 
get the elementary the basic, the most import- 
ant things right. `i) 
Other Models 
Because of problems of the interaction of the various stages in 
the process, some writers find it better to abandon the model of stages 
in the process. Eindhoven and Vinacke in their observation of 13 
artists and 14 non-artists did not find any evidence of the stages, 
claiming that the artists tended to evolve the final product, experi- 
menting at first and gradually concentrating on certain features that 
are selected, modified, and reorganised. They conclude that the stages 
blend together throughout the work: 
Thus creativity might be thought of as one 
whole process consisting of all the various 
aspects participating concurrently. (2) 
They also claim that artists have more control over their processes than 
non-artists and that from their training, they: 
appear to acquire a pattern of dealing 
with creative situations which differs from 
that. of non-artists. 
(1) Laub-Novak, K., Creativity and Children, Momentum, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
1976, pp. 13 - 19. 
(2) Eindhoven, J. E., and Vinacke, W. E., Creative Processes In Painting, 
Journal of General Psychology, XLVII, 1952, pp. 139 - 64. 
128 
Merwin backs this view when he writes: 
Invention is imagination; it is the very 
opposite of reasoning or inference; it is 
a single act of mind; rather an instant 
operation than a process. It has no 
stages; the essence zf)it is that it 
dispenses with them. 11 
Indeed it could be said that a number of different approaches to 
the problem of creative thinking have been condensed into the fore- 
going analysis. This has been done to show that there are similari- 
ties between them. It is, perhaps, also necessary to draw a few 
distinctions as well. Traditionally there were two approaches to the 
problem of creative thinking. One is the logical which concerned 
propositions made up of general concepts on the basis of which 
assertions were made and inferences drawn. Syllogisms were certain 
combinations of propositions that were new. To this method was 
added the procedure of induction with its emphasis on experience and 
experimentation. Wertheimer points out the problems in this approach: 
If one tries to describe processes of 
genuine thinking in terms of formal 
traditional logic, the result is often 
unsatisfactory: one has, then, a series 
of correct operations, but the sense of 
the process and what was vital, forceful, 
creative in it seems somehow to have 
evaporated in the formulations. (2) 
(Although as has been seen logical thinking may be part of the 
evaluative stage). 
(1) Merwin, H. C. 9 Patentability of Invention, Boston, Little, Brown 
and Co., 1883, p. 22. 
(2) Wertheimer, M., Productive Thinking, New York, Harper and Bros., 
1954, P. 10. 
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Associationism sees thinking as a chain of ideas, of stimuli 
and responses, of behaviour elements. Pillsbury writes: 
His he thinker'g attitude is very much like 
that which we may assume the animal to have as 
he works by trial and error. It is just as 
little controlled. It is, in fact, a trial 
and error process different from the other in 
that the trials are made in imagination, not 
in real movements ...... to find a way of 
obviating the difficulty. This is always 
by a series of trial and error processes, by 
a numbgr of suggestions suggested by associa- 
tion. ll) 
It is difficult in this approach which concentrates on habit and past 
experience, repetition rather than reason, to see how new ideas are 
generated. 
Wertheimer formulates that thinking proceeds by structuring 
Gestalten. There is a problem situation S1 in which the process 
starts and after a number of steps there is a second situation S2 in 
which is solved: 
When one , rasps a problem situation, 
its 
structural features and requirements set 
up certain strains, stresses, tensions in 
the thinker. What happens in real think- 
ing is that these strains and stresses are 
followed up, yield vectors in the direction 
of improvement of the situation, and change 
it accordingly. S2 is a state of affairs 
that is held together by inner forces as a 
good structure in which there is harmony 
in the mutual requirements and in which the 
parts are determined by the structure of the 
whole, as the whole by the parts. 
The process does not involve merely the 
given parts and their transformations. it 
works in conjunction with material that is 
structurally relevant but is selected from 
past experience, from previous knowledge 
and orientation. 
(1) Pillsbury, Recent Naturalistic Theories of Reasoning, quoted in 
Wertheimer, M. Productive Thinking, op. cit. p. 10. 
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In all this, such movements, steps are 
strongly preferred which change the state of 
affairs in S1 , along a structurally consistent line in S2 (I). 
This is clearly applicable to situations with a clearly defined 
problem S1 but in some situations S1 is not clear (indeed the first 
achievement is realising that there is a problem) and in others the 
individual begins with S2 that is to be created. He suggests: 
The process starts, as in some creative 
processes in art and music, by envisaging 
some features in a S2 that is to be created. 
The artist is driven towards its crystallisa- 
tion, concretisation, or full realisation. 
Characteristically the more or less clearly 
conceived structural whole-qualities of the 
thing to be created- are determining the 
process. A composer does not usually put 
notes together in order to get some melody; 
he envisages the character of the melody in 
statu nascendi and proceeds from above as he 
tries to concretise the parts. (Similarly 
with a mathematician who envisages the idea of 
a formula or of an equation. ) For some composers 
it is not an easy process, often it takes a long 
time. When ideas about the goal are somewhat vague, 
colloidal, there may be two directions at work 
simultaneously - one working to get the initial 
idea clearer, another to get at the parts. 
Characteristically in such cases what would and 
would not fit is immediately clear; whereas what 
happens in instances of the type Sl ..... S2, is 
structurally determind by the nature of S1, or of 
Sl in relation to S2, here Ot i2s determined by the 
structural features in the envisaged S2, even though 
S2 is still incomplete, still vague. This somewhat 
changes the dynamic nature of the outline given above, 
but in sensible procedures the vectors are again 
determined by the nature of the inner structural 
requirements. (1) 
This seems less satisfactory than the situation in which Sl is clearly 
defined for there is no suggested source for the imagined S2 or the 
drive to its realisation. 
(1) Op. cit. P. 195. 
(2) Op. cit. pp. 197 - 8. 
131 
Psychoanalytic literature yields a further approach. In 
it the motivation is closely bound up in the process. Freud') 
parallels the conflict in the genesis of neurosis and the 
genesis of creativity, the material being founded in the experiences 
of childhood and there being a connection between creative imagination, 
day dreaming and childhood play. He stresses the role of unconscious 
and pre-conscious processes in 'achievements of special perfection. ' 
Getzels and Jackson summarise his findings: 
1. Creativity has its genesis in 
conflict, and the unconscious 
forces motivating the creative 
"solution" are parallel to the 
unconscious forces motivating 
the neurotic "solution"; 
2. The psychic function and effect 
of creative behaviour is the 
discharge of pent-up emotion 
resulting from conflict until a 
tolerable level is reached; 
3. Creative thought derives from the 
elaboration of the "freely rising" 
fantasies and ideas relating to 
day-dreaming and childhood play; 
4. The creative person accepts these 
"freely rising" ideas, the non- 
creative person suppresses them; 
5. It is when the unconscious 
processes become, so to speak, 
ego-syntonic that we have the 
occasion for "achievements of 
special perfection; 
6. The role of childhood experience 
in creative production is emphasized, 
creative behaviour being seen as "a 
continuation and substitute for the 
play of childhood. " (2) 
(1) Freud, S., The Unconscious, Collected Papers Vol. 4, London, 
The Hogarth Press, 1949, P. 127. 
(2) Getzels and Jackson, Creativity and Intelliuence, New York, 
Wiley, 1962, pp. 91 - 2. 
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His views have undergone much development, notably by Kris 
who shifts interest from id to ego processes and emphasizes 
preconscious rather than unconscious processes. The preconscious 
is defined as what is: 
capable of becoming conscious easily 
and under conditions which frequently 
arise, Cdifferent from the unconscious 
processe] in the case of which such a 
transformation is difficult, can only 
come about with considerable expenditure 
of energy or may never occur. (1) 
Rapaport describes his position: 
...... any type of productive processes, 
from wit to art, and many other phenomena 
of inventiveness can be fully explained 
only if we assume that the ego regulates 
its own capacity to regression, that its 
organising functions include the functions 
of voluntarily and temporarily withdrawing 
cathexis from one area to the other, in (2) 
order later to regain improved control. 
Kris(3) describes two phases in the creative act: 'inspiration' which 
is characterised by regression to primary processes and 'elaboration' 
characterised by purposeful organisation and intent to solve a problem. 
(1) Kris, E., On Preconscious Mental Processes, Psychological 
arterl 19,1950, p. 542. 
(2) Rapaport, D., Organisation and Pathology of Thought, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1951, p. 372. 
(3) Kris, E., Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, New York, 
International Universities Press, 1952, P" 358" 
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Later psychoanalytic literature goes further and denies the role 
of the unconscious and even sees it as injurious. Kubie distinguishes 
'preconscious', 'conscious' and 'unconscious'. Preconscious processes 
have : 
the highest degree of freedom in allegory 
and figurative imagination which is attain- 
able by any psychological process. The 
contribution of preconscious processes to 
creativity depends upon their freedom in 
gathering, assembling, cQmposing and 
reshuffling of ideas . 
(1) 
He argues that conscious and unconscious processes rigidify the 
preconscious ones. 
Other motivating factors have also been suggested. Linked with 
the psychoanalytic approach, one gives a central role to the individual's 
destructive impulse and his capacity to make restitution through art. 
Fairbairn claims that destructive phantasies are accompanied by 
restitution phantasies that alleviate the guilt and anxiety engendered 
by the former. Since the destructive urges are the chief source of 
inner tension and some artistic activity relieves this tension and 
is creative, it is suggested that: 
the principle of restitution is the generating 
principle of art. Art relieves the tension 
between impulses qn4 ego and tension between 
ego and superego. l2 
Lee sets out the thesis that: 
the various esthetic states of the mind 
occur in particular kinds of personalities 
in order to relieve acute psychological 
ý1) Kubier L. S., Neurotic Distortions of the Creative Process, Lawrence, 
Kansas, University of Kansas Press, 1958, p. 37. 
(2) Fairbairn, W. R. D., Prolegomena to a Psychology of Art, British 
Journal of Psychology, XXVII, 1938, pp. 285 - 303" 
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emergencies due to the activation of 
destructive rage which is not being 
efficiently repressed; and that 
quantitive differences in emotional 
tensions arising from guilt over 
destructive rage determine in the same 
person a) whether defense occurs by 
making or by appreciating and b) thq1 
variety of making and appreciating. `) 
He goes on to distinguish modes of appreciating art and three types of 
artistic products distinguished in terms of their relationship to the 
maker's esthetic states of mind: 
, Making a: the mostly unconscious and 
compulsive making of a work of art by 
the creative artist, as the final step 
in his self healing of a neurotic 
depression. It follows upon Apprecia- 
tion D (the contemplative mode of 
appreciating) and inspiration. 
Making b: the mostly unconscious, 
compulsive, and transitory creativeness 
resulting in an artistic product, which 
compared with making a is of relatively 
superficial esthetic significance. It 
is called forth LbYJ ...... less extensive 
needs for defense with an esthetic orienta- 
tion ...... The product often contains 
considerable elements of unconscious 
plagiarism. 
Making c: the consciously directed making 
of an artistic product, technically well 
done, but of superficial esthetic signifi- 
cance, as answer to the need for defense by 
making something with an exquisite antithe- 
tical sense of order and cleanliness .... 
The author rejects the sublimation theory of artistic experience in 
favour of: 
The unconsciously compelled need to achieve 
an esthetic synthesis among the institutions 
of the mind, and between it and the outside 
(1ý Lee, H. B. 9 On Esthetic States of Mind, Psychiatry X, 1947, pp. 281 - 306. 
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world when ordinary integration is 
disturbed by destructive rage .... 
Jung brings in the concept of the collective unconscious: 
While the personal unconscious is made up 
essentially of contents which have at one 
time been conscious but which have disappeared 
from consciousness through having been forgotten 
or repressed, the contents of the collective 
unconscious have never been in consciousness, 
but owe their existence exclusively to heredity. 
Whereas the personal unconscious consists for 
the most part of complexes, the content of the 
collective iin gonscious is made up entirely of 
archetypes. 
McLaughlin, commenting on this, adds: 
His main interest was the way in which the 
contents of the collective unconscious often 
too unpleasant to be allowed naked into our 
consciousness, are clothed in the trapping 
of myth and folklore: in this form they 
are the province of poetry and other litera- 
ture, and much of plastic art. The approach 
of music to this repository of instinct is to 
recall the shapes and patterns, almost the 
diagrams, of the archetypes, and o bring them 
into consciousness in this form. I2ý 
This use of archetypal forms will be linked later with the growth of 
the vernacular in creative development. 
Adler(3) discusses feelings of inferiority as a motive. Rank 
suggests the desire to immortalise oneself. The artist recreates him- 
self into: 
an ideologically constructed ego; this ego 
is then in a position to shift the creative 
(1) Jung, C. G., The Concept of the Collective Unconscious, Collected 
Works, Vol. 9, trans Hebb, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, 
quoted in McLaughlin, T. Music and Communication, London, Faber and 
Faber, 1970, p. 104. 
(2) McLaughlin, T., op. cit. P. 104. 
(3) Adler, A., Problems of Neurosis, New York, Cosmopolitan Book 
Corporation, 1930, p. 244. 
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will power from his own person to ideolo- 
gical representations of t at person and 
then render it objective. 
'l) 
He says that after production, neurotic collapse may follow because 
of exhaustion or a sense of guilt from the power of creative master- 
fulness as something arrogant. White suggests: 
the existence of a fundamental urge towards 
competence, as fundamental as the urge to 
procreate. 
(2) 
(This links with later discussion of children's mastery play. 
) There 
is also much writing on music and the Oedipal phase in development. 
Schachtel takes issue with Freud and the post-Freudians. He 
I 
sees creativity as the ability to remain perceptually open to the 
world. He sees two basic perceptual modes, different ways of communica- 
tion between object and subject. One is subject-centred or 'auto- 
centric, ' the other 'allocentric' or object-centred. In the first 
the stress is on sensory pleasure and in the second on what the object 
is like. He defines creativity as the: 
art of seeing the familiar fully in its 
inexhaustible being, without using it 
autocentrically for purposes of remaining 
embedded in it and reassured by it. It is 
the7 existential struggle between the two 
tendencies in man: to remain open toward the 
world, capable of allocentric perception, or 
to seek the security of secondary embeddedness 
in a closed world and in the shared autocentricity 
of familiar perspective. (3) 
(1) Rank, 0., Art and Artists, trans. Atkinson, C. F., New York, Knopf, 
1932, p. 431. 
(2) White, R. '1., Inside the Space-man, Saturday Review, XL, 1957, 
pp. 40 - 3. 
(3) Schachtel, E. G., Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, 
Perception, Attention and Memory, New York, Basic Books, 1959, 
PP. 184 - Be 
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In creativity the first tendency conquers the second. (He says, 
of course, that there is a developmental movement from childhood 
autocentricity to adult allocentricity, although he allows for secondary 
autocentricity in adulthood as well. ) He sees this as no easy victory 
for it means perceiving differently from people we know. He postulates 
a totally different motivation from the psychoanalytic one: 
The main motivation at the roots of creative 
experience is man's need to relate to the 
world around him ...... This need is 
apparent in the young child's interest in 
all the objects around him, and his ever 
renewed explorations of and play with them. 
It is equally apparent in the artist's life- 
long effort to grasp and render something 
which he has envisaged in his encounter with 
the world, in the scientist's wonder about 
the nature of the object with which he is 
concerned, and in the interest in the objects 
around him of every person who has not succumbed 
to stagnation in a closed autocentric or socio- 
centric world. They all have in common the 
fact that they do not remain in a closed, 
familiar, labelled world but that they want 
to go beyond embeddedness in the familiar and 
the routine, and to relate to another object, 
or to the same one more fully, or from another 
angle, anew, afresh ...... 
(1) 
The essential difference from the psychoanalytic school is that whereas 
they regard creativity as a 'drive discharge function' he conceives 
it as openness in the encounter with the world. Theirs is tension- 
reducing, his is tension-increasing. 
These last two groups - the psychoanalysts and Schachtel and other 
writers such as Allport(2) and May(3) basically seem to disagree about 
(1) Op. cit. p. 241. 
(2) Allport, G. W., The Functional Autonomy of Motives, American Journal 
of Psychology, 50,1937, Pp. 141 - 156. 
(3) May, R., The Nature of Creativity, in Anderson, H. (ed. ), Creativity 
and its Cultivation, New York, Harper 1959, pp. 55 - 68. 
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motivation but as neither group has really defined creativity it also 
seems that they may not be describing the same type of behaviour. 
The reductionist authors of the psychoanalytic school most often 
discuss painting and writing whereas the self-actualising group seem 
to describe a much more global style of interactions with one's 
environment which could lead to products that would be judged as 
creative. promm(l) makes this distinction clearly between the 
creativity of the artist, conditioned by talent, genius, study, 
practice and by certain economic and social conditions that allow the 
person to develop his talent, and the second meaning of creativity 
which is an 'attitude' which is the condition of any creation in the 
former sense but which can exist even though nothing new is created in 
the world of things. It is more difficult as concepts such as sublima- 
tion and self actualisation are not easily measurable or definable. 
Goldan(2) proposed a hypothetical construct - the creativity motive- 
through which he attempted to express the view that creative products 
are only one segment of creative behaviour which becomes manifest when 
individuals interact with their environment so as to experience their 
fullest perceptual, cognitive and expressive potentials. 
Everyday Experience and Creativity 
Dewey sees experience as an: 
(1) Fromm, E., Creativity, in Anderson, H. (ed. ),, Creativity and its 
Cultivation, New York, "Harper, 1959, PP. 44 - 54" 
(2) Goldan, The Creativity Motive, Journal of Personality, 30,1962, 
- pp. -588 - 
600. 
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interpenetration of self and the world of objects 
and events .... Because experience 
is the fulfil- 
ment of an organism in its struggles and achieve- 
ments in a world of things, it is art in germ. 
Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the 
promise of that delightful erception which is 
esthetic experience .... 
rIn 
experience there is 
a process o] doing and undergoing between self 
and object. ZA-r / unites the very same relation 
of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming 
energy, that makes an experience to be an 
experience ...... 
Life contain a rhythm of 
loss of integration(ySth environment and 
recovery of union. 
Equilibrium is achieved out of tension and the artist cultivates his 
tension. 
Maslow also links the process with everyday life and in distin- 
guishing the stages in the creative process, says that many of us 
have the creative flash but are unable to realise it because of the 
hard work and discipline and training involved in the next phase. 
Now the virtues that go with the secondary 
kind of creativeness which results in actual 
products, in the great paintings, the great 
novels, in the bridges, the new inventions 
and so on, rest heavily upon other virtues - 
stubbornness and patience and hard work and 
so on, as they do on the creativeness of the 
personality. Therefore, in order to keep 
the fields of operation clean, you might 
say, it seems necessary for me to focus upon 
improvising, on this first flash and, for the 
moment, not to worry what becomes of it, 
recognising that many of them. do get lost. 
Partly for this reason, among the best subjects 
to study for this inspirational phase of 
creativeness are young children whose inventive- 
ness very frequently cannot be defined in terms 
of product. When a little boy discovers the 
decimal system for himself, this can be a high 
-moment of inspiration, and a high creative 
moment, and, should not be waved aside because 
of some a priori definition which says that 
(1) Dewey, J., Art as Experience, op. cit. p. 355" 
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creativeness ought to be socially useful, 
or it ought to be novel, or nobody should 
have thought of it before etc. (1) 
It would seem from this passage that young children therefore often 
enter only stage one of the creative process, lacking the knowledge 
or experience to pass through later stages. To refer back to 
Sinnott's(2) quotation on p. 39 the young child or inexperienced 
adult enters the image forming stage which as such an important part 
of all mental life from childhood to old age but does not have the 
experience to enter in to the constructive processes of creative_ 
imagination, for, as Sinnott ends: These are potentially creative, 
though often not actually so. 
Hindemith writes: 
When we talk about Einfälle we usually mean 
little motifs, consisting of a few tones - 
tones not often even felt as tones but felt 
merely as a vague curve of sound. They are 
common to all people, professionals and laymen 
alike: but while in the layman's mind they die 
away unused in their earliest infancy, as before, 
the creative musician knows how to catch them 
and subject them to further treatment. I know 
a scientist who said: "Everybody can have - 
and has - scientific ideas, but it takes a 
scientist to know what to do with them" ...... 
It is exciting to know how primitive, common- 
place, colourless, and insignificant, the first 
ideas, of even extraordinary musical masters are. 
But it seems almost more exciting to recognise 
the specific talents with which those masters 
keep their ideas fresh and despite all mutations, 
basically intact, during a sometimes considerably 
long interval of time required for treatment of 
(1) Maslow, A. H., The Creative Attitude, in Mooney and Razik (eds. 
), 
Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, P. 45. 
(2) Sinnott, E. W., The Creativeness of Life (1959) in Vernon (ed. ), 
Creativity, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, pp. 108 - 113. 
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these ideas. In this they are led by 
tradition, by the presumptive conditions 
of performance of the future piece, by its 
purpose and style, by personal whims and 
fancies that may add certain flavours to 
the final form. Sometimes the composer 
may derive his musical material, on its 
way from the Einfäll to its completion in 
a piece through a tremendous barrier of 
frustrations which may suppress most of the 
aforesaid considerations and lead even with 
the very first attempts at treating the 
basic materia i to formulations of utter 
strangeness. 
) 
This quotation summarises much of what has been said of the creative 
process, showing how the inexperienced stops short of the first stage. 
Sparshott confirms this when he says: 
What poets most evidently have in common 
is not a mysterious contact with secret 
springs, and certainly not any shared 
mental process but simply a steady 
application to the actual writing of 
poetry. Anybody can be a poet who 
really wants to be, though wanting will 
not make him a good one. What the lay- 
man does not do, and probably could not 
do, is bring himself to attend steadily, 
day by day, and year ter year, to the 
business of the art. C) 
Harris(3) sees the difference between genius and ordinary human 
beings in the speed in which they are able to go through the early 
stages of the process from realising the need for an idea to gathering 
information, to thinking through the information, to imaging possible 
solutions. 
(1) Op. cit. P. 68. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Harris, R. A., Creativity in Marketing, in Smith, P. (ed. ), 
Creativit - An Examination of the Creative Process, New York, 
Communication Art Books Hastings House, 1959, P. 147. 
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Rossman sees a variety of factors: 
The inventor is a child of circumstance. 
A great many people who have the ability 
to invent have never been in the environ- 
ment to stimulate their peculiar mental 
abilities. Others of mediocre talent 
have simply been able to appreciate the 
practical importance of more or less 
accidental discoveries. However, most 
of us for one reason or other, are 
potential inventors, and if we fail to 
invent, we only fail because we lack 
interest or incentive, or our vocation 
denies us the opportunity for analysis 
and original thought. It may be that 
we are sceptical of our ability to 
contribule and of the value of our contri- 
bution. ll) 
Stein writes: 
For some persons the creative process may 
stop during the stage of hypothesis forma- 
tion. They develop too few hypotheses 
because of intellectual or emotional 
reasons; or, in the process, they become 
sidetracked by considering a specific 
intellectual matter that is not relevant 
to the demands of the moment; or they come 
upon a previously unresolved emotional 
difficujty that forces its attention upon 
them. 2 
(Maybe in line with Witkin's analysis they should then go forward and 
resolve it .) 
However, Kubie makes this distinction between creative and less 
creative people: 
Common to most earlier writings on the topic 
and obscuring and beclouding their formula- 
tions, is a confusion between unconscious 
and preconscious functions. Thus when 
Sachs speaks of "toying with the unconscious" 
he is dealing really with preconscious 
(1) Op. cit. P. 36. 
(2) Stein, M. A., Creativity and Culture, op. cit. 
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functions as these are warped by the pressure 
of unconscious processes. If out of this 
transaction any creativity survives, this is 
due primarily and preponderently to pre- 
conscious and not unconscious processes. 
Similar examples could be drawn from 
most of the early literature on this topic; 
I believe that it would become closer to the 
truth, or at least to the thesis which I am 
presenting here, to say that the creative 
person is one who, in some manner, which today 
is still accidental, has retained his capacity 
to use his preconscious functions more freely 
than is true of qt ers who may potentially be 
equally gifted. ll) 
Dewey writes that what most of us lack to be artists is not 
emotion or skill but the: 
capacity to work a vague idea and emotio 
over into terms of some definite medium. 
( 
2) 
This has echoes in Ribot. 
(3) 
He sees the constructive imagination 
as reducible to three forms - sketched, a vague outline imagination 
which is primarily appearing first in dreaming and further set up in 
revery and then 'in castles in Spain', fancies of love, ambition, 
power and finally in plans for the future; fixed, which comprises 
mythic and aesthetic creations, philosophical and scientific hypotheses, 
a form projected outwards, made into something else; and objectified, 
comprising successful, practical inventions whether mechanical, 
industrial, commercial, military, social or political. It may be that 
less gifted people stop short early in the sketched form. 
(1) Op. cit. P. 48. 
(2) op. cit. P. 355. 
(3) Op. cit, p. 316. 
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However, Patrick found that poets and non-poets exhibited the 
four stages of creative thought and the differences appear to be that: 
poets put more imagination and meaning in their 
poem and are more dominated by the conventions 
of modern poetry. (1) 
The Problem-Solving Model and Artistic Creation 
There is much writing on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
use of the problem-solving model for artistic creation. Indeed 
Ghiselin writes, starting from Poincare's description of the creative 
process: 
This sequence of labour, quiescence, 
illumination, and further labour has 
turned out to be common to the experience 
of creative workers of all sorts. (2) 
Ruch(3) also sees creative imagination as similar to problem-solving 
and autistic thinking in that it uses symbols that have acquired 
meaning through learning. It differs from the other two in the 
degree of control. Creative imagination is less incisive than 
problem-solving that is directed by voluntary attitude and more 
controlled than autistic thinking. 
Vinacke asserts that: 
with respect to personality there is no reason 
to suppose that artists, as artists, are different 
to non artists. (3) 
(i) Patrick, C., Creative Thought in Poets, op. cit. 
(2) Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process and its Relation to the Identi- 
fication of Creative Talent in Taylor, C. W. (ed. ), The 1955 Univer- 
sity-of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Creative 
Talent, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1956, PP- 195 - 203. 
(3) Ruch, . '. L., Thinking and Language, in Buch, F. L., Psychology and Life, 
New York, Scott, Foresman, 1937, pp. 597 - 625- 
(4) Op. cit. 
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But he claims that the artist may have more practice and more 
training and thus make more use of perceptual and emotional 
response. Training also gives him the knowledge of media and methods 
of work. So the scientist differs only in patterns of training and 
skill and the idea that he thinks in a special way is not borne out 
by the evidence. 
Hirsch distinguishes the generic types of genius, artistic and 
scientific. The combination of intelligence and instinct and the 
unconscious is what they share. They differ in that in artistic 
genius : 
'the intuition', the inspirational idea, the 
erupting gleam first flashes, followed by 
critical intellectual work of improving, 
revising, adding, subtracting. In scientific 
genius, the intellectual work comes first, 
the collection of material, its ordering and 
analysis and correlation or lack of correla- 
tion with other material. Then comes the 
illumination, the radial glow that translates 
an incongruence of hypotheses and a multiplicity 
of facts into a harmonious ur}i'ied system of 
portraying an order of law. 11 
(He adds that both artistic and scientific geniuses are born from the 
marriage of unequals; in the former case, the influence of the mother 
parent - instincts and the unconscious - predominates; in scientific 
genius, the father parent, objective in intelligence, contributes a 
greater heritap'e. In neither case is there a true marriage which is 
a union of unlikes but equals, ) So it can be seen that in his view 
the difference between artistic and scientific creativity may be in 
the order of the stages of the creative process and in the background 
of the creator. 
(1) Hirsch, D. N. M., Genius and Creative Intelligence, Cambridge, Mass., 
Science Art Publishers, 1931, p. 339" 
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Bartlettldistinguishes between thinking within closed systems, 
'adventurous' thinking which breaks out of the closed system 'every- 
day' thinking and artist's thinking. He sees both scientific and 
artistic thinking starting from factual evidence but sees artistic 
thinking as having items laid out in a sequence with an internal 
gap or stopping short at a terminus or demanding reorganisation. 
The tasks of interpolation, extrapolation and reinterpretation follow 
these inadequacies in the sequence. He sees the 'preparation' stage 
as all that precedes the artist's awareness of the gap he is trying 
to fill. He sees the artist then following steps of two sorts - 
one of craftsmanship and one related to impulses and feeling worked 
out. As he proceeds in the early stages every step opens up new 
possibilities and later a critical stage is reached after which each 
stage 'achieves a partial issue which presents itself as the one that 
is most satisfying, but never as the only possible one. ' The 
completion still leaves open questions although it is understandable 
to those who accept the artist's standards. So this is view akin 
to Witkin's 'sensate problem' except that he does not see the solution 
as a complete resolution. 
Hutchinson(2) makes a similar distinction when he differentiates 
between "systematic thinking' and 'creative insitht'. In the first, 
the objective, the problem and the method are clearly defined and the 
process methodical and slow, the problem being well within the capabi- 
lities of the thinker and little frustration being felt consciously 
(1) Bartlett, F., Thinkinp,: An Experimental and Social Study, New 
York, Basic Books, 1958, p. 201. 
(2) Op. cit. p. 237. 
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'The first stages are like the last - constructive, developing, but 
also critical, reasoned, cautious. ' Systematic thinking occurs 
where the number of variables and hypotheses to be verified is not 
too large. He does see, however, systematic thought and 
'creative insight' being extremes of a scale which varies in the 
degree of 'psychic frustration' experienced. 
Plurnmeridge refutes the idea of applying the problem-solving model 
to artistic creation and argues that such an attempt is to confuse 
the two concepts of creativity described in Chapter One. He writes: 
Applied to music this might well take the form 
of asking children how many types of sound they 
can make on an instrument and then incorporate 
these sounds into a composition. We might 
say that finding the sounds is one problem and 
that the combining of the sounds constitutes 
a second problem. This would, I feel, be 
mistaken. One could accept the first operation 
as problem-solving but the second is a matter 
of working in a particular rule-governed manner. 
There is a sense, of course, in which it is 
'problematic' - there are many ways in which it 
could be accomplished - but it is essentially an 
aesthetic procedure. The child is 'expressing' 
the 'problem' through the medium of the instrument's 
sounds and the 'solution' to the problem is embodied 
in these sounds which form the 'composition'. The 
two operations are very different and serve to show 
the inappropriateness of problem-solyi g as an 
explanation of artistic achievement. ll 
He goes on to cite a possible view of the I8 as a solution to the 
problem of mean-tone versus equal temperament, of Haydn's Le Matin 
as a solution to having two outstanding violin and cello players. 
Sayers sees a problem in this approach too: 
(1) Plummeridge, C., Creativity and Music Education - the Need for Further Clarification, Psychology of Music, Vo1.8, No. 1,1980, 
pp. 34 - 9. 
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To the average man, life presents itself not 
as material malleable to his hand, but as a 
series of problems of extreme difficulty, 
which he has to solve with the means at his 
disposal. And he is distressed to find 
that the more means he can dispose of - such 
as machine-power, rapid transport, and general 
civilised amenities, the more his problems grow 
in hardness and complexity. This is particularly 
disconcerting to him, because he has been frequently 
told that the increase of scientific knowledge 
would give him "the mastery over nature" - which 
ought, surely, to imply mastery over life. 
Perhaps the first thing that he can learn 
from the artist is that the only way of "mastering" 
one's material is to abandon the whole conception 
of mastery and to co-operate with it in love: whoso- 
ever will be a lord of life, let him be its servant ... 
The second thing is, that the words "problem" 
and "solution" as commonly used, belong to the 
analytic approach to phenomena, and not to the 
creative. Though it has become a commonplace 
of platform rhetoric that we can only "solve 
our problems" by dealing with them "in a 
creative way", those phrases betray, either 
that the speaker has repeated a popular cliche 
without bothering to think what it means, or 
that he is quite ignorant of the nature of 
creativeness. 
From our brief study of the human maker's 
way of creation, it should be fairly clear that 
the creator does not set out from a set of data, 
and proceed, like a crossword solver or a student 
of elementary algebra, to deduce from them a 
result which shall be final, predictable, complete 
and the only one possible. The concept of 
"problem and solution" is as meaningless, applied 
to the act of creation, as it is when applied to 
the act of procreation ...... 
Again, there is no strictly mathematical or 
detective-story sense in which it can be said that 
the works of a poet are the "solution of the age 
in which he lived"; indeed, it is seldom at all 
clear which of these two factors is the result of 
the other. Much breath and ink are continually 
expended in the effort to find out, under the 
impression that this also is a "problem" awaiting 
of a final, predictable, complete and sole 
0 
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possible "solution". The most one can say 
is that between a poet -nd his age there is 
an intimate connection of mutual influence, 
hie"hly complex and various, and working in 
all directions of time and space. 
She elaborates on how the common man in times of crisis looks 
to the artist for solutions: 
This, thou'h excusable, is scarcely fair, 
since the artist does not see life as a 
problem to be solved, but as a medium 
for creation. He is asked to settle 
the common man's affairs for him; but 
he is welllq. ware that creation settles 
nothing. 
She C, 'oes on to distinguish the four characteristics of the mathematical 
or detective problem whichi are absent from the "life problem". 1. The 
detective problem is always soluble and she elaborates on how a 
fundamental human problem- death-is not so. 2. The detective problem 
is completely soluble and she elaborates on how there are no loose ends 
and how some people like this sort of solution,, citinr the spheres 
of medicine and politics whereas problems like liberty and order 
and liberty and equality have no such solutions. 3. The detective 
problem is solved in the same terms in which it is set and she cites 
Unemployment as a problem not of this kind. 4. The detective problem 
is finite and she adds that an artist: 
may finish a book, as we nay finish a war or 
set up machinery of a League, and he may 
think it is very (-ood and allow Eher ra 
brief sabbath of repose. But he knows very 
well that this is only a pause in the unend- 
ing labour of creation . 
(1) Op. cit. pp. 150 - 75. 
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She concludes: 
The mind in the act of creation is thus not 
concerned to solve problems within the limits 
imposed by the terms in which they are set, 
but to fashion a synthesis which includes the 
whole dialectic of the situation in a mani- 
festation of power. 
She sees the artist as rocking the foundations of the world although 
this is often unconscious. 
Chapter Three will examine whether children's processes follow 
those already seen in the mature composer. But Korzenik runs into 
one problem with children in defining creativity as a-problem-solving 
process. She writes: 
It is being proposed here that in order to specify 
creativity we mast know the problem that the 
child tackled. (i) 
In this she says the seven year old is much more concerned and able 
to make his intentions-obvious on paper than the five year old who 
doesn't see the need for clarity of expression on paper and uses a 
variety of media to put across his idea. She concludes: 
Finally the reader is reminded that these 
two stages of young child's picturing 
were revealed only after close research. 
The interest behind the picture-making 
is usually a well masked secret. Because 
of this, precise description of how the 
child seeks to solve a problem is likely 
to remain unavailable to the viewer. It 
is for this reason that art educators have 
been trapped in circular arguments. We 
know that the child's actions are responses 
to needs, but we generally cannot specify 
these needs. We have been forced into a 
position of saying something while in fact 
nothing is being said because we have lacked 
essential information. 
(1) Korzenik, D., Creativity: Producing Solutions to a Problem, 
Studies in Art Education, Vol-17, No. 2,1976, pp. 29 - 35. 
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From this analysis of children's drawings, 
I hope to have shown that certain mental 
and manipulative operations are demanded 
of the child as a means of solving a problem 
at different stases of development. It is 
these operations and not the product that 
are creative. One needs to recognise the 
goal sou; ht, the problem to be solved, in 
order to appreciate the solutions. Un- 
fortunately this is difficult to ascertain 
in the visual arts. 
Dorothy Taylor shows how problem-solving techniques can be 
introduced at various stages in the creative process. She takes as 
her starting point a quotation from Bruner: 
At the very first breath the young learner 
should, we think, be given the chance to 
solve problems, to conjecture, to quarrel 
as these are dQne at the heart of the 
discipline. ill 
Taylor goes on: 
Music teachers may be in a better position 
than any other subject to provide the 
opportunities advocated by Bruner. As an 
aesthetic subject, music, by its very nature, 
is about problem-solving; it is as much 
about preference and informed judgement as 
it is about finding correct solutions, some 
might say more. It is about intuitive 
response, individual interpretation, choice, 
enjoyment, feeling, imagination and dis- 
crimination. Do we, as educators, provide 
sufficient opportunities to practise such 
vital behaviours as by asking: "Which 
harmonisation sounds better? " "Which of 
these accompaniments do you prefer? " 
There should also be room Vor conjecture. 
"What would happen if we played this in the 
minor key'? " "How would the piece sound if 
it were played twice as fast"" Let us 
imagine what alternatives would be open to 
us if we were to apply the biological 
(1) Bruner, J., The Relevance of Education, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard 
University Press, 1974, p. 69. 
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principle to music teachin=:, namely "What 
function does this thing serve? " An 
extract of music could be taken out of 
context and the question asked: "Is it 
the beginning, middle or end? " On second 
playing the pupils hear for themselves the 
results of their decisions. A familiar 
piece could be taped in a dis-arranged order 
for pupils to re-order, thereby illuminating 
and lending a new perspective to the value of 
cadences, melodic climax, key change hrase 
beginnings and endings, for example. 
/l) 
Such a technique used could be used With the pupils' own compositions 
and this type of problem-solving would become part of the verifica- 
tion and evaluation stale. 
All these examples show the difficulties of the problem-solving 
model applied to the arts. I would conclude that although there are 
difficulties involved there are some similarities 
5specially if one 
looks in depth at the stage] and some differences. These must be 
held in balance. 
Flay and Creativity 
This quotation fron Torrance makes another link with problem- 
solving - through the area of play. He starts by quoting Grippen 
who concludes that: 
except in rare instances creative imagination 
does not function in children below the age of 
five years but some children at the age of 
five exhibit a degree of it gomparable to 
children seven years old. 2 
(1) Taylor, D., Towards a Theory of Musical Instruction, in Issues in 
? Music Education, Bedford 'ay Paper 3, University of Iondon Institute 
of Education, 1981, pp. 32 - 3. 
(2) Grippen, V. B., A Study of Creative Artistic Imagination in Children 
by the Constant Procedure, Psychological Mono !, 45 (1), 1933, 
pp. 63 - 81. 
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(This is confirmed in Part Two in what I have called the development 
of expressive character). Torrance concludes: 
If we observe how infants handle and shape 
things and twist and manipulate them in many 
ways we find some of the earliest manifesta- 
tions of creative thinking. We may see 
other beginnings of creative thinking in the 
infants use of facial expression, and the 
process of differentiating his body from the 
environment. Since the infant does not have 
a vocabulary, he can learn little by authority, 
thus, by necessity much of his learning must 
be created, that is, must evolve from his own 
activity of sensing problems, making guesses, 
testing and modifying themt and communicating 
them in his limited way. 13 
Indeed, playfulness is another aspect of the creative process often 
stressed (already referred to by Maslow). Indeed Ward 
(2) 
advocates 
the abandoning of the use of the term 'creativity' with young children 
in favour of going back to early Guilford and calling the creativity 
tests measures of playfulness. He claims that it is a less status- 
loaded word than creativity and therefore may produce more reliable 
results. It is highly significant that is within a structure 
founded on Piaget's analysis of children's types of play I have 
chosen to chart the progress of children's compositions. 
Many psychologists have discussed play. Huizinga sees its signi- 
ficance in promoting contests and groupings which are seen as civilising 
functions (part of the function of musical play as well). He considers 
(1) Torrance, E. P., Education and Creativity, in Taylor, C. W. 
(ed. ), 
Creativity/Progress and Potential, New York, McGraw Hill, 1964, 
PP. 71 - 2. 
(2) Ward, W. C., Creativity in Young Children, Journal of Creative 
Behaviour, Vo1.8, No. 2, (2nd quarter) , pp. 101 - 
5" 
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fun as important but that it resists all analysis, logical inter- 
pretation. 
(l) 
Erikson's view is akin to Piaget's mastery (which he 
does not call play, limiting this term to imaginative activities). He 
adds that adults use it as a relief from existing reality, referring 
to the characteristics of 'effortless rapidity' and 'repetitiveness 
which promises pleasing phenomena' in adult play(2). 
Lieberman(3) defines playfulness as social and cognitive 
spontaneity, joy and a sense of humour and says that it might aid 
early identification of the divergent thinker. He(4) finds that 
although play and exploratory behaviour are distinct, stimulus 
characteristics for play are familiarity, clarity, simplicity and 
congruity, while novelty, ambiguity, incongruity, surprise and complexity 
spark exploratory behaviour - exploratory stimulae prepare the ground 
for play. He adds: 
Icy review of the stimulus would suggest that, 
once the novel becomes familiar - and this may 
be as a result of exploratory behaviour - the 
playful attitude or playfulness can set in. 
This interpretation can also be applied to 
Piaget's model of assimilation and accommoda- 
tion. The existing, assimilated structures 
are the basis for recombinations not only in 
the pre-operational stages but also in the 
concrete and formal stage of intellectual 
(1) Huizinga, J., Homo Ludens. Boston, The Beacon Press, 1955, P. 2. 
(2) Erikson, E. H., Childhood and Society, New York, W. W. Norton and 
Co., 2nd ed., 1-91-r3 , p. 212. 
(3) Lieberman, J. N,, A. Developmental Analysis of playfulness as a Cue 
to Cognitive Style, Journal of Creative Behaviour, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
Fall 1967, PP. 391 - 7. 
(4) Lieberman, J. N., Playfulness: Its Relation To Imagination and 
Creativity, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1977, pp. 109 - 132. 
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development and may make up the content of 
imagination that leads to creative product' 
.... 
O shall return to this in Part Two " 
Young children play, older children play 
games, suggesting that, with age, a certain 
restrictive element enters the play situation. 
The young child's play, by dint of pre-opera- 
tional (symbolic) approach would have unique 
elements that could be labelled 'creative' 
at that time. 
When we come to consider the middle- 
childhood-child, already occupied with the 
reversibility of concrete operations and fact 
finding, we can understand how he is more 
accepting of the real world, willing to abide 
by rule-dominated games and possibly uncomfort- 
able with the ephemeral quality of early child- 
hood play. This play in its pure form can be 
depicted as a decelatory curve, but playful- 
ness may increase. 
The increase in rule-dominated play may link with the children's work 
in Part Two where form exercises more influence over the child in the 
imaginative phase. He differentiates mastery and play referring to 
Koehler's and Dolhinov's and Piaget's three subjects. 
The young chimps achieve mastery over more 
limited amount of skills in a shorter play 
time; the human infant achieves mastery 
over a larger number of skills but needs 
much longer play time to accomplish this. 
He links it with the suspension of evaluation adding that: 
the modes here would suggest that, to the 
extent that the playful enters imagination 
and originality, it creates that suspension 
of tension, that psychological distancing 
required for the idea to form and be produced. 
He adds that there is also a suspension of ego involvement involved as 
well. 
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'Those of us who have experienced it, even 
only fleetingly, will agree that the task 
in hand takes over; that physiologically, 
one experiences a surge of adrenalin; that 
there may be a sense of well-being that could 
be best be described as cosmic floating, a loss 
of boundary of self, and the merging with the 
universe. 
In his practical suggestions he calls for more playfulness in the 
classroom. He sees the pre-schooler and adolescent as similar in 
being: 
more comfortable with spontaneous happen- 
ings and less structured presentation of 
the curriculum. Their joy and sense of- 
humour thrive on ambiguities and incongrui- 
ties. The difference between them lies in 
the base line of factual material available 
and the greater awareness of the difference 
between fact and fantasy. 
The middle-childhood child, with his 
orientation towards the concrete and tangible, 
would more likely find delight in rules and 
regulations that make sense to him. I have, 
as yet, no hard data on playfulness in the 
elementary school child, but his delight in 
riddles, with their concrete referents, and 
the one and only answer that is always part 
of the riddle would seem to support our 
thesis. Mathematical rules and rules of 
grammar would, therefore, seem naturally to 
appeal to children of primary grades. 
Torrance(') found that in saious problem-solving situations 
creativity is sometimes dependent on fantasising. One set of his 
published material, Sounds and Images, is written with an invitation to 
regress, to have fun, to laugh and so enjoy oneself. Playfulness 
would seem to have a dual function in the creative process for it both 
reduces evaluation and encourages 'playing with ideas' which involves 
(1) Torrance, E. P., Creative Learning and Teaching, New York, Dodd, 
Mead, 1970. 
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pushing and pulling at the limits of concepts, examining new and 
different relationships and breaking out of inhibiting sets. 
Einstein's famous letter regarding his own creative processes 
runs: 
The words or language, as they are written or 
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my 
mechanisms of thought. The psychical 
entities which seem to serve as elements of 
thought are certain signs and more or less 
clear images which can be "voluntarily" 
reproduced and combined. 
There is, of course, a certain connection 
between those elements and relevant logical 
concepts. It is also clear that the desire 
to arrive finally at logically connected 
concepts is the emotional basis of this rather 
vague play with the above-mentioned elements. 
But taken from a psychological point of view, 
this combinatory play seems to be the essential 
feature of productive thought-before there is 
any connection, construction in words or other 
kinds of s'gns which can be communicated to 
others. 
(1) 
Feitelson and Ross showed a causal relationship between the increase 
in the level of thematic play and improved performances on conventional 
tests designed to measure innovative and original behaviour. They 
make the following proviso, however: 
One should also remember that there is no 
evidence that improving performances on 
creativity tests at age five has an impact 
on adult behaviour or even on performance of 
tests of creativity in later life. LThis 
opposes Lowenfeld's view. ] However, even 
the possibility that free play and more 
specifically thematic play, may be an act by 
which skills and attitudes conducive to 
innovative behaviour are exercised and 
(1) Quoted in Hadamard, J., The Psychology of Invention in the 
Mathematical Field, Prince*on, ' Princek,., výýý«sýtýýpFe ss ; tq L. 5, p. 142. 
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reinforced would indicate that there is a 
strong need for a re-evaluation of ed9cition- 
al priorities in the pre-school age. 
1 
Getzels and Jackson(2) found gifted and creative students as 
having a greater sense of playfulness, an abundance of humour in 
fantasy and other responses, being more accepting, more expressive 
of impulses, and having greater ability to 'toy with ideas' and 
tending to diverge from typical behaviour patterns. They saw 
humour as closely bound up with violence and aggression in the 
writings of highly creative adolescents. Kubie'e(3) work links 
with the work in the incubation stage when he sees playfulness as a 
sign that flexible thinking is going on in the subconscious, 
unconfined by the rigidity of consciousness. Kris's(4) work also 
links with this stage in his concept of 'regression in the service 
of the ego' which stresses the use of primitive modes of thinking 
in the first phase of the creative process. Maslow also roots it 
in the subconscious into which the subject dips and where he accepts 
his own primary process. He can regress without fear, have fun, 
be humorous or whimsical: 
The creative person has an uninhibited 
expressiveness and spontaneity typical 
of happy secure children. (5) 
(1) Feitelson, D. and Ross, G. S., The Neglected Play-factor, H_ 
Development, No. 16,1973, pp. 202 - 223. 
(2) Getzels, J. W. and Jackson, P. W., Creativity and Intelligence: 
Explorations with Gifted Students, New York, Wiley, 1964. 
(3) OP-cit. 
(4) Op. cit. 
(5) Quoted in Feitelson and Ross, op. cit. 
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Winnicott sees the origin of play in the space between 
mother and child, in a reality intermediate between subjective and 
objective experience. He calls this the 'potential space' between 
mother and child which at first the mother creates and which then 
with the help of transitional objects grows out into independent, 
social and symbolic play. He sees this space as the site of all 
creative and cultural experiences: 
adult, artistic creativity and appreciation, 
religious feeling, dreaming, the arousal and 
loss of affection, imaginative living and 
creative scientific work. 
It is assumed here that the task of 
reality acceptance is never completed, that 
no human being is free from the strain of 
relating inner and outer reality, and that 
relief from this strain is provided by an 
intermediate area of experience which is 
unchallenged (arts, religion etc. ) This 
intermediate area is an indirect continuity 
with the e ions of the small child "lost" 
in play. l5 
He sees the facing of the tensions implicit in play as a potentially 
creative situation: 
The searching (for the self) can only come 
from desultory, formless functioning, or 
perhaps from rudimentary playing as if in 
a neutral zone. It is only here, in his 
unintegrated state of personality, that 
which can be designed as creative can 
appear. This, if reflected back, but 
only if reflected back becomes part of 
the organised individual personality, and 
eventually, this in summation makes the 
individual to be, to be found: and event- 
ually enables himself or herself o 
postulate the existence of self. 
ý2) 
(1) Winnicott, D., Playing and Reality, London, Tavistock, 1971, p. 15. 
(2) Op. cit. P. 75. 
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Here is the phase of temporary dissolution of self seen earlier in 
the incubation phase. 
The character of this 'formless experience' is found in John 
Cage's description of his creative process: 
What we need is to fumble around in the 
darkness because that's where our lives 
(not necessarily all the time, but at 
least some of the time, and particularly 
when life gets problematical for us) take 
place; in the darkness, or, as they say 
in Christianity, 'the dark night of the 
soul'. It is in these situations that 
Art must act and then it won't be ju t 
Art but will be useful to our lives. l) 
The conflict involved in creativity is resolved through this act 
of regression by which we recover our primary or aesthetic modes of 
structuring experience and the adaptive operation of what Witkin(2) 
calls 'the intelligence of feeling'. The experience contains a 
feeling of discomfort as a new structure is created - which links 
with the drive towards balance and stability that is the basis of 
Piaget's work on cognitive development. Ross sees the second 
developmental crisis for individual creativity occurring at adolescence 
(the first occurring when the child discovered the potential space 
between himself and his mother): 
since creativity requires full mental and 
emotional maturity. Only when regression 
is optional - when there is a past to be 
accepted or rejected and when the choice is 
one's own- only when there is a felt risk 
attaching to the shift of realities, and 
the realm of the possible suddenly expands 
to infinity, can the creative crisis be 
(1) Cage, J., Silence, Calder and Boyars, quoted in Ross, M. The 
Creative Arts, London, Heinemann, 1978, p. 10. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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undergone. It is arguably a teacher's most - 
important - and certainly his most difficult - 
task to help the adolescent boy or girl 
negotiate this threat to autonomy, self- 
determination and full self-realisatio 
Freud, sees the adult world of fantasy as the extension of the 
child's world of play which he describes thus: 
Should we not look for the first traces of 
imaginative activity as early as in child- 
hood? The child's best loved and most 
intense occupation is with play or games. 
Might we not say that every child at play 
behaves like a creative writer, that he 
creates a world of his own, or rather, 
rearranges the things of this world in a. 
new way which pleases him? It would be 
wrong to think that he does not take that 
world seriously: on the contrary, he takes 
his play very seriously and he expends large 
amount of emotion on it. The opposite of 
play is not what is serious but what is real. 
In spite of all the emotion with which he 
cathects his world of play, the child 
distinguishes it quite well from reality; 
and he likes to link his imagined objects 
and situations to the tangible and visible 
things of the real world. This linking is 
all that diffe e tiates the child's "play" from 
"phantasying". (2) 
He sees the Lerman word for play 'Spiel' as a link between children's 
play and adult creations. He sees the creative writer as drawing 
on his own fantasy world -a world created of unsatisfied wishes. He 
sees the creative process like this: 
A strong experience in the present awakens 
in the creative writer a memory of an 
earlier experience (usually belonging to 
his childhood) from which there now proceeds 
(1) Op. cit. pp. 11 - 12. 
(2) Freud, S., Creative Writers and Daydreaming (1908), in Vernon (ed. ), 
Creativity, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, pp. 126 - 3ý. 
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a wish which finds its fulfilment in 
creative work. The work itself 
exhibits elements of the recent provok- 
occasion as well as of the old memory. ing 
He sees the creative writer as softening, altering and disguising his 
daydreams to make them acceptable to the reader whose 'actual enjoy- 
ment of true imaginative work' proceeds from a liberation of tension in 
the mind. 
Another aspect of play is the freedom to make mistakes well brought 
out in this passage from Antoine De Saint Exupery: 
"What mean you by 'creation'? For if you have 
in mind some noteworthy discovery, few indeed 
are capable thereof. Thus you are speaking 
of only a few - but what of the others? ". 
My father answered them: "To create may be 
to miss a step in the dance; or to deal a 
chisel awry when you are carving stone. 
Little matters it what the gesture brings 
forth. To you in your blindness, such an 
effort may seem fruitless, for you bring your 
eyes too close. Only stand back and observe 
from a distance the activity in this quarter 
of the city .... and mark my words, these 
noble words are shaped no less by those who 
botch their gestures than by those who make 
them deftly; for you cannot divide them up 
and if you will have none but great sculptors, 
you will soon have none at all ...... " 
Another day he said: "Build not an empire 
where everything is perfect. 'Good taste' 
is a virtue of the keeper of museums. If 
you scorn bad taste, you will have neither 
painting nor dancing, neither palaces nor 
gardens. You will have acted like an over- 
squeamish man who never goes out for fear 
of being soiled by contact with the earth. 
At the core of our perfection will be empti- 
ness and you shall have no joy of it. Na , 
rather build an empire where all is zeal. ' 2) 
(1) op. cit. P. 133. 
(2) de Saint Exupery, A., The Wisdom of the Sands, New York, Harcourt 
Brace, 1950, pp. 33 - 45. 
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Further Characteristics of the Creative Process 
Along with the element of play that characterises the creative 
process is an involvement in the present. Maslow writes: 
The creative person in the inspirational 
phase of the creative furore, loses his past 
and his past and his future and lives only 
in the moment ...... The ability to 
become 
"lost" in the present seems to be a sine qua 
non for creativeness of any kind ...... 
It 
has begun to appear strongly that this 
phenomenon is a diluted, more secular, more 
frequent version of the mystical experience 
that has been described so often as to have 
become what Huxley called The Perennial 
Philosophy ...... It is always described 
as a loss of self or of ego, or sometimes 
a transcendence of self. 
Laski calls them ecstasies and says that 
they have much to teach us about creativeness 
as well as other aspects of the full functions 
of human beings when they are more fully realising 
themselves, most mature and evolved, most healthy, 
when, in a word, they are most fully human. 1 
Maslow sees it at its simplest in fascination, concentration, 
absorption in anything not only in great works of art. 
He concludes his article by analysing the components of these 
peak experiences: 
1. Giving up the past; 
2. Giving up the future; 
3. Innocence (without should's 
and ought's); 
4. A narrowing of consciousness 
(concentration); 
5. Loss of ego (self forgetfulness); 
6. Inhibiting force of consciousness; 
7. Disappearance of fears; 
(1) Maslow, A. H., The Creative Attitude, op. cit. p. 45 - 7. 
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B. Lessening of defences and inhibitions; 
9. Strength and courage; 
10. Acceptance: the positive attitude 
(giving up selectivity); 
11. Trust versus trying, controlling 
striving; 
12. Taoistic receptivity (a yielding to the 
authority of the facts); 
13. Integration of B-cogniser (an act of the 
whole man); 
14. Permission to dip into primary processes; 
15. Aesthetic perceiving rather than abstracting; 
16. Fullest spontaneity; 
17. Fullest expressiveness; 
18. Fusion of person with the world. 
Characteristics of the Creative Person 
It is from such an analysis that the various lists of the 
characteristics of creative people are drawn. Barron(') lists the 
following adjectives - clever, imaginative, playful, poised, determined, 
talkative, logical, rational, shrewd, civilised, loyal, mature, 
versatile, efficient, initiatory, resourceful, reflective, quick, 
enterprising, energetic, organised, fair minded. Barron in a later 
article summarises thus: 
The creative person is more welcome to 
the apparently disorganised; in fact, 
they may be attracted to the disorganised 
and ambiguous as offering a challenge to 
their strong sense of need of the new 
ways of ordering. Creative persons are 
also more independent in judgement than 
less creative. They are also at once 
both sicker in terms of being troubled 
and healthier in terms of having greater 
resources in dealing with their troubles. 
They are of superior intelligence. And 
perhaps most important of all, creative 
persons are moved by an intense commitment 
(1) Barron, F., Originality in Relation to Personality and Intellect, 
Journal of Personality, Vol. 25,1957, PP- 730 - 41" 
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of an almost metaphysical sort that 
impels them to search for new forms 
of artistic vision. (1) 
Guilford and Torrance include many of these factors in their 
list: 
Inquiring nature, 
Observes and remembers, 
Independent thinker, 
Confident, 
Humorous, yet irrationally serious, 
Can show tremendous efforts, and at other 
times can pay attention to anything, 
Can be a hard worker and also very lazy, 
May be extremely sophisticated at times and 
other times be naive and gullible, 
Can function under stress, 
Is relatively free of inferiority and inadequacy, 
Is open and free in emotional processes, 
Is persuasive, 
Able to mobilise forces easily and effectively, 
Active and vigorous, - 
Is natural and free of pretence, 
Is expressive, 
Seeks and enjoys aesthetic and sensuous impressions, 
Searches for truth and lives truthfully, 
Is an adventurous thinker, 
Is dominant in a social situation, 
Possesses the qualities and attributes that lead to 
social status, 
Is poised and spontaneous in social and personal 
interaction, 
Is not especially sociable or participative, 
Is outspoken and sharp witted, 
Is aggressive and self-centred, 
Is verbally fluent, 
Is uninhibited in expressing worries and complaints, 
Is not preoccupied with the impression he makes on others, 
Is highly motivated to achieve where independence in 
thought and action are required, 
Is flexible psychologically, 
Is highly perceptive, 
Is open to richness and complexity of experience, 
Is tolerant of complexity and disorder, 
(1) Barron, F., Creative Vision and Imagination, in Frazier 
(ed. ), 
New Insights and the Curriculum Year Book 1963# Washington D. C. 
Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1963, 
pp. 285 - 305. 
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Prefers intuitive perception over sense perception, 
Is introverted but acts in a dominant way in social 
interaction, 
The creative person. includes a high spread of 
behaviours which has one common characteristic the 
intensity in everything he does and thinks. (1) 
Many other writers have produced similar lists. 
Hudson 
(2) 
goes further than Guilford's stress on divergent thinking 
and shows that 'convergence' and 'divergence' can be creative. He 
also looks on the creative process as a dialogue between expression 
and control, between exploration and restraint. The creative person 
needs to think divergently to create hypotheses and convergently to 
formulate these so that they can be tested. 
Courage is a quality mentioned by several writers. Rollo May 
entitled his book The Courage to Create. Gerard writes: 
Another emotional factor involved with the 
second series of conscious work is courage. 
It takes courage to face the unfamiliar, to 
espouse the different, courage to fight one's 
own prejudices only less than those of others. 
Was it not a little child who first dared to 
call the Dnperor naked? It took great 
fortitude for Kepler to adhere to his new 
notion of infinity (as the second focus of 
the parabola), for, as he said, "the idea 
seems absurd, but I can find no flaw in it. " 
Just as it did for Galileo to murmur among ý3) 
his inquisitors, "yet the world does move. " 
May adds to this that the creative person can live with the 
anxiety involved in the creative process: 
(1) As listed in Jensen, E., Creativity and its Sources, Music Educators 
Journal, Vol. 55, xo. 7,1964, pp. 34 -6 and 133 - 8. 
(2) Hudson, L., Human Beings, St. Albans, Paladin, 1978, first 
published 1975, pp. 137 - 8. 
(3) Gerard, R. W., The Biological Basis of Imagination, in Ghiselin, B. 
(ed. ), The Creative Process, New York, Mentor Books, 1952, 
pp. 226 - 251. 
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even though he may pay a high price in 
terms of insecurity, sensitivity and 
defencelessness for his gift of'divine 
madness' as the Greeks called it. 
He does not run away from non-being, as 
MacLiesh tells us, but by encountering 
and wrestling with the non-being, he 
forces it to produce being. He knocks 
upon silence and meaninglessness until 
he can force it to mean. (1) 
Jung(2)describes eight major kinds of people stemming from 
combinations of two general attitudes of extroversion and introversion 
and four functions: thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. In 
the eight types described he gives brief references to creativity so 
that there is: 
1. The extroverted thinking type who has 'synthetic' 
judgement, whose products are recognised by society 
like Darwin. 
2. The extroverted feeling type, found primarily in women 
and showing an interest in concerts, church, social and 
philanthropic enterprises. 
3. The extroverted sensation type concerned with external 
objects and who can become a jolly fellow or a refined 
person of good taste. 
4. The extroverted intuitive type who can 'make' men and 
inspire them ana promotes and indicates new enterprises. 
(1ý May, R., Creativity and Encounter, in Ruitenbeck, H. M. The Creative 
Imagination, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965, pp. 283 - 91. 
(2) Jung, C. G., Psychological Types, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1946, 
PP. 412 - 517. 
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5. The introverted thinking type who: 
formulates questions and promotes theories ... 
opens up prospects and yields insight, fs-/h7 
but in the presence of facts ... 
Zsi/he7 
exhibits a reserved demeanor. As illustrative 
examples they have their value, but they must 
not prevail ...... 
ZT-his type of thinking] 
can also create that idea which, though not 
present in the external facts, is yet the most 
suitable, abstract expression of them. Its 
task is accomplished when the idea it has 
fashioned seems to emerge so inevitably from 
the external facts that they actually prove 
its validity. 
Kant and Nietzsche exemplify this type. 
6. The introverted feeling type, principally women that 
shows itself in 'intimate poetic forms' guarded from 
others. 
7. The introverted sensation type in which the external object 
serves as a releaser for subjective emotions. Painters 
illustrate this. 
8. The introverted intuitive type who regards images in terms 
of the unconscious. 
The mystical dreamer, the seer, the fantastical crank and the 
artist fall into this category: 
If an artist, he reveals extraordinary 
remote things in his art, which in 
irridiscent profusion embrace both the 
significant and the banal, the lovely 
and the grotesque, the whimsical and the 
sublime. If not an artist, he is fre- 
quently an unappreciated genius, a great 
man 'gone wrong', a sort of wise simpleton, 
a figure of "psychological" novels. 
Some of the characteristics of creative children may not be 
desirable and often lead to unpopularity with their peers and teachers 
for they often produce wild and silly ideas and prefer to work on their 
own. 
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Torrance(1) lists the following from 150 letters describing the 
behaviour of children identified as creative: 
Over active physically and/or mentally, 
Annoying curiosity, 
Forgetful and absentminded, 
Good sense of humour, 
Doesn't participate in class, 
Reads in room while friends (boys) roughhouse 
with sisters, 
Enjoys nature and outdoors, 
Won't Join Scouts, 
Mind wanders too much, 
Friends think him slightly queer, 
Likes to work by himself, 
Imaginative, enjoys pretending, 
Sensitive, 
Likes colour, 
Uncommunicative, 
Is a 'what-if? ' man, 
Daydreams, gets lost in thought, 
Feels left out of things, 
Spends time watching others, 
Loves to read, 
Good only in science; good only in art and music etc. 
Teachers, counsellors and administrators listed the following: 
Curiosity, 
Originality, 
Independent in thinking and doing, 
Imaginative, 
Non-conforming, 
Sees relationships, 
Full of ideas, 
Experimentation, 
Flexibility, 
Persistent, 
Constructs and builds and rebuilds, 
Prefers the complex, 
Daydreamer. 
(1) Torrance, E. P., Non-test ways of Identifying the CreativetJGifted, 
in Gowan, J. C., Demos, G. D., Torrance, E. P., (eds. ), Creativity: 
Its Educational Implications, New York, Wiley, 1967, pp. 242 - 50" 
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Intelligence and Creativity 
This relationship is far from resolved, but evidence suggests that 
intelligence is a necessary but not sufficient aspect of creativity. 
Osborn states categorically: 
As Dean Stoddarel of NYU's School 
of Education pointed out, IQ tests 
reveal nothing concerning creative 
talent. (1) 
Guilford and Torrance distinguish between creativity and the 
traditional concept of general intelligence. Taylor invents a 
cumbersome term to describe those dimensions of the mind not 
covered by IQ tests-non-intelligence intellectual activities. 
(2) 
However, Guilford noted that below IQ level of 120 there is a 
positive low linear relationship between IQ and creativity. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the creative individual 
is characterised by an above average intelligence. 
Barron writes that a: 
specifiable minimum IQ is probably necessary 
in order to engage in the activity at all, 
but that beyond the minimum which often is 
surprisingly low, creativity has little 
correlation with scores on IQ tests. (3) 
(1) Osborn, A. F., Selection 3: Developments in Creative Education in 
Parnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative 
Thý, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 19 - 29. 
(2) Taylor, C. W., A Tentative Description of the Creative Individual, 
in Farnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative 
Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 169 - 165- 
(3) Barron, F., Creative Person and Creative Process, London, Rinehart 
and Wilson, 19'9, p e. z,. 
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MacKinnon 
(1) 
agrees with this and also notes that creative people 
have an unusual capacity to record and retain and command a greater 
store of information. However, traditional intelligence tests 
measure convergent thinking whereas creativity tests are often 
concerned with divergent thinking, so it is possible to distinguish 
high IQ and highly creative people and also to say that high IQ 
people are more acceptable at school. Lorge and Hollingworth(2) 
asserted that if the dictionary definition of genius is adhered 
to it must be regarded as appearing at near an IQ of 180 on the 
Stanford Binet. Sam Taylor(3) found only a moderate correlation 
between musical ability and verbal reasoning ability. But 
Phillips concludes: 
The evidence gained from this investigation 
indicates the presence of the close connection 
musicality and intelligence. The reason for 
this connection appears to be basically an 
environmental one - the home that fosters 
musicality is also likely to foster intelli- 
gence. The findings of this study are in 
agreement with those of Sergeant and Thatcher 
in that musicality, musical background and 
intelligence appear to be closely associated 
with social status. The higher the social 
(1) MacKinnon, D. W., The Highly Effective Individual, in Mooney and 
Razik, (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper 
and. Row, 1967, p. 66. 
(2) Lorge, I., and Hollingworth, L. S., Adult Status of Highly 
Intelligent Children, Journal of Genetic Psychology, XLIX, 1936, 
pp. 215 - 216. 
(3) Taylor, S., Musical Development In Children Aged 7-11, Psychology 
of Music, Vol 1, No. 1,1973, PP- 44 - 9" 
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status of the home, the more likely are 
the children ýjo be both musical and 
intelligent. `1). 
The Nature and Nurture of Creativity 
There is a further literature on the problem of nature/nurture 
especially among analysts like Kris 
(2) 
. The most detailed survey of 
this area was in Galton's Hereditary Genius. 
(3) 
Galton claims that 
mental capacities are hereditary and follow the laws of organic 
transmission. These laws can be ascertained by careful observation. 
This book is devoted primarily to a demonstration of the hereditary 
linkages among persons of outstanding achievement in a variety of 
fields. He finds certain exceptions like a small number of eminent 
sons of commanders, of eminent fathers of scientists (particularly 
as compared with the large number of eminent sons of scientists), 
of eminent fathers of poets and the enormous number of eminent sons 
of artists. Geniuses often have a good physical constitution and 
die later. He claims that genius always asserts itself and that it 
is ability combined with zeal and the capacity for hard labour which 
is also inherited. Bramwell 
(4) 
confirms many of his findings but 
found that the number of sons of eminence had declined from 45% to 
19%. He suggests that this was due to a smaller family size. He 
(1) Phillips, D., An Investigation of Relationship between Musicality and 
Intelligence, Psychology of Music, Vol. 4, No. 2,1976, pp. 16 - 3I'. 
(2) Kris, E., The Study of Creative Imagination, in Ruitenbeck. H. M. 
The Creative Imagination, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965, 
pp. 23 - 46. 
(3) Galton, Hereditary Genius, New York, D. Appleton, 1870, pp. 390 - 393. 
(4) Bramwell, 'd. D., Galton's Hereditary Genius and the Three Following 
Generations since 1869, Eugenics Review, XXX1X, 1948, pp. 146 - 
153. 
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concludes 'very few eminent men will spring from parentage in the 
lower half of the distribution of ability'. Scheinfeld(l) 
emphasizes the hereditary nature of musical genius and others. 
Greenacre(2) draws on and agrees with Galton but deplores the lack 
of study in this field. She does, however, say that the direction 
the genius will take is produced by identification at various crucial 
emotional phases in the child's life. 
Summary 
The creative process has been much described. Some writers 
favour a stage by stage analysis. See Fig. 1. Motivation 
has been the subject of much discussion and has included such 
theories as those based on Freud's view that an artist is working 
out a personal problem, to the invention of a 'sensate' problem by 
Witkin to Maslow's self-actualisation. The above lists link the 
process with problem-solving. Most theorists agree that a 
preparation stage or a basis of experience is important. Most 
interest has been shown in the incubation stage although its nature 
makes analysis difficult. It has been postulated that the unconscious 
operates like the conscious in its sifting of facts. Some describe 
it as regression to childish processes or underground games and it is 
suggested that it is characterised by a relaxation of critical processes. 
(1) Scheinfeld, A., A Musical Talent, Part 1, musical Talent, Part 11 
and From Aptitude To Genius, in Scheinf,,. eld, A., You and Heredity, 
Garden City, Garden City Publishing Company, 1939v pp. 239 - 88. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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Inspiration follows this stage and this is tested out by previous 
experience and experimentation with the ideas. The evaluative stage 
is important and integrated into the whole process in some schemes. 
It is possible that children and the less experienced stop short 
in the first stages in the process. Other models of the process 
have been put forward. Several writers stress the continual 
interaction between impulse and medium. Others dislike the 
application of the problem-solving model to musical composition 
and stress the difference between the artistic and scientific 
processes. Playfulness and play have been much discussed as one 
aspect of the process - and also courage and an involvement in the 
present. Many lists of the characteristics of the creative process 
have been drawn up including flexibility, openness, spontaneity, 
humour, adventurourness and so on. The role of intelligence is also 
much discussed in which the difference between convergent and divergent 
thinking features prominently along with the nature/nurture problem. 
V 
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CHAPTER III 
CREATIVITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 
Possible Stages in Children's Development 
Taylor, a social psychologist, after analysing over a hundred 
definitions of creativity found evidence for five levels of creativity 
which: 
vary in depth and scope rather than type. 
It is misleading to distinguish between 
scientific and artistic creativity since 
creativity involves an approach to problems, 
more basic t an the accident of professional 
training. (1) 
The first level, exemplified in the spontaneous drawings of children is 
'expressive' creativity. It is fundamental and probably necessary for 
the emergence of advanced skills later; it involves 'independent 
expression where skills, originality and the quality of the product 
are unimportant'. The next stage of 'productive' creativity contains 
the tendency to restrict and control free play and improve technique 
while the products are not very different from those of other people. 
The next level is 'inventive creativity in which the realistic 
representation of a person by an older child displaces the earlier 
spontaneous and free expressive conception'. Important characteristics 
of this stage are invention, discovery and flexibility in perceiving 
'new and unusual relationships between previously separated parts'. 
The next level 'innovative' creativity is found in few people. Its 
(1) Taylor, I. A., The Nature of the Creative Process, in Smith, P. (ed. ), 
Creativity : An Examination of the Creative Process, New York, 
Hastings House, 1959, pp. 54 - 61. 
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products modify the basic principles and foundations of a whole artistic 
and scientific S eld. e. g. a Cubist view of the human body. The highest 
form is 'emergentive' creativity where 'an entirely new principle or 
assumption .... emerges at a more fundamental and abstract level. ' 
There is a level of abstraction so that a human shape may have abstract 
properties 'still capturing human qualities but departing radically 
from representational art. ' 
Cottle outlines similar stages: 
Creativity involves the capacity to work simultaneously 
with human impulses and aspects of external reality - 
and apply one's own imagination and impulses onto reality 
- through a means of expression such as drawing. The 
first drawings of childhood are essentially an out- 
pouring of impulses. In the next phase of a child's 
drawing, the representation of reality and an allegiance 
to detail become important. Still later there can be 
a phase of what again appears to be pure spontaneity, but 
those who go through this phase will be able to speak 
about the meanings of their abstract renderings - as 
they were not in their kindergarten years relating them 
to the world they see and the feelings they are beginning 
to comprehend. At about this time we may catch sight 
of the beginning of creativity, which may emerge at age 5 
or not until age 40. Alone none of these phases in the 
development of expression constitutes creativity but all 
prepare for its emergence. So, as the drawings of 
children change from the amorphous to the specific, 
creativity has not passed them by. Instead its founda- 
tion is being constructed. (1) 
In music Glynne-Jones outlines three stages in musical creativity. She 
starts with a four year old who: 
beat out noises (not really patterns), on a drum but 
all the time was taking in what was going on in the 
room. (2) 
(1) Cottle, T. J., A Simple Change in Creativity, Journal of Creative 
pp. 11-4. Behaviour, Vol-7, No. 3, (Third quarter), 1973,7-771 
(2) Glynne-Jones, M., Learning about Music, Froebel Journal, No. 26, 
Summer 1973, pp. 12 - 14. 
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She comes to the five and*six year old: 
A five year old played a drum, using one 
beater and watching the instrument carefully; 
he was entirely 'lost' in the music he was 
making. Patterns of time appeared in the 
music though the beat was not always regular, 
and the sound was attractive musically ..... 
His behaviour is characteristic of this stage 
of development: their attention is directed 
to the action of playing a instrument and they 
make decisions to do so, on occasions choosing 
to play at the same time as each other, making 
a "band". A six year old played a xylophone 
concentrating on hitting the notes but without 
any specific order in mind. The music was given 
a shape by a recurring glissando (slide) up and 
down the instrument, which also ended the music. 
The tunes children hum and sing as they are busily 
employed often sound like "proper" tunes reflecting 
the patterns of pitch which have been assimilated 
during the early years; they are likely to be in 
the traditional idiom as most of the music children 
hear is constructed in this way. The time patterns 
and tunes played and sung by six year olds seem like 
real music and give great pleasure to the adults 
who hear them, though it would seem that it is really 
the sight which pleases. However, at this stage of 
development the focus is on the action of playing 
the instrument, or on the action which is accompanied 
by the singing or humming or chanting. The purpose 
is not to use definite musical ideas as none are yet 
developed. These ideas are first intuitively used 
by children in response to all that they have both 
heard anu done musically. A teacher asked a six 
year old who was playing an instrument what he 
was doing. He replied in a tone of voice which 
suggested that the teacher was rather stupid not to 
know that he was playing music! He was not conscious 
of the fact that the music included time patterns and 
a tune, and had a beginning and an ending and was loud 
all the way through. He had a general view of his 
action which could not yet be subjected to analysis. 
This account illustrates a point that will be taken up later, how the 
adult can be mistaken in his/her appraisal of children's creations. 
The next stage she links with Piaget's operational stage: 
It is perhaps at this stage of development that the 
contribution of the teacher is most crucial in foster- 
ing the development of operational thinking. In fact 
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this is happening from the time the children 
enter school; the breadth of experiences at the 
pre-operational stage of functioning supports 
the establishing of concepts. The basic concep- 
tual structure of music depends for its growth on 
the sort of experiences children have when they 
are functioning intuitively. Teachers foster 
the gradual metamorphosis from this mode of mental 
functioning to the subsequent mode of operational 
thinking by bringing to the children's attention 
what they have done. For example, it is not a 
question of telling children what a beat is or of 
demonstrating how to play a regular beat, but of 
carefully analysing children's music - the music they 
have made up in a free working situation-and noting 
the ideas from our musical culture which are emerg- 
ing. It is obvious when children's music begins to 
be in time and whether this is spasmodic, as it 
usually is at first, or constant. The constant 
appearance of this method of organising sound reflects 
the growth of an understanding of pulse and the begin- 
nings of a concept of pulse. 
Glynne-Jones encourages the teacher to talk about it with the composer 
and play examples of music with a strong beat. Verbalisation helps 
and is an essential part of the conceptual understanding and the 
analytic function. She sees pulse as usually the first concept to 
become operational and sees the use of pitched instruments at this stage 
as a product of time patterns. 
result of their action in space. 
The notes they happen to hit are the 
She goes on to deal with the 
increasing notion of communicating with another person: 
As children begin to think operationally they can 
for the first time communicate a specific intention 
to a companion. Now it becomes possible to say 
exactly what is to be played and genuine co-operation 
emerges. This in turn fosters children's realisa- 
tion that careful planning is necessary of endings, 
for example, if their music is to make sense. 
These discoveries lay the foundations of the under- 
standing of form in music, and initially no informa- 
tion given by the teacher can replace the understanding 
that develops from the children's perception of a 
problem of organisation and the efforts to deal with 
it. When a problem has been perceived, teachers 
need to help children to see how to solve it for 
themselves. 
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Glynne-Jones discusses the role of listening to other pieces of music 
to aid evaluation of one's own and continues: 
Ideas about how to play a piece of music grow with 
experience of actually doing and it is only when 
technical skills and concrete ideas are adequately 
developed that children begin to perceive what is 
involved in expressiveness. Indeed this is a 
sophisticated notion but has its roots in the 
early playing of children's music to the group. 
She warns against the too early introduction of written skills which in 
her model precede reading skills. 
Ingley and HunteP raw their stages of development from those 
identifiable in language learning - hearing, babbling (unintelligible 
sounds), imitation (significance of some pattern emerging), conversation 
(repetition of words and phrases and eventual emergence of 2-way 
communication) reading, writing. The musical stages they suggest are - hearinE 
(a variety of sources and styles), experimenting (first with the voice 
and then any thing capable of producing a sound, at first quite randomly 
although repeated if found attractivet imitation (patterns sung or 
played to him repeated), improvisation (the taking of already learnt 
phrases and reconstructing them into a piece of music), reading and 
writing. Of these the first two seem to parallel Glynne-Jones's 
first stage, the third is included in her stage two but not the whole 
of it and the fourth is her stage three. 
Tait(2) postulates four stages of musical development. The first 
emphasizes sound exploration and discovery in which all available sounds 
(1) Ingley, W. S., and Hunter, H., Music for Today's Children, Music 
Teacher, Vol-54, No. 3, March 1975, pp. 15 - 16. 
(2) Tait, M., Whispers, Growls, Screams and Puffs - lead to Composition, 
Music Educators Journal, Vol. 57, No. 6,1971, pp. 33 - 4. 
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are explored. The second stage associates the sound with a wide range 
of imagery-ideas - the natural world of rain, thunder and sea- and 
feelings -happiness, anger, excitement, sadness - colours, shapes - 
realising drawn pictures in sound. The third phase (which would seem 
to correspond to later in Glynne-Jones's third stage)focuses on funda- 
mental characteristics of sound - length, loudness, pitch and quality. 
(Imaging still continues in this stage. ): 
Children should become aware of sound elements 
so that they can use them to say what they want 
to say with precision. This is a period when 
children begin to strengthen sound discovery 
and imagery with knowledge of the media. In 
order to do this, they need to respond ant work 
with the inner components of sound. 
While such concepts as pulse, tempo, pitch, 
dynamics and accent have been implicit in earlier 
phases, they now become explicit and take on 
personal meanings. They are now viewed in the 
context of sound phenomena, as well as in terms 
of the expressive potential. Similarly concepts 
such as introduction, repetition, imitation, and 
variation provide a means of extending compositions 
and bringing them into cohesive shapes. 
Tait suggests activities for this phase: 
Sing an answer to this question. Extend this 
phrase. Vary this pattern. Imitate this motif. 
Change the dynamics. Increase the tempo. Vary 
the accent ..... Fill 10 seconds with any number 
of high, short sounds superimposed on three long 
low sounds. Create a fluctuating series of 
dynamics on one sustained pitch. Explore the 
problems of balancing untuned persussion sounds 
with some vocal sounds of indefinite pitch in a 
recurring five second cycle. Develop three 
different melodies above this ostinato. Treat 
this melody heterophonically. Compose a 
rhythmic canon. 
The fourth stage he suggests records and preserves sound if this is 
deemed desirable. 
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The M nhattanville Music Curriculum Project(1) sets out the 
concept of spiral curriculum in which through discovery methods a 
child will encounter gradually a more complex type of sound. So 
that in cycle 2 timbre is largely to do with contrast, while in cycle 
5 combination of sounds is introduced and by cycle 10 they are 
tackling polyphony and harmony to achieve homogeneity and contrast. 
Walker questions the premise that there is some kind of development 
from one level to another, for example, from note cluster to chords 
built in fourths. He adds: 
A much more fundamental question arises 
concerning planning in musical education. 
Dealt with in this manner, can there be 
such a thing as sequence implying higher 
and higher levels of conceptual understand- 
ing? It is a matter of merely being 
different or of being on a higher conceptual 
plane? When Beethoven, for example, 
introduced a greater emphasis on contra- 
puntal, as opposed to harmonic content in 
his compositions, was he moving to a higher 
plane of thought or merely a different one? 
In this case also there was an implict increase 
in complexity but does such an increase automa- 
tically mean higher in terms of concepts? His 
fifth symphony is surely as difficult conceptually 
as any of his late quartets in terms of formal 
structure! In the same way the cycles of MMCP 
Synthesis suggest different configurations of 
materials, not sucge sively higher levels of 
concept formation. `2) 
However, it would seem from the literature and from my observations 
(described in Part Two) that there is some development in children's 
composition. These are tabulated as follows: 
(1) Manhattanville Music Curriculum Project, New York, Media Materials 
Inc. 1965, 
(2) Walker, R., Innovation in the Music Classroom II The Manhattan- 
ville Music Curriculum Project, Psychology of Music, Vol. 12, 
No. 1,1984, pp. 25 - 33" 
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Factors affecting Children's Development 
Writers have suggested ages for the stages in the development but 
no doubt there are variations in this. Piaget(l) gives four factors 
that effect the rapidity and duration of his developmental stages: 
1. Heredity, internal maturation, although he claims this 
always acts with one of the other factors. 
2. The physical experience, the action of objects. He claims 
that although this is an essential factor it also is 
insufficient for child logic is not drawn from the experience 
of objects, it is drawn from the actions which effect the 
objects. 
3. Social transmission, the educative factor in the large sense. 
Naturally a determining factor in development, it alone is 
insufficient for the obvious reason that if a transmission 
is possible between adult and child or between that social 
milieu and the educated child, the child must assimilate 
what one is trying to inculcate in him from without. This 
assimilation is always conditioned by the laws of this 
partially spontaneous development. 
4" The factor of equilibrium : 
Discovery, a new notion, a statement etc. must 
balance with the others. A whole play of regula- 
tion and of compensation is required to result in 
a coherence. I take the word 'equilibrium' not 
in a static sense in that of a progressive equilibra- 
tion, the equilibrium being the compensation by 
reaction of the child to the outer disturbances, a 
compensation which leads to operatory reversibility 
at the end of this development. 
(1) Piaget, J., trans. Rosen, A., The Child and Reality (Problems of 
genetic psychology), Paris 1972, London 1974, Frederick Muller 
Ltd, pp. 27 - 9. 
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Equilibrium appears to me to be the fundamental 
factor of this development. We then understand 
both the possibility of acceleration and at the 
same time the impossibility of an increase going 
beyond certain limits ...... Balance takes time, 
this we agree, but the equilibration can be more 
or less rapid. Nevertheless this acceleration 
cannot grow indefinitely, and it is here that I 
will end. I do not believe that there is even 
an advantage in attempting to increase child 
development beyond certain limits. 
(He has already commented on the amount a modern child has to learn 
compared with those of the ancient Greeks .) 
He discusses too the possibility of a relationship between Freud's 
affective stages and his cognitive ones. He sees links at all stages - 
e. g. the beginning of the concept of object permanence - and goes on: 
At the age of 7 or 8, for example, new 
reciprosity relations are developed (in 
the logical sense of the term) in the 
connection of the formation of reversi- 
ble operations. In the field of moral 
feelings, a lessening of the effects of 
the superego and of authority is noted 
on this same level in favour of justice 
and other aspects of the moral or 
affective reciprocity. Similarly, on 
the adolescent level, during the period 
when the individual inserts himself into 
adult life, relations exist among the 
affective and cognitive transformations 
..... Affectivity or its privations can 
certainly be the cause of acceleration or 
delay in cognitive development .... But 
this does not mean that affectivity 
produces or even modifies the cognitive 
structures whose necessity remains 
intrinsic. Actually the affective and 
cognitive mechanisms always remain 
indissociable although distinct; and it 
goes without saying that if the affective 
stems from an energetic then the cognitive 
stems from structures. (l) 
He develops his ideas of stages more thoroughly by defining their 
characteristics: 
(1) Op. cit. pp. 47 - 50. 
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1. The order of succession of acquisitions must be constant. 
2. They have an integrative characteristic, that the structures 
constructed at a given age become an integral par+ of JhA 
structures of the following age. 
3. A stage is a whole structure. 
4. A stage includes both a level of preparation on the one hand 
and of completion on the other. 
5. There is a distinction between the process of formation and 
final forms of equilibrium. 
Are Children Creative? 
With these surveys of the stages of creative development we come 
to the problem as to whether we can use the term 'creative' to apply 
to young children. Certainly the so-called creativity tests have 
proved not to be very reliable predictors of adult creativity. 
They define creativity as an ability, or rather as an collection of 
abilities. But, if you view it primarily is a process can a child 
be viewed as creative? Cleall thought that he could. He quotes 
Mannheim: 
It is probable that every attempt at doing 
something has an antecedent view of the act 
to be performed. The main task of the 
adult is not to hamper opportunities for 
expression in movement, speaking, singing, 
touching, tasting; and not to expect too 
early a self-consciousness in spontaneous 
acts. We should not want the child to 
reflect too early on the relationships 
between his private world and the world 
as we know it. Our maxim should be 'Let 
it happen' rather trian e him do tha . In 
other words 'If a thing is worth doing, 
it is worth doing badly. '(l) 
(1) Cleall, C. + Notes toward the Clarification of Creativity 
in Music 
Education, Psychology of Music, Vo1.19, No. 1,1980, pp. 44 - 7. 
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Cleall sees the need for children to be allowed to 'act of their own 
volition' likening the process to play and referring to Froebel (as 
already discussed in Chapter Two). 
However, it is at this point that a difficulty arises. In the 
Chapter Two adults were thought voluntarily to return to primary 
processes to achieve the creative act. But the child is still at 
the mercy of-these primary processes and therefore unable to use them 
willingly for the service of the ego i. e. of the work of art- Dudek 
says: 
The abstractness of his work has resulted 
not by choice but by the nature of his 
global thinking .... The child's painting 
therefore lacks true imagination; it is 
imaginative by the same processes that a 
dream is imaginative. Although the drawing 
looks free and spontaneous, the child has 
actually worked hard to put his abstractions 
of reality down on paper. But there has been 
no transformation of the raw material. The 
final product is not art. It is an expressive 
gesture, telling is much about the child's mind 
and his immediate psychological state. 
(1) 
She does not devalue children's art but disputes the use of the term 
'creative product'. She does add the proviso: 
The activity may, perhaps reflect the first step 
of the creative process. 
This was discussed in Chapter Two. 
Flannery defines two states of aesthetic consciousness: 
Though we often think that children and 
animals are more in touch with the aesthetic 
than adults, they are, on the contrary, in a 
pre-aesthetic state. A child is unconsciously 
aware of aesthetic phenomena. The aesthetic 
is a state of conscious awareness; thus a 
child is not in a state of aesthetic awareness. 
(1) Dudek, S. Z., Creativity in Young Children - Attitude or Ability, 
Journal of Creative Behaviour, Vol-8, No. 4, 
(4th quarter), 1974, 
pp. 95 - 9. 
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When we wistfully dream to return to the state 
we had as children it is impossible as adults 
because we have crossed the threshold of 
consciousness. What we can turn to is the 
mature aesthetic consciousness of the adult. 
(') 
She adds that this gives us a sense of our value as an individual being 
and she favours the idea of aesthetic maturation in childhood by a 
variety of sense experiences. 
Dudek refers to to the work of the art historian Arnheim who says 
that: 
genuine art work requires organisation which 
involves many, and perhaps all of the cognitive 
operations known as theoretical thinking. 
Perceptually a mature work reflects a highly 
differentiated sense of form, capable of 
organising the various components of the 
image into a comprehensive compositional 
order (1972) ...... is analysis of 
Rembrandt's Christ at Emmaus runs: The 
basic compositional scheme, often considered 
a purely formal device for pleasant arrangement, 
is in fact, the carrier of the central subject. 
It represents the underlying thought in a highly 
abstract geometry, without which the realistically 
told story might have remained a mere anecdote .... 
Works of art, on the other hand, are made exclusively 
for being perceived, and therefore the artist endeavours 
to create the strongest purest, most precise embodiment 
of the meaning th1ý)unconsciously or unconsciously he 
intends to convey (1972). 
Could a child think like this? S/he lacks the grasp of the materials and 
experience of the tradition. But she may be acquiring these through 
his/her activity. 
(1) Flannery, M., Images and Aesthetic Consciousness, Art Education, 
Vol. 27, No. 3, March 1974, PP- 4- 7" 
(2) Op. cit. 
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The Gulbenkian Report The Arts in Schools stresses this: 
Creative work has to stand on the shoulders of 
previous work and understanding in the discipline 
in question. In all of them we have to do the 
hard work of learning the grammar and syntax of 
the various modes of understanding as part of our 
attempts to make advances or innovations within 
them. This is no less true of the arts than of 
the sciences. We have to learn to walk before 
we can run, much less fly. One has only to watch 
the efforts of dancers warming up, of actors 
living themselves into a role, or painters' close 
attention to single strokes, of musicians struggling 
to - find the right sound, ana the long hours of 
practice for all to realise that original work, 
brilliance even genius, in the arts, requires as 
much discipline, control and patience, knowledge 
and vision as that of any engineer, historian or 
scientist struggling to solve problem, find the 
evidence or falsify a hypotheses. But as James 
Gribble remarks: 
'We do not try to get children to think up 
scientific hypotheses or put themselves in the 
shoes of historical personages or paint pictures 
in order to develop their creativity or imagina- 
tive ability. For what we mean by developing 
creativity or imaginative ability is getting them 
to perform these varied tasks as well as they are 
able. (1969)1. (l) 
This is a confusing quotation, but the passage does contrast the 
child's creative process with the long working out of ideas in a 
material form already seen in Chapter Two. 
Pickard agrees with Dudek that no creativity is possible before 
the stage of operational or causal thinking. She writes: 
Operational knowing is a way of acting upon and 
transforming reality. Creativity, which is 
concerned with transformations leading to novel 
conclusions, is, at its zenith, dependent on 
operational ability .... The purpose of 
considering a selection of the findings is to 
illustrate the child's increasing ability to 
transform identities and to attempt to demonstrate 
that without operational ability creative con- 
(1) Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, The Arts in Schools, London, 1982, 
P. 33. 
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clusions are not possible .... In recent 
years the label 'creative' has been applied 
somewhat too freely to work, usually in the 
field of art, carried out by children of 
different ages. It is argued here that 
often the label has not been appropriate 
because the majority of young children are 
not capable of creative thought. Without 
doubt their products might well be evaluated 
as creative by a perceiving adult who is 
capable of appreciating the transformation of 
identity involved and who has enough under- 
standing of knowledge as constructed in his 
own culture to regard the product as based 
upon another logic. Researchers interested 
in creative products usually stop short at 
the product itself and rarely continue to 
investigate the ability of the individual 
responsible for it. Apart from the fact 
that evaluation of creative products is a 
highly subjective matter, in approaches of 
this type the recognition and appreciation 
of the transformation may lie with the 
evaluator and not necessarily with the 
individual carrying out the transformation. 
Unless the researcher considers the ability 
of the knower and until he goes beyond the 
evaluation of the product, he may be doing 
no more than assessing his own response to 
it. But we must not confuse what we make 
of children's constructions with what they 
intend or are capable of. (l) 
This is in sharp contrast to Torrance who outlines stages in 
creative development thus: 
In the culture of the United States, one peak 
in development seems to be reached approximately 
at age 4. By age 5 when the children enter 
kindergarten there follows increases in the first, 
second and third grades. At age 9, near the end 
of the third grade, or at the beginning of the 
fourth, there is a rather severe decrement in 
almost all of the creative thinking abilities. 
Then comes a period of recovery, especially for 
girls in the fifth grade. This recovery, how- 
ever, is primarily in fluency and not in origin- 
ality. The recovery in originality comes largely 
ý1) Pickard, E., The Development of Creative Ability, Windsor, 
National Foundation for Educational Research Publishing, 1979, 
p. 55. 
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in the sixth grade. After this, there is 
another decrease between six and seventh 
grades. 
The shape of the developmental curve differs 
from culture to culture. Indications are 
that, where there is a large degree of cultural 
continuity, development of these abilities is 
continuous. Drops in the curve appear to occur 
where cultural discontinuities coincide with 
severe discontinuities in development. Thus, 
the evidence indicates that drops in the develop- 
mental curve are strongly influenced by cultural 
forces as well as by purely developmental forces. 
Dudek in this context looks at the so-called drop in creativity 
aged 8 or 9 and sees it as a change in the quality of 'expressiveness' 
(the term that she prefers to creativity in young children)& 
At age 8 or 9 the child begins to see and 
integrate reality in a differentiated as 
opposed to a global way. This has been 
occurring slowly earlier but at age 8 he 
becomes full of perceptual dominance to a 
significantly greater extent. He is now 
at the stage of concrete operations possess- 
ing concepts he previously lacked i. e. seria- 
tion, transformation reversibility, causality 
etc. (Flavell 1963). He therefore begins to 
express his new cognitive mastery through a 
more differentiated, more realistic drawing 
and painting. He paints as the adult sees 
it.... Feeling has not disappeared; it 
becomes subservient to manipulation of form, 
to articulation of more realistic detail, to 
concepts of appropriate match. The greater 
subtlety of thought indicates actually more, 
not less imagination. Primary process 
material with its ambiguity and autistic 
logic is no longer evident, however, and there- 
fore the surprise and vividness is also missing. 
The adult concludes that the painting shows 
little of its former creativeness. True, by 
previous standards, it, has lost its freedom and 
spontaneity, but the acquired control reveals 
that the mind is'now ready for more complex 
activity -possibly for creativity. 
(2) 
(1) Torrance, E. P., Education aniCreativity, in Taylor, C. W. 
(ed. ), 
Creativity - Progress and Potential, New York, McGraw Hill, 1964, 
PP. 50 - 128. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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The other drop in creativity (aged 11 - 15) she allies with the 
emergence of true conceptual ability. Having entered the stage of 
formal operations the children begin to hypothesize, predicate, perform 
combinatorial analysis, images etc. She attributes it to Piaget's 
claim that the advent of a new cognitive action causes an increase in 
egocentrism. She stresses the dangers of the pressures on a child to 
conform and asks for the child to be encouraged to make use of his 
primary process rather than fear it. Her conclusion runs: 
Defined as a personality trait, then, creativity 
in young children has little relationship to 
creativity as the making of novel products by 
adults and may be better described by the term 
expressiveness. 
In Part Two I will describe a similar change in musical development. 
Cottle, however, while making similar distinctions on the stages 
still recommends the use of 'create': 
While the content of the child's imaginations 
and expressions is always changing the drive 
to create and establish something new as 
uniquely their own remains very alive despite 
our fear that it may be slipping away. (1) 
Elsewhere, Torrance(2) looks at the slumps in more detail and sees 
the slumps in the 4th grade as being in fluency, flexibility, origina- 
lity and elaboration. It will be seen in Part Two that there are 
times when the child is more concerned with acquiring the patterns of 
culture. S/he therefore appears less original but is in fact going 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Torrance, E. P., A Longitudinal Examination of the 4th Grade Slump 
in Creativity, Gifted Child Quarterly, Winter 1968, PP. 195 - 9. 
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through a development mode and far from going backward, is going 
forward and needs to go forward in order to reach the higher levels 
of originality at a later stage. This shows the weakness in 
creativity tests in examining what is essentially a developmental 
process not a static phenomenon. Indeed the two slumps outlined 
by Dudek at 8 or 9 and 11 coincide with this tendency. Dudek's use 
of the word expressiveness instead of creativity ties in with this 
too. 
So there are various views on creativity in children as compared 
with that of adults. The products may indeed seem to the observer 
as novel and spontaneous and therefore some would say creative, but 
the process is different in various ways. It could be seen as 
different in degree or level -as Irving Taylor puts forward -children 
only reaching the first three levels of his analysis of creativeness. 
It could be seen as different in so far as it stops short at the first 
stage of the creative process (Dewey)(1) because the child lacks the 
skills and experience to enter the later stages. It could be seen as 
different in the whole process in so far as the preoperational child 
has insufficient grasp of reality to transform it. (The operational 
child, however, embarks-on the first stage of creativity. ) It could 
be seen as different in the incubation process for the child cannot 
consciously use primary processes in that s/he is still totally the 
mercy of them. It could also be that a child is gradually building 
(1) Dewey, J., How we think, in Dewey, J. 9The Middle Works 1899 - 1924p Vol. 6., Illinois, Southern Illinois University Press, 1978. 
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up a 'culture conscience' that he will be able to use to evaluate his 
work (as referred to in Chapter Two). Children's play is also 
significant for it is within a structure founded on Piaget's analysis 
of children's types of play that I have chosen to chart the progress 
of children's compositions. 
The Role of Skills in Creativity 
There is a great deal of discussion of this. Swanwick sees them 
as necessary at two stages in the process: 
When the term is applied to achievements in 
maths, science and elsewhere, there are two 
conditions usually in evidence along with any 
crucial imaginative act. The first of these 
is a background of knowledge, skills and 
experience in the particular field of activity 
to which a problem relates. The second is 
that any 'creations' are verified, tested, 
either by rigorous reasoning and debate, or 
by controlled experiments, or, in the case of 
technology, by whether the thing works or not. 
He goes on to quote Zola's introduction to L'Ouevre: 
I shall recount my own intimate life as a 
creative artist, the everlasting pains of 
childbirth. 
and Copland's belief that music is especially demanding of all the 
arts: 
Music boasts no Henri Rousseau, no Grandma 
Moses. Naivete' doesn't work in music. To 
write any sort of usable piece presumes a 
minimum kind of professionalism. 
(1ý Swanwick, K., The Concept of 'Creativity' in Music Education, 
Education for Learning, Autumn 19749 PP. 34 - 43" 
195 
In the light of previous writing about Koestler's(l) act of 
bisociation, it would seen that one must have already acquired two 
different sets of rules before they can bisociate. 
Rossman supports this: 
Many impressive and highly coloured stories 
have been told of accidental discoveries and 
inventions. It is natural, of course, that 
stories should appeal to the popular imagina- 
tion. A careful study of these stories of 
accidental inventions, however, will reveal 
the fact that luck accidents only happen to 
those who deserve them. 
In nearly all cases we find the accident 
happens only after a persistent and carefully 
conducted search for what is invented. (2) 
He does, however, add that: 
undoubtedly man's earliest discoveries 
and inventions were the result of pure 
chance. 
Bentley is particularly condemnatory of 'modern' creativity for 
its apparent denigration of skills. He takes as his starting point 
a quotation from Brian Dennis: 
This enabled the teacher to find an 
approximation in the classroom to many 
of the sounds of avant-garde music (Cage, 
Berio, Stockhausen, Penderecki, and even 
Boulez). The system demonstrated how 
sophisticated as well as 'modern' a group 
of young musicians could be particularly 
as, each person added to the overall 
complexity-of the textures by playing 
different pitches, rhythms etc. In other 
words a large ensemble of youngsters was 
(1) Koestler, A., The Act of Creation, London, Hutchinson, 1964. 
(2) Rossuran, J., The Psychology of the Inventor, Washington D. C., 
Inventors Publishing Co., 1931, pp. 117 - B. 
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able to match in sound the virtuosity of a 
smaller number of professional players ... 
The extreme difficulty of Boulez and similar 
composers is- that the music re uires unpreced- 
ented technique of execution. 
(1) 
From this Bentley draws the conclusion: 
One cannot have it both ways. If unprecedented 
technique is needed for the performance of certain 
pieces of music, how can we accept that relatively 
unskilled school players (however euphemistically 
described as "young musicians") can "match in 
sound" that which requires "unprecendented 
technique". What have the professional players 
been doing spending years of training and hard 
work acquiring their techniques, if youngsters in 
school can 'bnatch their virtuosity' without any 
training or effort? And what, if they read the 
above quotation would the composers Messrs Boulez 
and Co think? (2) 
(They might, of course, think that those young musicians are in the 
beginning stages of acquiring this unprecedented technique-) He 
finishes by using a quotation from Schafer to question the educational 
validity of these procedures: 
A question often raised over the years at 
lectures at workshops has been 'Where does 
it all lead? ' and I suppose after ten years 
you might have an answer. But the easiest 
answer to give will be the hardest to take 
and will not win converts for creativity. 
"Where does it all lead? " the Principal asked 
after one of my more daring sessions, and 
looking desperately around at the debris I 
fixed my eye on him firmly and said "Anarchy 
anarchy ...... a totally creative society 
would be an anarchic society. " (3) 
(1) Quoted in Bentley, A., Music in Education: A Point of View, 
Windsor, NFER Publishing Co. 1975, pp. 57 - 8. 
(2) Op. cit., p. 58. 
(3) Schafer, M., Where does it all lead? Australian Journal of Music 
Education, No. 12, April 1973, PP. 3-5. 
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This is an extreme view and Ellis softens it in: 
Creativity flirts with chaos and unless 
there is an active and stimulating inter- 
change of ideas, techniques and experiences, 
then the process becomes valueless ...... 
(1) 
Other writers see exploratory activity as the first stage of 
creativity the skills being taught as and when the child feels a 
need for them. This is John Horton's view in the UNESCO report: 
In teaching musical skills there can be no 
successful attempt at intellectual analysis, 
formulation and recording in graphic symbols 
until a mass of sense impressions has been 
acquired .... The reading and writing can 
come later. What is surely to be avoided 
is the premature teaching of abstractions, 
however attractively it may be possible to 
present them .... The teacher cannot afford to let himself forget that notation is only 
the servant of musical creation and inter- 
pretating. (2) 
This is exemplified in this quotation from Jenny Fowler: 
Getting music down on paper presents problems. 
The first problem is that the notation should 
not dictate the ideas. One has to thwart the 
mind from thinking in traditional notation and 
consequently along beaten paths. I usually 
devise a short-hand way of jotting down ideas 
as I think them, and work out later, how best 
to notate them in order to convey them to 
other people. 
(1) Ellis, P., Creative Music at Notley, Music Teacher, October 1977, 
PP. 17 - 18., 
(2) Horton, J., A Report on Music Education in England, UNESCO, 
1955, pp. 136 - 9. 
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A. conventional notation can be a way of putting out 
signs to show what is relatively important or not 
important in a piece. In my string quintet, 
Ravelation, some of the patterns of quicker notes 
are written with much smaller noteheads, and without 
accidentals. It is requested that these be played 
as microtones, according to their approximate 
position on the stave, and that the pattern of notes 
be followed. It seemed to me that if I had written 
exact pitch values in microtones, the players would 
be concentrating very hard on getting the pitch right 
(pitch being a priority that players expect to be impor- 
tant - and, indeed, one hopes that they get it right 
when one does notate it precisely! ) whereas I wanted 
their attention to be concentrated on the patterns and 
the way they were changing and progressing. (1) 
Shaw adopts the opposite view from Horton for while praising the writings 
of Herbert Read he sees music as different: 
By means of freely offering children means of self- 
expression in various creative media without first 
teaching technique or skill, very remarkable results 
have been achieved but music does not seem to offer 
the appropriate opportunities for children's self 
realisation on these lines principally because there 
is no form of creative work which does not require 
technique. (2) 
Paynter disputes that this is true of music alone, and asks why people 
expect musical sophistication from the start: 
Does it really help to develop children's 
musical imagination if one begins by imposing 
on them our own developed concepts and techniques 
of music? Is it possible that there is a vital 
stage that comes before the techniques of having 
something to say? Here, however rudimentary the 
level of exploration and discovery, the processes 
will be no less than those at the root of any 
artist's working methods; (3) 
(1) Fowler, J., My Own Ears, NMA4,1985, Victorian Ministry for the 
Arts, PP. 3-6. 
(2) Shaw, W., Music in the Primary School, London, Dobson, 1952, pp. 15-16. 
(3) Paynter, J., D. Phil Thesis, York University, 1970, P. 13. 
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So Paynter sees the child's creative process akin to the adults in 
having the fundamental purpose of feeling articulated in form as its 
underlying purpose. Hollander also sees the acquisition of techniques 
as being a second stage in the achieving of creativity: 
Parents say to me "Johnny doesn't study his 
scales. He's always improvising the way he 
wants". My God, let him. This is what 
being a human being is about. And when he 
says "My mind is going this way but I can't 
move my hands" he'll have to know about 
muscle relaxation and those little black 
dots. "Well, tell me, teach me". 
(1) 
Maxwell Davies appears to support the idea that children will learn 
skills when they feel the need for them. He talks about a pupil's 
composition that: 
has remarkable assurance for a composer who 
never had a piano lesson, a harmony lesson nor 
a rudiments lesson. His musical tuition has 
been limited to two years on a clarinet, and 
to normal orchestral and choral rehearsals at 
the school. Very many hours indeed went into 
this work, and he taught himself to play the 
piano competently enough to try the harmonies (2) 
himself during the weeks of its composition . 
This compares with a friend's son who taught himself harmony on the 
piano for his compositions. 
Paynter(3) suggests that it is time we stopped using the word 
'creative music' simply because teachers do see it as an alternative 
to traditional values with a dichotomy between this and other forms of 
(1) Hollander, L., Loosen up! For God's sake loosen up!, Music Educators 
Journal, Vol. 56, No. 9, Pp- 32 - 5" 
(2) Davies, P. Maxwell, Musical Composition By Children, in Grant, W. 
Music in Education, Colston Papers 14, London, Butterworth, 1963, 
pp. 108 - 124. 
(3) Paynter, J., The Role of Creativity in the School Music Curriculum, 
in Burnett (ed. ), Music Education Review It London, Chappell, 1977, 
PP- 3- 27" 
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music-making and that, therefore, skill learning has been distinct from 
the creative employment of skills. 
The sequence of exploration and discovery leading to more opera- 
tional thinking does seem to be an essential part of learning to be 
creative. Indeed this links with Ghiselin's premise that: 
media are wholly mastered only in the exercise 
of creative power in production, by efforts to 
shape the substance of the medium in new configura- 
tions. (1) 
A child cannot work in his imagination with sounds he has not heard. 
Cleall describes how the child's formation of concepts is based on 
motor experience. He quotes Kephart: 
At the earliest stage, the child's information- 
processing strategy is largely motor in nature. 
If his motor patterns are inadequately developed 
he is literally unable to contact and apprehend 
the world around him. In later stages, the 
motor component becomes subservient to the child's 
early perceptual and conceptual capabilities. 
Initially, however, intellectual deficiency is 
a tantamount to a disrupted and undeveloped motor 
s stem, 1968, quoted in Ball 1977). 2 
Cleall sees that the problem of music education has been that the 
methods used required 100% accommodation to the demands of the teacher. 
(Make him do this! Make him do that! ) and motor patterns were inade- 
quately developed precisely because the pupil was forbidden to vary 
his performance spontaneously. 
(1) Ghiselin, B., The Creative Process and its Relation to the Identi- 
fication of Creative talent, in Taylor, C. W. (ed. ), The 1955 
University of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of 
Creative Talent, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1956, 
PP. 195 - 203. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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If the vicious circle is to be broken, 
we must accept, with Kephart, that 
perception and cognition, including the 
capacity for abstraction, ultimately 
develop from a motor base and that, 
without the necessary motor elaborations 
and generalisations, intellectual growth 
will be impeded and distorted; in which 
case remedial treatment requires the 
appropriate therapeutic reintroduction of 
the motor component. Even for the normal 
child, concepts are ultimately anchored in 
motor experience. /Given thag there was 
formed at last an internal model- a constant 
and orthoscopic perceptive image .... Now 
with no extended exploratory operation, one 
short glance at the object - the distinguish- 
ing of some characteristic feature -can signal into action the whole internal model, and thus 
lead to an immediate grasping of the properti s 
of the perceived object. (Zaporozhets, 1965). 1) 
Plummeridge sees a basic difference between the composer and the pupil 
in the music lesson as what Seashore calls "tonal imagery": 
Over fifty years ago Seashore analysed the 
introspective reports of famous composers and 
concluded that the most significant common 
factor of the "musical mind" was the ability 
to live, think and operate in a tonal world. 
"Tonal imagery", he argued, was a necessary 
condition of any creative work in music. 
Although there is no reason to suspect that 
the child has not entered this worla, it will 
be reasonable to suppose that his knowledge 
of it is very limited in comparison to that of 
the recognised composer. (2) 
(He goes on to deal with children's work based on graphic symbols 
where the child conceives it in visual terms rather than aural terms as 
an example of the difference in a child's world compared with a 
composer's. ) I suggest that the "tonal imagery" is built on a base 
of the child's exploratory activities and without these it cannot 
exist. 
(i) op. cit. 
(2) Plummeridge, C., Creativity and Music Education - the Need for 
Further Clarification, Psychology of Music, Vo1.8, No. 1, pp. 34 - 9. 
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It is interesting also to note that Stravinsky talks about the 
role of the sounds of St. Petersburg in his musical development: 
The sounds of St. Petersburg are still close 
to the surface of my memory. Whereas visual 
images are recalled, in my case, mainly by 
unexpected shifts and combinations of pressures, 
sounds, once registered appear to remain in a 
state of immediacy; and while my accounts of 
things seen are subject to exaggeration, to 
mistaken observation, and to creations and 
distortions of memory itself (a memory being 
a whole cartel of invested interests), my 
recollections of sound must be faithful. I 
am proving as much, after all, every time I 
compose. 11) 
Agnew(2) looks at the work of Schumann, Mozart, Brahms, Tchaikovsky 
and Wagner and at the spontaneity of their auditory images (although 
he also finds visual and kinaesthetic images there as well) and the 
importance of auditory memory. And Aeldi writes: 
Neither inherited talent nor physical growth 
of a child are factors to be denied, but the 
older a child becomes, it is not these but 
the previous learning experience a child has 
had that exerts a more decisive influence. (3) 
All this links back to the discussions in Chapter Two of the role of 
memory in the creative process. In my observation of children's 
development can be seen the building up of a bank of cliche and musical 
conventions in certain modes of operating. This is clear in Maxwell 
(1) Stravin3ky, I. and Craft, R. 9 
Expositions and Development, London, 
Faber, 1962, p. 28. 
(2) Agnew, M., The Auditory Images of Great Composers, Psychological 
Monographs, XXXI, 1922, pp. 271 - 287. 
(3) Aeldi, H. in Roth, H., (ed. ), Begabung und Lernen, Stuttgart, 
Deutscher Bildungsrat, Gutachten und Studien der Bildungskommission, 
1969, p. 27. 
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Davies's description of his work at Cirencester. I include a long 
quotation as it embodies much of what has been discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs: 
It was while we were rehearsing for the 
first performance of my Magnum Mysterium 
for choir, instrumental ensemble, that 
the first original composition by members 
of the school appeared. This was late in 
1960, after several small works I wrote 
specially for the school orchestra had 
been rehearsed and performed, but Ma lunL 
Mysterium was my first work for schools 
with a choir. As the young composers had 
learned I, IV, and V in class working with 
them practically, their first original 
efforts naturally employed this formulae. 
I must add that because my compositions 
grew out of this stage many years ago, 
many visitors to the School have been 
surprised to see me insisting on chords 
I, IV and V to the extent of having the 
children improvise on them clearly and 
correctly in groups on simple chord 
patterns, with voices and instruments, 
resulting in an elementary but controlled 
polyphony. It would be useless to deny 
the basic chord patterns at the very roots 
of our musical experience, which form the 
basis of so much of our musical communica- 
tion. If, in order to create a freedom 
from tradition as certain elements would 
have it, we deprive our pupils of a common 
denominator of experience and communication, 
they have no common ground from which to 
start out, reassured, towards a natural 
individuation. The rootless composer will 
be reduced to the meaningless, disintegrated 
manner of composition adopted by the composers 
who either never had roots, or denied them. 
Their work will be uncontrolled, in that it 
must fail to present meaningful musical images 
deriving from a perceived inherent 'ideal' 
technique. The striking and persuasive quality 
of this approximation is dependent, to a para- 
doxically large extent, upon the difference in 
the recognisable work from previous interpreta- 
tions of, the "ideal". Such an ordered, inte- 
grated and related process in composition differs 
absolutely from the automatic processes adopted 
when either the total field of the music is 
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organised according to pre-determined 
formulae, for instance by a series 
projected via numerical permutation 
to all dimensions (pitch, note values, 
dynamics, colour etc. ), whereby the 
composition process is reduced to the 
selection of the series and the rest 
amounts to watching a computer work 
once the buttons are pressed, or at 
the other extreme, but with the same 
result (that the composer has no 
control over any given musical event 
or any given point in his creation), 
when musical events are determined by 
chance operations, such as dice-throw- 
ing. Freedom is pointless when the 
responsibilities implied are betrayed 
into absolute pre-determinism on the 
one hand and into absolute anarchy on 
the other. 
I have dwelt on this point in the hope 
that it will clear up some misunder- 
standings about tradition. In circles 
where tradition is misinterpreted, art 
becomes grotesque as tradition is lost, 
conscious creation is abandoned and 
unconscious creation is compromised by 
either of the two extremes described 
above. 
What tradition does not mean, however, 
is the blind observation of a priori 
values formulated by non-creative 
middle-men from a lack of understanding 
of the real means of communication, whereby 
rules about progressions from note to note 
within fundamental chord patterns obscure 
the idea which the chord progression 
formulates. The first need of a young 
composer trying to compose is to get his 
idea across, and to niggle him about note- 
to-note niceties before the basic idea has 
become alive and meaningful on a very deep 
level is to inhibit all creation and 
probably to inflict permanent harm on the 
creative faculty. this links with 
Chapter Four] It is as if one were to 
insist that a sentence formulating a desire 
for water be perfect according to a 
grammatical system having no meaningful 
relationship perceptible to the thirsty 
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person with the immediate need for water, 
and upon repeated insistence on true 
grammatical niceties, the need for water 
would meanwhile be superceded by the demise 
of the thirsty organism. These early 
compositions, then, by our children, contain 
parallel octaves and plenty of the pundit's 
"grammatical errors". Had I insisted on 
grammatical accuracy at this stage, the 
freshness and spontaneous joy would have 
disappeared. (1) 
Creativity and Contemporary Idioms 
Stephens, however, in a somewhat different slant puts the onus 
on the teacher to be steeped in modern composition and quoting 
Lutoslawski he writes: 
The twentieth century has discovered 
enormous areas of new sound beauty and 
for those who can admire this beauty it 
seems almost absurd to stick obstinately 
to the old rules, tastes and habits and 
to scorn the unlimited possibilities 
discovered by the masters of the twentieth 
century. The task of today's music educa- 
tionalists and animators of musical life is 
to get acquainted with these new laws, new 
values and new artistic aims and then to 
"tune" the sensibility of listeners from 
younger generations so that they will be 
able to assimilate new artistic values 
created by the people of our times. (2) 
Later in the same article Maxwell Davies supports this when he 
refers to helping a pupil with a composition using Webern - like 
orchestration: 
(i) 
. Op. cit. 
(2) Stephens, J., Creative or non-creative, Unpublished paper presented 
at ISME International Conference, Bristol, 1982, p. 6. 
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It is clear that to help a pupil work 
out a composition like this, in a very 
"contemporary idiom" the teacher must 
be familiar with the problems involved, 
in this instance, necessitating a good 
knowledge of Messiaen and Stravinsky, 
who both faced similar compositional 
problems on a far more advanced level. 
Yet the ready answers to the problems 
must be forgotten, and not intrude 
upon the solution of a particular work. 
This is a good occasion to introduce the 
work of Messiaen (Vingt Regards) and 1 Stravinsky (Argon) to the composer. 
Plummeridge, 
(2) 
however, sees children's creative work more in 
line with aleatoric techniques of Cage, Xenakis and Zinofieff. (The (3) 
Manhattanville Curriculum Project also says that musicians in the 
creative aspects of involvement. are concerned with the musical 
thought of our times. It does not preclude the use of historical 
music for appreciation but it does as a source of creative actions. 
The reason given is that: 
a musician is a contributor to the 
continual development of musical 
thought and practice ...... music is a continuing art and not a static 
or completed set of occurrences. 
So creativity is again concerned with the new and only concerned with 
the old if new is developed from it. The practices advocated in 
MMCP support this. ) 
However, Plummeridge(4) makes the important proviso about the 
creative process involved here, that whereas an important part of the process 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
(3) Op. cit., p. 6. 
(4) Op. cit. 
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for established composers is that they have the initial idea that leads 
to the composition process, often in the classroom that idea is given 
to the children, not created by them. (This sets apart the work of 
established composers and children again. ) 
Loane summarises much of the discussion in these last paragraphs 
when he says: 
However, if we grant that the act of 
creation is itself the central sort 
of musical learning, our investiga- 
tions seem also to reveal close and 
complex connections with skill learn- 
ing and theory learning. 
Firstly, pupils may draw on 
previously acquired skills when they 
create. For example, Midnight Delirium 
could never have been created without 
the various instrumental skills learned 
through practice nor without the compo- 
sitional skills built up through months 
of making up more elementary pieces. 
Secondly, pupils may draw on 
techniques suggested by the teacher as 
a starting point for an assignment. 
For example again, Midnight Delirium 
took its initial impetus from the flute 
player's exploration of the suggested 
triads of E minor and A minor. 
Thirdly, pupils may draw on 
techniques suggested by the teacher as 
work progresses. For example again, 
the teacher suggested the improved hand 
position for the guitarist in Midnight 
Delirium, and he suggested the extension 
of the 'terror' passage, because he heard 
the possible relevance of those ideas to 
what seemed to be the pupils' emerging 
musical intention. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most interest- 
ingly, the pupils may find techniques they 
never knew before, but which they stumble 
on during exploration, and which they 
accept and adopt as appropriate to their 
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creative intent. Indeed, we find that 
often the most intriguing and exciting 
aspects of pupils' work came into this 
category. If this is so, there may be 
important implications for the way in 
which we initiate composition work in 
class. It may be vital to present 
assignments that allow, or rather 
encourage, the pupils to explore ideas 
in that open-ended way. 
We cannot predict in advance which 
techniques will become musically relevant 
to which pupils when, and we must fear 
that to restrict pupils' musical experience 
to teacher -directed work, or to composing 
"within a framework", might tend to result 
in the setting of trivial tasks. In the 
tape-recorded compositions we are studying, 
each pupil is climbing his or her own msuical 
path, albeit in constant interaction with 
other pupils and with the teacher and that 
path very frequently transcends any particular 
outcome the teacher may have foreseen. We 
might say that the teacher's initiating role 
should be more like that of a launching pad 
than like that of a framework. 
New techniques, whether suggested by the 
teacher or discovered by the pupils, are not 
yet, of course, skills. A skill is a practised 
ability, something that can be drawn on when- 
ever chosen, in a variety of unforeseen 
contexts. But perhaps a pupil's more or 
less fortuitous discovery may be taken by the 
teacher as signal that the pupil is ready to 
learn it as a skill. Then a performance 
technique may require a technical exercise 
before it becomes a performance skill. And 
a composition technique might require theore- 
tical elaboration before it becomes a compo- 
sition skill. 
Of course, the evidence presented here 
cannot be conclusive on its own, but it does 
suggest the possibility that skills may be 
learned better not worse in the context of 
imaginative application. Certainly many will 
take the view that that imaginative applicatio 
is the whole point of learning skills anyway. 
(1) Loane, B., Thinking about Children's Compositiona, British Journal 
of Music Education, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 1984, pp. 205 - 31. 
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Creative Work in the Classroom 
Implicit in this problems is the whole idea of being creative 
to order in a classroom and what the teacher needs to do to overcome 
the problems. Swanwick writes: 
Over the rarer moments of inspiration, the 
flashpoints of original ideas, we seem to 
have little control, and they may indeed 
arrive when least expected, perhaps 
uninvited, when relaxing rather than 
working. Certainly they will not come 
to order, or in a contrived 'Let's be creative' 
session. But however and whenever they come, 
the ground is prepared beforehand and the 
novelty tested after its emergence. (1) 
Gutman writes: 
Creative behaviour, by its very nature, 
is spontaneous, nondirected, ordinarily 
not capable of being elicited at will. 
Therefore it is unpredictable and 
escapes manipulation and control. It 
is generallx not amenable to experi- 
mentation. 12) 
I would submit while this is true of the flashpoints of illumination 
described in Chapter Two, there are other stages in the creative 
process which do not demand this intuitive flash. It is possible 
that we can explore these in the classroom. Tchaikovsky writes: 
Do not believe those who try to persuade 
you that composition is only a cold 
exercise of intellect. The only music 
capable of moving us and touching us is 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Gutman, H., The Biological Roots of Creativity, in Mooney and 
Razik (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and 
Row, 19679 P. 3. 
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that which flows from the depths of a 
composer's soul when he is stirred by 
inspiration. The guest does not 
always respond to the first invitation. 
We must always work and a self respecting 
artist must not fold his hands on the 
pretext that he is not in the mood. If 
we wait for the mood, without endeavouring 
to meet it halfway, we easily become 
indolent and apathetic. We must be patient 
and believe that inspiration will come to 
those who can master their disinclination. 
Creativity is for Everyone 
If inspiration is a component of the creative process one may 
well ask how far it is universally found in music. The writings 
about creativity in the classroom abound with the idea that it is. 
Paynter and Aston: 
We have all the capacity to perceive, 
reflect and express. We all have the 
capacity to create. (2) 
Hickok and Smith: 
We know that most all the children have 
the gift of creation. We know that music 
is a universal behaviour of mankind. To 
develop these two qualities in the child 
-his musical ability and his creative 
ability has been the goal of the public 
school since music was n orporated as 
part of the curriculum. k3) 
(1) Tchaikovsky, P., Letter (1878), in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, " 1970, p. 58. 
(2) Paynter, J., and Aston, P., Sound and Silence, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1970, p. 4. 
(3) Hickok, D., and Smith, J. A., Creative Teaching of Music in the 
Elementary School, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p. xiii. 
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Steinberg: 
Everyone is born with a high endowment 
of awareness; the creative attitude 
seems to have been built into the 
species. (l) 
Gowan and Demos: 
Children are naturally creative and only 
require the right atmosphere to manifest 
it. 2 
Benson: 
The purpose of this kind of study is to 
deal with students of known gifts; 
another purpose of this combination of 
the creative act and the joy of pursuit 
is to discover the inherent creativity 
there is within every person. The 
degree of achievement and accomplishment 
may vary, but these procedures and 
attitudes have been successful in teach- 
ing classes whose age ranged from 13 
through 19 and whose previous musical 
sophistication ranged from no previous 
instruction tg considerable knowledge 
about music. 
N 
Auerbach: 
We have focused only at the tip of the 
pyramid of development with looking at 
creativity, and thereby inadvertently 
excluded whole groups of children from 
participation in the creative acts that 
arouse wonderment in adults and add to 
(1) Steinberg, L., Creativity as a Character Trait: an Expanding 
Concept, in Gowan, J. C., Demos, G. D., and Torrance, E. P. (eds. ), 
Creativity : its Educational Implications, New York, Wiley, p. 126. 
(2) Gowan, J. C., Demos, G. D., and Torrance, E. P. (eds. ), Creativity 
its Educational Implications, New York, Wiley, 1967, P. 221. 
(3) Benson, W., The Creative Child could be any Child, Music Educators 
Journal, Vol. 53, No. 8,1973, pp. 38 - 49. 
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the children's self-respect. Many nursery 
school teachers and adults sensitive to the 
needs of young children recognise these acts 
as being creative regardless of where they 
occur in the pyramid. A child with a lung 
disease who manages to develop better breath- 
ing skills is a joy to his teachers and nurses 
because it represents a new, unique and original 
development ...... Those individuals whose 
levels of abilities, skills, learning and 
associative thinking cannot reach the level of 
concentration or free play are still creative 
and unique in their own way, although they might 
not be highly intelligent. Recognition of the 
child's creative acts, regardless of his position 
on the pyramid of development, can be made formal 
with the adoption of the creative act as the unit 
of assessing each child's progress andýdývelop- 
ment in any nursery school programme. l 
Arnold concludes: 
'I believe most sincerely that all men are 
born with a very definite potential for 
creative activity. This potential may 
vary from individual to individual but the 
large differences are more due to failure 
to realise the inherent potential r they 
than due to original limitations. 
"2) 
He supports ways to improve one's own creative potential. 
Thurstone says that Spearman assumed creativity to be a general 
characteristic but states his own position as: 
We shall probably discover that creative 
talent must be combined with specific 
abilities which are requ4red for expres- 
sion in different media. 3) 
(1) Auerbach, A. G., The Bisociative or Creative Act in the Nursery 
School, Young Children, Vo1.28,1972, pp. 27 - 31. 
(2) Arnold, J. E., Education for Innovation, in Parnes,. S. J., and 
Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative Thinking, New York, 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 127 - 138. 
(3) Thurstone, L. L., The Scientific Study of Inventive Talent (1952) in 
Parnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source Book of Creative 
Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, pp. 51 - 62. 
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Torrance maintains that everyone possesses creative abilities to 
some degree and that it is the obligation of all schools to provide 
training thinking for four reasons: 
1. That it is important for mental health 
as an antidote to repression so destructive 
to personality. 
2. That it improves memory. 
3. That it is essential for the application 
of knowledge in personal and professional 
spheres. 
4. That it is important for society. 
ýlý 
Hallman(2) makes the point that unless it is commonly found in 
children it can never serve as a proper aim of education. He 
supports the view from the philosopher Murray(3) and Bergson 
(4) 
the 
physiologist Gerard, 
(5) 
and the psychologist Maslow(6) and psychiatrist 
Fromm. 
(7) 
He goes on to outline three views about the reasons for 
(1) Torrance, E. P., Developing Creative Thinking through School 
Experiences, in Parnes, S. J., and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source 
Book of Creative Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1962, 
pp. 31 - 45. 
(2) Hallman, R. J., The Commonness of Creativity, Educational Theory, 
Vo1.13,1963, PP. 132 - 6. 
(3) Murray, H. A., Vicissitudes of Creativity, in Anderson, H. (ed. ), 
Creativity and its Cultivation, New York, Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1959, p. 100. 
(4) Bergson, H., Creative Evolution, New York, The Modern Library, 1944. 
(5) Gerard, R. W., The Biological Basis of Imagination, Scientific 
Monthly, Vol. 62,1946, PP. 477 - 504. 
(6) Maslow, A. H., Toward a Psychology of Being, Princetown, New Jersey, 
D Van Nostrand Company Incorporated, 1962, p. 127. 
(7) fromm, E., Value Psychology and Human Existence, in Maslow, A. H., 
New Knowledge in Human Values, New York, Harper Bros., 1959, 
p. 163. 
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difference in the range of creative abilities. The first is that 
the difference is quantitative rather than qualitative, referring to 
Jones('). The second is that although all people are creative, some 
have learned to release into outward expression, while for others it 
is only a potential of which the individual may even be unaware, a 
view exemplified by Lowenfeld(2) who exhorts teachers thus: 
We have to regard it as our sacred responsi- 
bility to unfold and develop each individual's 
creative ability as dim as the spark may be and 
kindle it to whatever flame it may conceivably 
develop. 
In the third view the difference in the range of creative abilities 
tends to disappear when creativity is defined as a way of conducting 
one's life rather than in terms of a number and kind of object which 
one may have produced, thus equating it with self-actualisation, a 
view best developed by Rogers 
(3). 
Creativity and the Gifted 
However there is another literature that sees creativity as not 
universal. Guilford sees excellence as limited to a few people when 
he writes: 
(1ý Jones, E., How To Tell Your Friends from Geniuses, Saturday Review 
Vol. XL, August 10th, 1957, P. 9. 
(2) Lowenfeld, V., Basic Aspects of Creative Thinking, in Andrews (ed. ), 
Creativit and Psychological Health, Syracuse, Syracuse University 
Press, 1961, p. 130. 
(3) Rogers, C. R., On Becoming a Person, Boston, Houghton Miffing 1961, 
Chapters 8 and 9. 
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Another important reason for the neglect, 
of course, is the difficulty of the problems 
themselves. A practical criterion of 
creativity is difficult to establish because 
creative acts of an unquestioned order of 
excellence are extremely rare. In this 
respect the situation is much like that of a 
criterion for accident-proneness which 
calls for accidental occurrence of accidents. 
The accidental nature of many discoveries and 
inventions is well recognised. This is partly 
due to the inequality of stimulus or opportunity 
which is largely a function of the environment 
rather than of individuals. But if environmental 
occasion were equal, there would still be great 
differences ir} the creative productivity among 
individuals. (1) 
Bentley 
(2) 
claims that the instinct to create original'music is not 
universal and points to the way in which many infants lose interest in 
sound exploration activities as an example of this. Dudek adds: 
What evidence do we have then for the notion 
that children are universally creative, as 
most adults would like to believe? The 
type of expressive creativity which a child 
demonstrates in behaviour is difficult to 
assess and we have no research data to 
report on its frequency. I believe, 
though that it is more a myth than a 
reality. Few children are able to dance, 
sing, recite a poem or tell a story at a 
moment's notice. We need only reflect on 
our own personal experience as and with 
children to realise how few children can do 
this easily (in contacts other than participa- 
tion in games with peers). In fact, the child 
of ten or twelve dies a thousand deaths (as 
does the adult) atýthe thought of having to 
perform before an audience. When it comes to 
created products, - drawing and painting, for 
example - we have slightly more objective 
(1) Guilford, J. P., Creativity, American Psychologist 
, 
5,1950, 
pp. 444 - 454. 
(2) Op. cit. P. 57. 
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evidence. The remarkable freshness of 
vision to which the articles on creativity 
refer as characteristic of children's 
drawings is much less frequent than we are 
led to expect. Any art teacher will testify 
to this. Moreover, clinicians have accumulated 
drawings of house-tree-person by the thousands, 
both in colour and in pencil, and the artistic- 
ally vivid productions are not many. We see 
clearly that the distribution of ability in 
this domain, as elsewhere, follows the bell- 
shaped curve, (1). 
Reese outlines how creativity in music was traditionally seen 
as the domain of only a few: 
We turn to the traditional composer-the authority, 
the expert - to provide us with music to sub- 
stitute for our own lack of self-expression. 
As mere performers, we simply accept the dictates 
of the composer-repeating the music just as he 
tells us to. After all, he is the expert. He 
should know. We tend to define composition in 
terms of its highest reaches and ultimate skills 
thus making musical creativity inaccessible to 
most people. (2). 
It is interesting to note how performance is viewed as a lesser art 
(although Swanwick) argues that a good performance can be said to 
have created the musicý3) Reese goes on to extol the virtues of new 
music in so far as it requires the performer to share in the creative 
process: 
Composers of new music often create pieces 
that do not even require any special vocal 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Reese, S.. ' New Music breeds Creators, not Repeaters, Music 
Educators Journal, Vol-59, No. 5,1973, pp. 65 -7 and 109. 
(3) Op. cit. 
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or instrumental technique, such as Ben 
Johnston's Four Do-it -yourself Pieces. 
Many similar compositions have been 
written that are not just for specialists, 
for professional musicians 'out for absolutely 
anyone and everyone, anyone who can take the 
aesthetic attitu e towards the events of life' 
(Ahlstrom 1971)1) 
He advocates the use of new music in the school music programme for 
this reason. 
Treasa Marez Oyens gives an example of this too when she 
concludes: 
One of my own works is particularly intended 
to set in motion student-performer's own 
creativity. It is thereby left to him to 
interpret symbols, to improvise, to make 
variations on the theme that has just been 
introduced, and, above all, to listen to 
fellow performers very carefully. For 
initiated students the work prevents no 
difficulty. But it has also been performed 
by children who have never before experienced 
anything of this sort. The choir consisted 
of some 40 children between 6 and 10 years of 
age; the instrumentalists varied between 10 
and 20. There was from the outset a willing- 
ness to try something new, but there were also 
the expected initial embarrassments and hesita- 
tions. Yet, with a bit of encouragement to 
improvise along given lines, and with help from 
an enthusiastic professionalist, I could feel 
a growing appreciation of my expectations. I 
worked three afternoons with the whole group; I 
then made a recording of the work. It contained 
many imperfections but with more rehearsal 
most of them could have been avoided. Lest the 
assertive pleasure of participation be reduced 
through long drilling, I dcided to leave it 
with its imperfections. (21 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Marez Oyens, T., On the Composer Provoking Student Creativity, 
in International Music Education Year Book, Vol. 9.1952, 
PP- 152 - 7. 
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The Problem of Originality 
The question of how far everyone is potentially creative leads 
on to how far the product has to be novel or original to merit the 
label creative. Rogers definition runs: 
Nay definition, then, of the, creative process 
is that it is the emergence in action of a 
novel relational product, growing out of the 
uniqueness of the individual on the one hand, 
the materials, events, peo le or circumstances 
of his life on the other. 
il) 
And T. S. Eliot writes in East Coker: 
There is, it seems to us, 
At best, only a limited value, 
In the knowledge derived from experience, 
The knowledge imposes a pattern and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new every moment, 
And every moment is a new and s}jogking, 
Valuation of all we have been. (2 
In this we see the tension between experience and newness. (It links 
back to the philosopher's writings in Chapter One-) In a conversa- 
tion with a composer friend it was clear that her intention in 
composition was always to produce something new and original. White 
in his discussion of originality claims that only some free work is 
original: 
Only that work which does not conform to 
conventional expectations in the way that 
the conventional drawing of the house did. 
Let us admit-without worrying too much over 
the criteria for conforming to conventional 
expectations that many young children's 
drawings are not original in this sense ... 
(1) Rogers, C., Towards a Theory of Creativity, in Anderson, H. ed. ), Creativity and its Cultivation, New York, Harper and Row, 19558, 
p. 139. 
(2) Eliot, T. S., The Four Quartets, London, Faber and Faber, 1963, 
p. 26. 
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In some ways such drawings resemble 
abstract paintings produced by adult 
artists: if one went only by what one 
saw, one might conceivably even mistake 
a child's drawing in some cases for an 
adult's. But there is an important 
difference between the two artists here. 
To say that both are producing something 
which is "different from conventional 
expectations" obscures the fact that the 
adult artist is reacting against conventional 
standards, while the child clearly is not. 
Originality in the case of the adult has 
written into it this intention - to produce 
something different-which in its turn implies 
a knowledge of what the conventional standards 
are. Unconventional children's drawings like 
the ones in Read's book, are not original in 
this sense, since the children who draw them 
have nejter this intention nor this know- 
led e. 1) 
Maxwell Davies sees some reputable composers missing the sense of 
being original when he writes: 
Any musical 'freedom' must know from what it 
is supposed to be free, otherwise it can only 
be meaningless. We have, in advanced musical 
circles, the sorry sight of the extreme products 
of this misinterpretation of freedom, who, mis- 
understanding what is involved, betray freedom, 
either by imposing order in the consequent 
limitless chaos of musical possibilities by 
reducing the composition process to the realisa- 
tion of predetermined formulae concerning pitch, 
note length, dynamics or, at the other extreme, 
of leaving the composition process to 'chance' 
elements, which process leads to musical meaning- 
lessness, with the introduction of extra-musical 
stunts which are not even shocking, ý}aving no 
significance in any sense whatever . l2 
) 
(1) White, J. P., Creativity and Education. A Philosophical Analysis, 
The British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 16(2), 1968, 
pp. 123 - 137. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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Maxwell Davies's point about needing to know from what you are free 
is important when assessing children's compositions. If a child 
cannot yet maintain a steady pulse on an instrument do we commend 
his composition for its free use of rhythm? Surely he is not free 
to choose the alternative and therefore he has not made a conscious 
decision to be free. 
The solution to creativity being linked with originality is often 
seen as defining the newness of the product as new to the child. 
Glasser writes how a headmaster in Pershing School near Sacramento: 
defines creativity carefully. He does not 
expect children to create great works of art, 
literature or music. To him the creative child 
is a child who discovers something on his own. 
The creative process is the discovery of some- 
thing new to the child, He gets the same thrill 
as the original discoverer; a thrill which xoyes 
him to keep searching, to keep discovering. 1 
Piaget implies this too for he claimed that: 
even in order to understand we have to invent, 
or that is, to reinvent because we can't start 
from the beginning again. But I would say 
that anything is only understood to the extent 
that it is reinvented. (2) 
Taking up the same theme as that passage, Storr writes: 
The child who links together two ideas in his 
mind which have hitherto been separated, and 
who produces a third as a result of the 
fusion .... has been creative in that he has 
prod ced for himself something which is new to 
him. (3) 
(1) Glasser, W., Schools without Failure, New York, Harper and Row, 
1969, p. 206. 
(2) Jennings, F. G., Jean Piaget: Notes on Learning, Saturday Review, 
May 20th, 1967, pp. 81 - 3. 
(3) Storr, A., The Dynamics of Creation, London, Seiber and Warburg, 
1972, P. xi. 
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It could be argued that this is true of any composition because of 
the infinite range of possibilities (of dynamics, for example) available 
in music. 
Loane holds this view when he writes: 
We have considered the suggestion that human 
consciousness is incalculably complex, and 
that it is to that complexity that music 
addresses itself. If this is so, then there 
are incalculably many aspects of consciousness 
to be understood. There is just so much to be 
discovered about conscious life, and moreover 
that conscious life lies so close to each of 
us (indeed, it is each of us), that every 
twelve-year-old, or sixteen-year-old, or 
eight-year-old, is perfectly able to embody 
in music, and so to understand and to 
"communicate", some special aspect of conscious- 
ness or feeling never before understood by any- 
one at all. 
In all seriousness, I suggest that the 
composers of the pieces on the accompanying 
tape, and no doubt many other young composers 
in schools throughout the world, have revealed 
some small aspect of the possibilities of human 
living never previously revealed. Had they not 
composed it into these particular sounds, it 
would never have been revealed! 
It must follow that work in class need not 
be a mere preparation for future artistic activity, 
although it is certainly that too. Children's work 
in music class can already be itself an act of 
artistic creation. (1) 
Pickard struggles with the problem of newness to the individual 
versus newness to society: 
This leads us to ask who is responsible for 
deciding what is to be regarded as creative. 
Are there any clear criteria for such 
decisions? Much creativity must go unrecog- 
nised. When a creative process leads to a 
creative outcome there has to be recognition 
and public approval of that outcome if it is 
(i) op. cit. 
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to exist in the consciousness of that group 
or society. Sometimes the public can be 
uncertain. Not everyone has appreciated 
the scribblings of the Picassos of this 
world and piles of bricks in art galleries 
have sometimes remained a puzzle. This 
raises the question: is creativity 
essentially subjective in that a particular 
reconstruction of reality is limited to the 
individual responsible for it? At its 
inception, at the point in time when it is 
newly understood, it may well be subjective 
to that perceiver. To the extent that there 
develops a shared understanding of this new 
construction of reality, it will become shared 
knowledge and more objective. However, 
creativity is necessarily shortlived. For 
a relatively brief time the new constructions 
of reality may hold the status of "creative" 
but eventually they will take their place in the heritage of knowledge as something 
"known". Depending upon their value to 
society, products may be handed down to the 
members of a culture within the socialisa- 
tion process, and for many, these products 
once regarded as creative, will become know- 
ledge which is learned and not sQmething which 
is discovered for themselves. ý1J 
The pattern of new moving to something known is also a-valid one of 
looking at the novel product in relation to the child's individual 
development. A piece, once new, becomes part of his experience and 
takes its place in his/her tonal memory. 
The Criterion Problem 
One real problem of defining creativity in terms of its products 
is that of the criteria on which the decision will be taken. 
Rogers(2) raises the possibility of 'good' and 'bad' creativity linking 
(1) Op. cit. P. 17. - 
(2) Op. cit. 
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those who find new ways to relieve pain and those who invent forms of 
torture together with Galileo and Copernicus who in their day were 
considered blasphemous and wicked. In general, however, 'creative' 
is often a value judgement. We talk about Dostoyevsky as a 'highly 
creative writer' when comparing him to a hack novelist. Hans Keller(') 
(1966) talking about Mozart's symphonies talks about the composer's 'growing 
creativity' by which he means growing in terms of his contribution 
to the discipline of music. We talk about people and periods in a 
person's life as being more or less creative. White quotes this 
passage from Pears' book on Bertrand Russell: 
He jear. 7 traces the development of Russell's 
metaphysics and theory of knowledge during his 
great creative period from 1905 to 1919. In 
these fifteen years a considerable part of the 
history of philosophy was he history of the 
development of his ideas. 
(2) 
He points out how what the writer had in mind was the value or 
importance of Russell's work in this period. But the problem is: 
Who will make the value judgement? 
Stein builds into his definition of creativity the notion of 
acceptance by a group: 
It is suggested that the creative product 
is congruent with the needs or experiences 
of a group. It strikes a chord for the 
group as it does for the individual ..... Thus certain art works resonate with 
feelings while inventions resonate because 
they fulfil practical needs. In the case 
of art it could be pointed out that there 
is not always a one-to-one relationship 
between what the artist attempted to 
(1) Referred to in Plummeridge, C. op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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express and what it resonated in the 
group ...... acceptance by a group is 
significant. It provides the creative 
worker with his final test of reality, 
if you wish. The size of the group may 
vary. At times it may be only those on 
the 'left bank', Greenwich Village or 
the small number of persons who first 
gathered around Freud or Einstein. fin 
a classroom situation this group may be 
the class] Individuals may seek out the 
creative person. They may have to prosely- 
tise them. The group provides the individual 
with necessary feedback so that he can clarify , 
alter or make progress in his future work. (1) 
Stein also concludes in his definition that this acceptance must be 
at some point in time to include artists like Van Gogh who were not 
considered creative in their own lifetime, or Socrates who died for 
his ideals. So Stein puts forward the idea that reputation is a good 
enough criterion. 
The commonest criterion has been the frequency with which an 
individual has been mentioned in histories, biographical sources and 
encyclopedias. Castle 
(2) 
invented a weighting system whereby 
her eminent women were chosen by means of a weighted number of lines 
in six biographical and encyclopedic source books. And Lehman(3) 
chose his chemists for his survey based on the number of different 
histories of chemistry that cited each chemist's work. Another procedure 
is to accept the judgement of professionally qualified experts as did 
Roe(4) in her studies of eminent scientists. Another criterion is a 
(1) Stein, M., Creativity and Culture, in Mooney and Razik (eds. ), lorations in Creativity, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, p. 115. 
(2) Castle, C. S., A Statistical Study of Eminent Women, Columbia University 
Contributions to Philosophy and PsyeholoRy, Vol. XXII, No. 1, New York, 
Science Press, 1913, p. 90. 
(3) Lehman, H. C., The Chemist's most Creative Years, Science Vo1.127, 
1958, PP. 1213 - 22. 
(4) Roe, A., A Psychological Study of Physical Scientists, Genetic 
Psychology Monograph, Vol. 43,1951, pp. 141 - 8. 
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general consensus of opinion, as in Freud's choice of Leonardo Da 
Vinci (1920) and Dostoyevsky (1928) as subjects for study. Another 
criterion is rating by peers or superiors (C. W. Taylor). 
(') 
Others 
used the ratings of votes of others regarded as qualified to make 
judgements like Catte11. 
(2) 
Some have based it on intelligence test 
scores and other studies of people who are in professionally creative 
spheres e. g. Rosen. 
(3) 
Some have used statistical definitions 
involving deviations in psychological tests e. g. Guilford, Christensen, 
(4) 
Frick and Merrifield. Quantity of output has been another criterion 
involving counting poems, novels, inventions, scientific contributions, 
patents and the like e. g. Rossman. 
(5) 
This is one partly discounted 
by Harmon 
(6) 
while Macpherson(? 
) 
recommends three sets of criteria- 
(1) Taylor, C. W., Smith, W., Chiselin, B., The Creative and other 
Contributions of One Sample of Research Scientists, in Taylor, C. W. 
and Barron, F. (eds. ), Scientific Creativity, New York, Wiley, 
1963, PP. 53 - 76. 
(2) Cattell, J. McK., A Statistical Study of American Men of Science: 
The Selection of a Group of 1,000 Scientific Men, Science, New 
Series XXIV, 1906, pp. 658 - 65. 
(3) Rosen, The Barron-Welsh Art Scale as a Predictor of Originality 
and Level of Ability among Artists, Journal of Applied Psychology, 
XXIX, 1955, pp. 366 - 7. 
(4) Guilford, Christensen, Frick and Merrifield, The Relations of 
Creative Thinking Aptitudes to Non-Personality Traits, -Reports from the Psychological Laboratory, No. 20, California, The University of 
California Press, December 1957, P. 51. 
(5) Op. cit. 
(6) Harmon, R. L., The Development of a Criterion of Scientific Competence, 
in Taylor, C. W. (ed. ), The Second (1957) Research Conference on the 
Identification of Creative Scientific Talent, Salt Lake City, 
University of Utah Press, 1958, pp. 82 - 97. 
(7) Macpherson, J. H., A Proposal for Establishing Ultimate Criteria for 
Measuring Research Output, in Taylor, C. W. (ed. ), The 1955 University 
of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Creative 
Scientific Talent, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1956, 
pp. 62 - 8. 
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quick judgements of the scientist's creativity, application of an 
analytical scheme as well as a count of products. 
The Gulbenkian Report The Arts in Schools, 
(' 
however, sees the 
test as being quality and quantity as in the case of J. S. Bach, Emily 
Bronte or Ernest Hemingway who would compare less favourably with 
Georgette Heyer if quantity alone were used. It concludes that the 
important attribute is consistency although it does raise the question 
of single masterpieces such as Reubke's Sonata on the 49th Psalm. 
(It also lists context as another criterion for creativity by which it 
means according to the conventions and standards, obtaining within the 
area of work concerned. ) 
In all these cases of criteria it would be possible to have a 
sliding scale of creativity as Terman proposes: 
We have at one extreme Dr Field's laboratory 
rats which required thousands of trials and 
a good part of their lives to learn to 
respond to triangularity in visual stimuli; 
that is, to acquire one crude concept. At 
the other extreme are the Newtons and the 
Aristotles. The intermediate levels range 
upward through infra-human intelligence, 
average human intelligence and the superior 
grades that permit higher and higher levels 
of abstraction. Any line that may be drawn 
to denote genius is purely arbitrary. (2). 
Ghiselin distinguishes between the creative ('productive') act 
and the applicative ('reproductive') act: 
A creative product is intrinsically a 
configuration of the mind, a presentation 
of constellated meaning, which at the time 
of its appearance in the mind was new in 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Terman, L., Psychological Approaches to the Biography of Genius 
'(1947), in Vernon (ed. ), Creativity, Harmondsworth, Penguin 1970, 
pp. 25 -4-1. 
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the sense of being unique, without specific 
precedent. Any such configuration will be 
new in the totality of its aspect, in the 
constellation of its component elements..... 
He distinguishes creativity and inventiveness and resourcefulness and 
disputes the view whereby the creative product is judged according to 
its usefulness. He distinguishes two levels of creativity -a higher 
sort which alters the universe of meaning by introducing into it some 
new element of meaning or some new order of significance and a lower 
sort which gives further development to an established body of meaning 
through initiating some advance in its use. 
versions of creativity in Chapter One. 
Assessment 
This links with Elliott's(2) 
The problem of assessing children's work is one of subjectivism. 
Are good and bad simply in the eye of the beholder? Society makes 
judgements as to great works of art but what about such lesser work as 
the children produce? If we call them creative does it just mean we 
approve of them? Loane teases out two meanings of subjective: 
Sometimes a statement is called "subjective" 
because it is a value statement-it expresses 
an attitude of the subject and does not give 
information about the object. Sometimes, 
however, a statement is called "subjective" 
because it is relatively uncertain; the 
evidence for the assertion i held in some 
way less than watertight. 
ý3. ' 
(1) Ghiselin, B., Ultimate. Criteria for the Levels of Creativity, in 
Taylor, C. W. (ed. ), The Second (1957) Conference on the Identification 
of Creative Scientific Talent, Salt Lake City, University of Utah 
Press, 1958, pp. 111 - 55. 
(2) Elliott, R. K., Versions of Creativity, Proceedings of Philosophy of 
of Education Society of Great Britain, Vol. 5, No. 2,1971, 
PP- 139 - 152. 
(3) Loane, B., Unpublished Thesis, 1982. 
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He argues that assessment of children's work uses the second sense 
and may not use the first meaning at all : 
Our understanding of a piece of music may have 
to be put forward tentatively, but it is real 
understanding nonetheless. Information of 
less than 100% probability remains information. 
This discussion of aesthetic criteria could continue much longer but 
the problem of criteria is the central one to the teacher facilitating 
a creative approach in the classroom. Plummeridge(l) points out, 
bearing in mind the problem concerning criteria, the incongruity of 
having musical creativity directed by a non-specialist. This quota- 
tion from Warren Benson comes up with practical solution: 
Self expression is encouraged when a child 
is allowed to make mistakes. We must be 
careful to critize his work within the 
context of its musical expression rather 
than on the basis of our personal views 
of right art or wrong art. To criticize 
the work by saying "This is wrong ........ That is wrong ...... Here it is wrong" is to stop the flow of the creation and to 
interrupt the private intimate communication 
that the child is offering. It is much more 
effective to encourage the student to analyse 
the form and content of his own effort and 
that of others to establish whether it all 
belongs together; in this way he can see 
his errors as flaws in consistency or lapses 
of contextual relationships. Incomplete 
efforts, partially satisfactory statements 
of obscure definitions can be criticised 
constructively by asking for further develop- 
ment. For example "Let's see how you could 
develop that point a little bit more ....... Let's see what happens if you tried to carry 
that discussion a little bit further ....... Let's take a look at this example (by some 
composer such as Bach or Debussy) to see 
another way of doing it-it may suggest a way 
(1) Op. cit. 
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for you". All of these comments have 
suggested a need for further development 
or for clarity and emphasis; at the same 
time they have allowed the student to do 
it in his own way as a positive assignment 
rather than a positive correction. We must 
remember how difficult it is to say anything 
about art in terms of its being correct or 
incorrect. The works of the masters are 
magnificent examples of failures to abide 
by their own laws. The world of art is the 
world of exceptions. The world of art is the 
world of the exceptional. (1) 
In the style of teaching advocated by Warren Benson, teacher and class- 
mates are acting as judges of the creative product. I would submit 
that with younger children the teacher must assume this role and make 
her own decisions about the criteria that she will use. The role can 
gradually be handed over to the children. 
Summary 
How far then can the model of the creative process described in Ch. Tro in 
adults be applied to children? It would seem that children do pass 
through various phases of development in creativity in the arts; and 
although the products of children appear to be creative the process 
is different. In Irving Taylor's levels children only progress 
through Expressive, Productive and Inventive levels while adults can 
move through the higher levels of Innovative and ESmergentive. It 
may be true that children stop short at the hypothesis forming'stage 
due to lack of skills and experience. The whole process could be 
different in so far as the pre-operational child has not sufficient 
grasp of reality to transform it. It may be different in that the 
(1) -op. cit. 
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child cannot in the incubation phase revert to primary processes as 
that is where he is. Much debate has centred around the role of 
skills ranging from the view of Bentley and the Gulbenkian Report 
that to embark on composition activities without skill or technique 
is a nonsense, through the view that children will acquire the 
techniques as they go along and need them, to the more extreme end of 
Murray Schafer. Paynter stresses the need for 'something to say' 
being the pre-requisite for all creative work and asks for a healing 
in the split between 'creative' music making and the more traditional 
view of music education as skill learning. The child needs a basis 
of sound experiences upon which he can build up what Seashore calls 
'tonal imagery which the established composer must have in greater 
measure than the child. Swanwick casts doubts on the possibility of 
the creative process operating within a timetabled lesson in which 
children are called upon to be creative to order. It can be argued 
that there are stages in the process other than the inspirational 
flash which can be experienced. In some doubt also is the fact that 
everyone is universally musically creative. Writers are divided 
between those who see it as so, only the environment stopping people 
realising their talents and those like Guilford and Bentley for whom 
excellence is limited to a few. The problem is one of the notion of 
originality. A child's creation may appear original like an adult's 
but the underlying reason for it is different in so far as the adult 
is reacting against the conventions and the child is not. The problem 
of novelty is solved by some writers by defining it as 'new to the 
child' although this is a passing phase, as what is new to the child 
yesterday becomes known today and part of his tonal imagery. (The 
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same is true of the history of music. ) Involved here is also the 
notion of good and bad products. This criterion problem has been 
solved in various ways-reputation, a consensus of opinion amongst 
judges, consistency and so on. It raises its head again in the 
assessment of children's work. Many writers favour the absence of 
good/bad judgements in creative work, although Plummeridge makes the 
difficulty for such decisions a reason for not using the non-specialist 
in this work in the classroom. Teacher and pupil can be involved in 
the evaluative process, the role gradually passing from teacher to 
pupil as the child gets older. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CREATIVITY AND EDUCATION 
The History : Musical Pioneers 
It is often supposed that the idea of encouraging children to 
compose in so called creative work is a new phenomenon and its very 
newness has made it seem a reason for its adoption on the grounds 
that new=good, old=bad. Although it is associated in the minds 
of many people with Carl Orff whose work started to find popularity 
in Britain in the 1950's, there are instances of previous music 
educators advocating it (although they may, of course, not have used 
the word 'creative' for it). Rousseau (1712-78) urged that children 
should make up songs themselves which he says gives them real know- 
ledge of music. He favoured (in contradistinction to contemporary 
creative work) the use of simple clear-cut phrases founded on the most 
usual chords with an obvious bass and accompanied on the keyboard to 
help voice and ear. 
Later followers of Curwen (1816-80) introduced melodic extempnriza- 
tion into his method. Pupils were asked to sing phrases to solfa, 
either spontaneously or in answer to a given phrase. Not only did 
they thus increase their powers of melodic invention but also 
crystallised their improvisations so that they might write them down 
easily. At a higher level they were encouraged to explore modulation 
and a second part to a given written part. 
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In the very early years of this century, Yorke-Trotter (1854- 
1934) was encouraging pupils to make up their own music and giving 
demonstrations of it. He believed that the creative instinct is a 
latent force in mankind, which can be the mainspring of a tremendous 
activity of the mind. And it was the development of this creative 
instinct which he wholeheartedly believed existed in all children 
(whether labelled 'talented' or not) that provided his unifying 
philosophy. He also exploited musical intuition. A young child's 
attention might be drawn to the rhythm of a phrase of simple chords 
but he'would be unconsciously absorbing chordal usage and phrase 
balance. Soon he would be asked to sing an answering phrase but 
this was to be done without conscious thought. He stressed the 
necessity for the spontaneous response springing from intuition, 
unhampered by the very literal thought process, for he believed that 
this response was akin to the developed inspiration of the great 
composer. (This links with the writings on inspiration in Chapter 
Two and has important implications for music education. ) Notation 
was seen as a way of perpetuating a child's idea; so this stress on 
creative development gave all theoretical teaching an important 
meaning. ' This sung response - sung, rather than played to ensure 
its absolute spontaneity- was the start of an important development, 
for it was followed by a played response by one hand at the piano and 
then the gradual inclusion of a bass. Each new chord (introduced 
aurally not by the book) was gradually absorbed into the child's 
musical vocabulary and used with freedom and growing artistic skill. 
In the end the child would be able to extemporise with taste and 
freedom. He, unlike many musicians of his day, saw the connection 
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between this ability to handle the musical language freely and other 
musical activities like performing and listening, for the children 
could now speak the language of Schubert, Beethoven and Brahms. 
His disciples often unfortunately did not always speak the language 
sufficiently well to develop fluency in other people or were too 
academically trained to understand the freedom of his approach. 
Walford Davies (1869-1941) in his writings and broadcasts in the 20's 
and 30's was also encouraging children to compose music, indeed, 
drawing their attention to the pentatonic scale. 
Ja ques-Dalcroze (1865-1950) worked in Switzerland and Germany 
although the London School of Dalcroze Eurhythmics was founded in 
1930. His approach to composition was very different from Yorke- 
Trotter - being based on the muscular sensations of playing. His 
system was based on three series of exercises which together involved 
a study of rhythm, solfe ge and improvisations at the piano. The 
rhythmic studies were aimed at awakening the feeling for bodily 
rhythm and its aural perception; the solfege was designed to encourage 
a sense of pitch, tone relations and ability to distinguish tone 
quality. The piano improvisation was aimed at developing motor- 
tactile consciousness enabling the student to interpret on the piano, 
melodic, harmonic and rhythmic ideas. This improvisation, however, 
was not offered to all students, (an example of composition being seen 
as the province of a chosen few). It was a tackled when a back- 
ground of the other activities'had been acquired, (thus rooting 
composition on a bedrock of experience as has already been seen in 
Chapter Two). The student required a special technique allying 
muscular sensations to emotional feelings. He provided exercises in 
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muscular contraction and decontraction and a study of scales, 
arpeggios and chord progression with regular accents and equal 
. time measures, regular accents 
in unequal beats and with irregular 
and 'pathetic' accompaniments. At a second piano the teacher 
played scales in various rhythms and times which were imitated 
immediately by the student. The student was asked to use his muscular 
sense to study rhythm in space. With eyes closed s/he was to direct 
his/her arms to different parts of the keyboard and measure the 
distances between the points according to the greater or lesser ampli- 
tude in the muscular sensations s/he experienced. His/her faculty 
for mental hearing was encouraged by having to play only three parts 
of a four part chorale, following the fourth in the head. S/he was 
asked to change rhythms quickly and modulate at the point of the 
rhythm change. ' S/he used his voice to follow a melody played on the 
piano but on command was to create an entirely different melody or 
different rhythm. The two hands were'alsö required to play with 
contrasts of rhythm, time, nuances, phrasing, dynamics or tone quality. 
S/he was asked to improvise a bar, notate it in figured bass, improvise 
a rhythmic accompaniment to vocal melodies and to accompany barred 
harmonic progressions. Finally s/he was to improvise freely at the 
piano conducted by a teacher or fellow student or two students were to 
improvise alternate sentences or phrases. A description of this is 
given in detail to show how much stress on skills and structure is 
given here compared with more modern 'creative' work. 
Dr. Justine Ward (b1879),. the American music educationalist, in 
her method for all children from Upper Infant or Junior Level laid 
great stress on the original creative work of the child which she 
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conceived primarily in terms of vocal music. Free improvisation, 
musical conversations and composition were to form an integral part 
of each lesson from the very beginning and were to be adapted to the 
child's stage in musical development and knowledge. She wrote: 
By original composition we mean something 
that the child himself creates out of the 
elements he possesses, just as he would 
build a house of blocks or put together 
a picture puzzle ...... Each child has 
a need for self expression and in music, 
such expression is a powerful aid to 
assimilation. We are not expecting 
teachers to turn out distinguished 
composers, but anyone can encourage and 
guide a tiny child in his desire to express 
himself musically .... The result will not 
be a masterpiece. We dare not hope for a 
class of little Mozart's. But every effort 
of the child is an essential part of his 
musical education. (1) 
In the light of Chapter Three it is interesting to note that she 
saw it possible for anyone to help in this process, not necessarily 
a trained musician. She also viewed music as materials to be mani- 
pulated like blocks or a jigsaw, (which is returned to in Part Two), 
and saw it within the capacity of every child to manipulate sound 
materials. 
Carl Orff (b1895) is the name most often associated with the 
beginning of the 'creative' movement. In his school in Munich he 
encouraged students to improvise and compose their own music on 
instruments that were easy to learn and handle. He constructed and 
had made pitched percussion instruments based on medieval and oriental 
(1) Quoted in Simpson, K., Some Great Music Educators, Sevenoaks, 
Novello, 1976, p. 76. 
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prototypes such as the xylophone, glockenspiel and metal lophone 
modelled on the instruments of the Indonesian gamelan orchestras. He 
encouraged the use of the'recorder and stringed instruments such as 
guitars, lutes, gambas and cellos (for plucked sounds mainly). From 
1930 he brought out a series of printed collections -rhythmic and 
melodic pieces, exercises for hand-drums, timpani, tuned percussion, 
recorders, dances and instrumental movements - based on the improvisa- 
tion that he encouraged'in his school. Later he revised his scheme 
going back to simpler beginnings and with greater emphasis on song and 
the spoken word. He started from the descending minor third and 
moved through the pentatonic scale to a major scale with drone basses 
and tonic triads, adding then the dominant and subdominant ostinati 
and chords, the minor scale with drone basses, some triadic harmony 
and then subdominant and dominant harmonies in the minor mode. 
Creative work was encouraged throughout but it is structured within 
these concepts. So the Orff approach to creative work is more 
structured than much of what passes for 'creative' work in schools 
today. 
The Other Arts 
If the musical roots of the creative movement lie in the work of 
the educators described here, there are other and as important roots 
in the developments in the 1930's in art education and the other arts 
Marion Richardson and Herbert Read led the art educators to a stress 
on what the individual had to say. She wrote in 1938 in an introduction 
to a children's art exhibition: 
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The artist discovers in the world around 
him (that is to say, in his raw materials) 
relationships, order, harmony - just as 
the musician finds these things in the 
world of sound. This cannot be done by 
the conscious, planned mind. Art is not 
an effort of will but a gift of grace-to 
the child, at least, the simplest and the 
most natural thing in the world. When- 
ever people are sincere and free, art can 
spring up. (1) 
They saw education taking place through art without in any way 
destroying. the values of art. education. Children must be freely 
allowed to explore the materials. 
Peter Slade developed similar ideas in drama starting like them 
from the real experience and using bodily movement and language for 
experiment: 
One of the most important reasons for 
developing child drama in schools 
generally is not actually a thera- 
peutic one but the ever more construc- 
tive one of prevention. Prevention 
of many things is provided by the 
general balancing process, discovery 
of personal rhythm and "playing out". (2) 
He wrote in 1968 of the dynamic phenomenon of spontaneity as useful 
in all attitudes to life which links with the discussion of play- 
fulness in Chapter Two. In his theory of play he considered two 
types of human activity: 
1. Projected activity - the passive form 
of activity which infuses the mind 
into object, symbols, outside itself 
(1) Richardson, M., 'Note' published in connection with an exhibition 
of children's drawings in County Hall, London, July 12 1938, 
quoted in Read, H., Education through Art, London, Faber and Faber, 
1943, p. 234. 
(2) Slade, P., Child Drama., London, University of London Press, 1954, 
p. 119. 
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and brings them to life. This 
is seen in organisation, govern- 
ment of others, three R's, crafts, 
painting and technical accomplish- 
ments. 
2. Personal activity-the active forms 
of activity where a human being 
takes on personal responsibility 
for doing something being someone, 
indulging in accurate communication, 
using the whole body in an active 
physical sense, discovered in acting 
and dance. (1) 
These ideas have been developed in the last fifty years and 
have more recently found expression in the 'creative' writing 
movement in the work of Sybil Marshall, Margaret Langdon and David 
Holbrook who wrote in Children's Writings that the process depends 
on whole experience .... that the writer is working in his inner 
world. 
(2) 
Their work was commended by the Plowden Report who found 
the amount and quality of children's writing: 
perhaps the most dramatic of all 
revolutions in English teaching. 
Its essence is that much of it is 
personal ...... and the writers 
are communicating something which 
has really engaged their minds and 
their imaginations. (3) 
(1) Quoted in Taylor, D., Music Now, Milton Keynes, Open University 
Press, 1979, pp. 66 -'7. 
(2) Holbrook, D., Children's Writing, 'Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1967, p. 9. 
C3) Plowden Report, Children and their Primary Schools, Central 
Advisory Council for Education, London, HMSO, 1967, Vol. 1, 
p. 218. 
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The 'Creative music making' Movement 
Music education lagged behind the other arts in accepting these 
ideas. It was not really till the mid 60's that the ideas came to be 
worked out musically. Various factors encouraged this movement. 
Maxwell Davies's work at Cirencester Grammar School in helping 
children to compose was publicised and he pointed out parallels in art 
and music. In the early 60's came the impact of Orff instruments 
which put the raw material of music at the disposal of children in the 
same way as Marian Richardson had done in art long before. The 
instruments were easily playable and transportable and had a pitched 
component that the earlier percussion band instruments had lacked. 
(The chime bar introduced as far back as 1951 by the Rose Morris 
Company only gained its real popularity with the Orff instruments in 
the 60's. ) 
George Self was one of the pioneers in the early movement. He 
took a wider view of sound than traditional educationalists and sought 
to involve children in musical activities regardless of their back- 
ground or*aptitude. To this end he abandoned the idea that notational 
teaching was central to music education and encouraged children to 
invent their own instruments and pieces. He advocated work in groups 
and saw the child as a developing composer, performer, listener. He 
devised a new notation' based on the acoustical properties of instru- 
ments-e. g. sustaining instruments like violins of trombones would be 
notated i "ý"' , instruments with a dying sound like piano or 
chime bars: « staccato sounding instruments: " and 
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so on. Children could both realise the symbols and use them for their 
own pieces. He was followed by Brian Dennis in Experimental Music 
in Schools. 
(') 
In 1970 came a Department of Education and Science 
paper on Creative Music in Schools which stated: 
In recent years the scope of music in school has 
broadened sufficiently to allow children's 
original music-making to occupy a more signifi- 
cant place alongside the traditional activities 
of choral singing, aural training, listening and 
instrumental playing. The idea that children 
should work creatively with the raw materials 
of music, as with those of the artist and poet, 
has been practicable through the increasing 
availability of classroom instruments of good 
quality, melodic and otherwise, which facilitate 
progress without undue preoccupation with 
technique. This report by a small group of 
HM Inspectors is an account of some of the ways 
in which creative music is being developed in 
both primary and secondary schools. 
The phrase 'Creative Music' is here taken 
to have two aspects: through experiment children 
may discover the nature of sound and improvise 
their own music either individually or in groups: 
or they may take an existing melody and make an 
original arrangement of it for voices and 
instruments. (2) 
It will be seen that, although this is based firmly on the sound 
educational principles of doing and knowing, this already narrows the 
field of 'creativity in music to mean composing music rather than 
creativity in performing, for example. The paper advocated exploring 
sound in the early stages, extolled the virtues of the pentatonic scale 
(1) Dennis, B., Experimental Music in Schools, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1970. 
(2) Department of Education and Science, Creative Music in Schools, 
Reports on Education, April 1970, No. 63, p. 1. 
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and techniques such as, rhythmic and melodic ostinato, drone, ground 
bass, canon, round, inversion, augmentation and diminution, working 
round a theme, graphic notation, integrating other orchestral instru- 
ments into the work and the handling of pop and jazz idioms. It had 
a separate section on modern music, advocating the introduction of 
jazz and ethnic, folk and pop elements into it and adding: 
But creative music must also take account of 
the experiments of avant-garde composers: 
whole tone scales, modal harmony, polytona- 
lity, simple tone rows and note clusters can 
all be explored on tuned percussion instruments. 
By devising new ways of playing old instruments, 
inventing new instruments when necessary and 
incorporating tape recordings and simple 
electronics, students can begin to come to 
terms with new forms gf composition and fresh 
systems of notation. l1) 
It finished with a plea for rooms better designed for group creative 
work and a further look at the dilemma of the teacher: 
The real educational dilemma facing the 
teacher is the extent to which he should 
offer help to individual groups: some of 
these 'may need constant guidance if they 
are to come to terms with the medium, whilst 
others will quickly organise themselves and 
produce work of striking quality. The 
teacher's role may thus change from 
instructor to consultant and collaborator. 
But the versatility demanded of him in 
devising projects involving language, drama, 
movement, the visual arts and social studies 
will constitute a new challenge ............ Through creative music it becomes possible 
for a majority of pupils of all ages and 
abilities to experience the deep satisfaction 
of participation- an activity too often in the 
past reserved for a small minority. Indeed 
the creative approach, with its opportunities 
(1) Op. cit. P. 4. 
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for improvisation, its more flexible use of 
rhythm and harmony and its generally less 
inhibited attitude to the interpretation of 
music can afford the ideal grounding for 
intelligent listening and artistic perform- 
ance at any level. 
Despite this last phrase the stress in the paper is on 'creativity' 
as composition. Certain other elements that have characterised the 
creative movement are also present. One is an emphasis on the idioms 
of the avant-garde - unusual sounds, unusual ways of playing traditional 
instruments. Another is the idea of 'integration', another 'in' word 
that is widely used and not very clearly defined. Paynter and Aston's 
'Sound and Silence' also appeared in 1970 and not only gave great 
impetus to the creative movement but also included this statement on 
integration: 
The liberal education we all wait for our 
children implies a breadth of understanding 
and experience that will be possible only 
when we make conscious efforts to remove 
the boundaries between subjects .......... 
Music suffers from isolation in the curri- 
culum; it has for so long been regarded as 
a highly specialised subject. In fact, it 
needs the other arts as much as they need it. 
If a team of teachers (art, movement, drama, 
English, music) work together with a class o 
one project, each will enrich the others. (i 
Projects they suggest are Music and Word , Music and Drama , Patterns 
in Nature and Theatre Piece . 
Philosophical writings also influenced the movement especially 
those of Dewey(2) who held that aesthetic experience of music is closely 
(1) Op. cit. p. 4. 
(2) Dewey, J., Art as Experience, New York, Minton, Balch & Co. 1934. 
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related to ordinary experience. The basis for artistic experience 
was the very rhythm of life - struggle/fulfilment, ebb/flow, tension/ 
repose. Langer(') focused on the 'feeling' aspect (not to be 
confused with emotion) rather than the cognitive aspect and saw its 
fullest expression in the rhythm patterns and symbols of art. Terms 
originate in her work that are-now commonplace such as 'expressive' 
a ,. 
or 'creative' arts, a 'feeling' response and 'self realisation'. 
She influenced heavily the writings of Witkin(2) and Ross(3) who 
investigated the status of arts subjects in the secondary school 
curriculum and in a subsequent music curriculum project. 
Creativity and the Music Curriculum 
In the discussion document produced by H. M. Inspectorate in 1975 
called Music 5-13(4) composition activities take their place at all 
stages alongside performing and listening. It is now called 
composition although activities called "creative" are included in 
other headings as well. For example, in the five to eight year 
stage under Working with instruments comes: 
The childrens' first experiences of musical 
instruments are likely to be exploratory and 
experimental; working as individuals, they 
(1) Langer, S., Feeling and Form, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 
1953. 
(2) Witkin, R., The Intelligence of Feeling, London, Heinemann, 1974. 
(3) Ross, M., The Creative Arts, London, Heinemann, 1978- 
(4) Department of Education and Science, Music 5-16, London, 1985.76 
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can be helped to devise the necessary 
techniques to produce the sounds that 
attract them . 
In the eleven to thirteen years stage there is a separate section 
entitled Musical Exploration which describes work exploring such 
concepts as: 
the pentatonic scale, the practical harmonisa- 
tion of simple folk melodies with two or more 
chords, the production of atmospheric "sound 
pictures" ...... the possibilities of the 
major and minor scales, the whole tone scale 
and even the twelve tone row, improvising or 
embellishing the melody over a simple ground 
bass ...... and the twelve bar blues. 
The Composing section follows this and calls for the basing of original 
compositions on these techniques and the desirability of 'a fairly 
high degree of structure', increasing involvement of responsibility 
of the pupil and the importance of a'period of evaluation and self- 
assessment'. In the two previous stages the links with the other 
arts are mentioned. In the five to eight stage comes the sentence: 
Sometimes this work can form part of the classroom activities such 
as when children compose simple tunes for songs and dances as part of 
the class play; and in the eight to eleven stage is the statement: 
If the music is linked with dance, drama, poetry or painting, this 
will often extend the imaginative approach . 
In analysing the nature of the creative music making movement, 
Swanwick is worried by the assumptions that go with the term that have 
not necessarily anything to do with the word 'creative', namely: 
A premium on imaginative activities, 
an emphasis on children making 
up their own music, sympathy 
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with the techniques o the avant-garde, 
an urge to integrate. 1) 
He criticises the use of the word as being value-laden (as indeed 
has already been seen in other spheres as well) and as a kind of 
umbrella and cure-all. Indeed, an article like Walker's starts 
off with the very worst of this approach: 
The teacher of class music in schools is 
beset by a number of serious problems. 
In many ways they are no worse than those 
faced by any other subject teacher, but in 
some circumstances they can be much more 
difficult to overcome and they can be made 
worse by the very nature of music, the 
demands it makes on the partigi ant and 
the attitude of the teacher. l2) 
He then goes on to outline his 'creative music' solution to these 
problems. It seems very dangerous to base an adoption of creative 
music making methods on the premise that there are too many problems 
in the traditional approach. If it is worth getting children to make 
up their own compositions it must be on a securer footing than that 
'nothing else works'. 
Creative music has also been viewed as primarily for the less 
able not for those who would succeed at traditional skills. Paynter 
refutes this, as does Addison who points out that: 
there are children, I believe, who 
are being left out or who at any 
rate are under-achieving because 
(1) Swanwick, K., The Concept of 'Creativity' in Music Education, 
Education for Learning, Autumn 1974, pp. 34 - 43. 
(2) Walker, R., Creative Music in Class, Music Teacher, Vol-54, No. 3, 
March 1975, pp. 11 - 12. 
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of the very skills in music which they 
acquire. I refer to children who 
learn musical instruments 'properly'. 
Attitudes are many and different, but 
any of the following is common enough: 
a) learning to play a. i 
something you do "from 
You never play without 
except scales and arge; 
the exams say you must 
rising is discouraged. 
i instrument Is 
the music". 
the music, 
ýgios (because 
Even memo- 
b) experimenting is all right for 
"the others" but we only play "proper" 
music. 
c) we only use xylos and glocks, or 
percussion for "creative". "Real" 
instruments are for "real music". 
Common to all these attitudes is the 
fundamental idea that there is a differ- 
ence between "the real" and "the creative". 
That is why I, and so many others, ae 
suspicious of the word "creative". 
(1) 
He goes on to outline his Durham Junior Music School where children 
learning an instrument can go and compose. 
LeFanu also questions the use of the term 'creative': 'The 
A-stream are doing Grade V Theory and some will go to do 0-level 
music. The B-stream are doing creative music and won't take music 
next Year. 
(2) 
Having outlined how some of her most exciting lessons 
have been a whole afternoons with two teachers and sixty children in 
a project combining music and drama and dance, she offers her own 
definition: 
(1) Addison, R., Children (even musical ones) make music, Music in 
Education, Vol. 39, No. 372,1975, pp. 60 - 3. 
(2) Lefanu, N., The Experience of Composing, Music Teacher, Pt. 1 in 
June 1979, Vol-58, No. 6, PP. 15 - 16, Pt. 2 in July 1979, Vol. 58, 
No. 7, pp. 13 - 14. 
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Creative music making means, to me, a way 
of teaching musicianship at any level. 
It means a way of training ears and trains 
intelligence in a way of exploring and 
sharing the physical sensation of music 
making. Faced with a class of say, middle- 
class children, I feel that my first responsi- 
bility is to to give them the means for acquir- 
ing those skills and disciplines which will 
enable them to be practical musicians. Ears, 
fingers, intelligence and imagination must be 
trained to work together in a way that no other 
school subject can develop. I believe that 
this is realised most appropriately through the 
creative approach. Similarly, I see no point 
in children learning rudiments or elementary 
harmony, if they do not understand the concepts 
behind them: If their ears cannot follow the 
implications of what they are learning. I would 
urge all teachers to try teaching theory through 
the creative experience; separating the two seems 
to be missing the point of both. 
She goes on to describe an imaginative and sensitive approach to 
0-level teaching and to a class of students at Morley College. She 
indicates how the experience of composition improved their performance 
of more traditional styles. (In this she parallels the findings 
of Yorke-Trotter. ) 
Those musical journeys on which I took 
my class never undermine our love of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century 
music; on the contrary, they intensify 
our understanding and experience of it. 
At the same time, the class have to 
appreciate the unfamiliar (contemporary 
music, for example) with trust and open 
mindedness. Should they choose to go 
into the musical profession they will 
have a good contribution to make; and 
whatever they become, I think they all 
understand why composing is a necessary 
complement to playing and listening. 
All have experienced that crucial 
journey into their own imagination. 
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Indeed Horton supports this view: 
The view taken by those who face this 
dilemma is that a balance can and should 
be found between performance and listening 
on one hand and invention and discovery on 
the other, and that, these two aspects are 
educationally and artistically complementary 
each helping and enriching the other ....... 
As far as English schools are concerned, 
there seems little question that the creative 
approach is most successful where performance 
and listening are well established and are 
continued s de by side with improvisatory 
methods. 'l) 
This is a point taken up by Swanwick when he calls for a 
redefinition of creative to include work in a variety of idioms and 
to include imaginative ways of approaching other aspects of music. 
He quotes Vaughan Williams who said that Boult 'created' the second 
movement of his Fourth Symphony and this passage from Copland on 
the subject of the gifted listener (which can be compared with a 
passage from a sixth form pupil in Chapter Three of Part Two): 
Nothing really tells him what he should 
be hearing, no treatise or chart or guide 
can ever sufficiently pull together the 
various strands of a complex piece of 
music-only the inrushing floodlight of 
one's own imagination can do that. 
Recognising the beautiful in an abstract 
art like music partakes somewhat of a 
minor miracle; each time it h. ppens I 
remain slightly incredulous. 
(2 
This process is described by Kris as the reverse of the artist's 
creative process: 
(1) Horton, J., Music, London, MacMillan, 1972, p. 20. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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The reaction of the public repeats in 
reverse order and in infinite varia- 
tions some of the processes which 
the artist experienced. These varia- 
tions are determined by cultural and 
social factors as well as by individual 
predispositions. Though these reactions 
may vary in depth, the core of the process, 
the gradual moving from fringe to centre, 
seems to occur with great frequency ...... ft-hi-s7 means that gradually a change in 
attitude of the audience is taking place. 
This change may have various dimensions. 
It may lead from the borrowed fantasy stage 
to the appreciation of the complexity of 
composition, from what is being said to how 
it is being said and here again from the 
pleasure in rhythm to a gradual under- 
standing of first one, then many interacting 
and integrated meanings. These changes have 
one factor in common. They are all changes 
involving the movement of the audience from 
passivity to activity. In the end the 
audience may experience some of the excite- 
ment and find the release of tension which 
arises when barriers separating unconscious 
from pre-conscious or conscious processes 
have been loosened. (l) 
Composition and Improvisation 
There is one other definition of terms used in this work that 
needs clarifying before we pass to an examination of how this quality 
of imagination can be allowed to operate freely in the classroom. 
Bagenal starts by outlining how children can make a 'creative' choice 
over the instrumentation: 
(1) Kris, E., Psycho-Analysis and the Study of Creative Imagination, 
New York Academy of Medicine Bulletin, 1953, pp. 334 - 51. 
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Could we not take creativity a step further 
and give the children a chance to compose 
their own music in the forms of medieval 
or renaissance or early baroque composers 
used? (1) 
She then describes how to add drones and ostinati to existing tunes. 
However, she feels the need to qualify it, by saying: 
This sort of activity is strictly 
speaking improvisation rather than 
composition and it could be extended 
with able pupils into the improvisa- 
tion of variations or divisions on a 
simple dance tune ...... This again 
is not strictly composing, it is just 
choosing one of a number of a conventional 
alternatives-but so is a great deal of 
jazz improvisation and it is a beginning, 
a way of getting used to the feeling of 
taking off on your own. 
She goes on to emphasize the importance of the down beat in improvisa- 
tion quoting the example of the Ladybirds who specialise in pop backing: 
If it is an a capella (no music) thing they're given a down beat and 
and they improvise . She seems to have a sliding scale 
in mind by 
which you measure how much composition is involved in any given 
activity when she says: 
Moving closer towards actual composition in 
an early music idiom one can provide a ground, 
such as Passamezzo Antico ...... and with 
help proportionate to their ability children 
can learn to compose their own divisions 
upon it. 
So here she finds it necessary to distinguish between improvisation 
and composition (although both seem to fall under the banner of 
'some creative approaches') but she finds it difficult, It would 
(1) Bagenal, A., Don't just play it, write it: Some Creative Approaches 
to Early Music, Music in Education, Vo1.42, No. 399, November 1978, 
pp. xiii - xv. 
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seem that' improvisation in her view is concerned with the 'one-off' 
creation that can't necessarily be repeated whereas composition 
involves repeating and refining. 
Maxwell Davies writes of improvisation: 
The very first step to composition is 
improvisation. Composition, after all, 
is much slowed down and chewed over 
improvisation. I used it very early 
with the school orchestra. A set of 
pieces I wrote in the early 1960s has 
the following section where the 
accompanying instruments have a chord 
sequence, and the soloists improvise on 
the notes of those chords, using them as 
main notes, and adding passing notes. 
In this way they complete the composition 
process I started. (1) 
And Gamble writes: 
The use of the term "creative" in music 
education is very ambiguous; it can 
mean anything from crude self-expression, 
exploration, or experiment, to improvisa- 
tion or even interpretation in performance. 
Its meaning ought to be restricted simply 
to the making of an original sound object, 
an organised pattern of sounds, made with 
the intention that it should be listened 
to as a complete aesthetic object worthy 
of attention. Of course, self expression, 
exploration, experiment, improvisation, and 
performance may all play a part in the 
creation of a "composition", but none of 
these alone can, strictly speaking, constitute 
musical creativity. Many of the activities 
listed in the syllabus cannot therefore be 
called "creative" in this sense; they are, 
however, preps atory (and essential) to 
creative work. 
(2) 
(1) Davies, P. Maxwell, Musical Composition by Children in Grant, W. 
(ed. ), Music in Education, Colston Papers No. 14, Loncon, Butterworth, 
1963, PP. 108 - 134. 
(2) Gamble, T., Creative Music at Manland, Music Teacher, December 
Vo1.55, No. 12,1976, pp. 9- 10. 
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Chisholm(') makes the point that much eastern music is improvised, 
the composer being the performer and that contemporary composers are 
using performers more as composers, giving them ideas and then 
leaving them free (a point made in Chapter Three). 
In the creations of my children I can distinguish both elements 
mixed together in varying degrees. The work is only sometimes 
written down and even when it is, the final product contains 
improvisatory elements although these are within a preordained, worked- 
out structure. The improvisatory element is often in the way the 
parts fit together or in the rhythm used for a certain pattern of 
notes. Younger children can seldom repeat their first ideas exactly, 
so each new repetition is in a sense a new piece although with elements 
of the original idea present. I regard both composition and improvisa- 
tion as part of creative work. 
The Conditions for Creativity: General Principles 
Piaget outlines the optimum conditions for learning: 
Children should be able to do their own 
experimenting and their own research. 
Teachers of course, can guide them by 
providing appropriate material, but the 
essential thing is that in order for a 
child to understand something, he must 
construct it himself, he must reinvent 
it. Every time we teach a child some- 
thing, we keep him from inventing it 
himself. On the other hand that which 
we are allowing him to discover himself 
will remain with him visibly, as it did 
in the case of my mathematician friend, 
for the rest of his life. (2) 
(1) Chisholm, E., Creative Education in Music, in Grant, W. (ed. ), 
Music In Education, Colston Papers No. 14, London, Butterworth, 1963, 
pp. 188 - 202. 
(2) Piaget, J., Some Aspects of Operations, in Piers, Maria W., Play 
and Development. A Symposium, New York, W. W. Norton Inc., 1972, 
p. 27. 
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Demos and Gowan(') list the following steps or phases in those 
furthering student creativity - inspiration, stimulation, ameliora- 
tion (an atmosphere of warmth and affection), direction and encourage- 
ment and development. 
The Creative Classroom Environment 
Hickok and Smith(2) make a comprehensive list of the basic 
principles of creative teaching which will serve as a basis for this 
section. They are drawn from the issues already discussed in this 
part and reinforce many of them. 
1. In creative teaching something new, different or unique 
results. Each individual's creation will be different from anyone 
else's, each interpretation of his or her experience will be different 
or unique. This has already been discussed and Torrance(3) asks 
the teacher to develop a tolerance of new ideas and of creative 
personality and not be annoyed by the unusual. 
2. In creative teaching, divergent thinking processes are 
stressed. This is in contradistinction to the stress laid tradition- 
ally in education on convergent techniques which is usually called 
(1) Gowan, J. C., Demos, G. D., Torrance, P. E., (eds. ), Creativity: 
Its Educational Implications, New York, Wiley, 1967, p. 6. 
(2) Hickok, D. and Smith, J. A., Creative Teaching of Music in the 
Elementary School, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1974, pp. 13 et seq. 
(3) Torrance, E. P., Developing Creative Thinking through School 
Experiences, in Parnes, S. J. and Harding, H. F. (eds. ), A Source 
Book of Creative Thinking, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 
1962, PP. 31 - 45. 
255 
intelligence. In music this stress has been seen in skill training. 
Paynter writes: 
The convergent procedures of training 
are most like to come to mind first. 
They have an immediate attraction in 
that the teacher can define skills to 
be learned and when the period of train- 
ing is completed it is relatively easy 
to devise tests to show whether or not 
pupils have acquired what was prescribed. 
The divergent process on the other hand, 
is much more of a problem, and difficult 
to assess satisfactorily. Jean Piaget 
suggests that education should enable us 
to do new things-not simply repeat what 
other generations have done. It should 
develop the e plorer-the discoverer in 
all of us. J 
He goes on to describe how training in skills in the music classroom 
caters for only a minority of pupils and concludes: 
As far as music in schools is concerned 
it would seem necessary to accept a 
distinction between musical education 
music in education. The former term 
would describe adequately the training 
essential for anyone who is to follow 
a musical career. But music in educa- 
tion suggests something much-broader- 
the use of music in the general school 
curriculum in such a way that it can 
make a significant contribution to the 
education of all pupils .... In this 
context artistic activities which offer 
the greatest scope for the majority of 
pupils to develop their innate sensiti- 
vity, inventiveness and imagination 
might have strong claim for a place of 
importance in the curriculum. 
(1) Paynter, J., The Role of Creativity in the School Curriculum 
in Burnett (ed. ), Music Education Review I, London, Chappell, 
p. 4. 
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3. In creative teaching, motivational tensions are a pre- 
requisite to the creative process; the process serves as a tension 
relieving agent. Torrance(') calls this creating "thorns in the 
flesh", creating the disturbance that, as has already been seen, 
some writers regard as the motivating force behind creative action. 
He advises the teacher never to ridicule questions, however unusual 
they may seem. 
Weisskopf sees teachers as traditionally promoting industry, 
regular study habits, and a critical controlled attitude which form 
part of the first and last stages of the creative process -preparation 
and verification -neglecting the incubation and illumination stages 
because of their dependence on unconscious material: 
Just as lightning represents the sudden 
explosive merging of positive and negative 
electricity, intellectual insight may 
represent the sudden merging of conscious 
content accumulated during the stage of 
preparatio ith unconscious repressed 
material. 
(2) 
Students are taught to exert control, to keep impulses repressed 
rather than: 
teaching them to make their impulses 
subservient to intellectual activity ... 
By de-emotionalising intellectuality ... 
we suffocate creativity. 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Weisskopf, E. A., Some Comments Concerning the Role of Education 
in the 'Creation of Creation', Journal of Educational Psychology 
XLII, 1951, pp. 185 - 89. 
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A. teacher must stimulate children to compose with the same things 
that motivate any composer: 
Personal experiences, things seen and 
heard (including other works of art- 
literature, poetry, paintings, sculpture), 
events of national and international 
importance past and present, sour s them- 
selves, structures and patterns. 
11) 
Paynter goes on to say that music will either be about its own 
materials or a response to something outside itself, with the proviso 
that the success of the music depends on the coherence of the sound 
pattern alone, whatever inspired it. 
4. In creative teaching, open ended situations are utilised 
The one great difference between'lessons which develop convergent and 
divergent thinking processes is that in the former the lesson ends when 
the knowledge is learned, while in the latter a situation is provided 
in which the newly acquired knowledge is put to work to solve a problem. 
The acquisition of knowledge begins the divergent thought process. 
Paynter writes of the need to look at evidence and weigh things up, 
then take small imaginative leaps, taking decisions and acting on 
them; 
A , teacher must be prepared for the 
unexpected; must be ready to follow (2) 
up. leads the pupils themselves offer. 
(1) Paynter, J., 1977, op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
258 
Wehner reinforces the point: 
We teachers need constant self- 
examination to find out if we are 
flexible enough to change our 
direction easily when the situation 
warrants or if we are bound by a 
single set of dogmatic values. If 
our students feel the need to move 
musically in a way that disagrees 
with a dogma we teachers have 
accepted we must be prepared to 
change. (1) 
Auerbach was against the slavish pursuit of themes or 
finished products in the nursery school which: 
may leave no freedom of choice, permit 
no selection of alternatives and make 
the child's daily routine rigid. This 
emphasis can teach the child the 
inappropriateness of combining activities 
and of trying to develop new skill levels. 
If the child is left to develop his own 
resources in the context of a relaxed and 
minimally structured environment, he will 
eventually perform the creative act. As 
the child becomes flexible in utilising 
new skills, he develops not an approach 
of "I do not know" but an approach of 
"I will give it a try" because of the 
possibility of the successful completion 
of the creative act. 
(2) 
Torrance also sees as an obstacle in teaching the overrating of the 
finished product: 
the finished poem, the masterpiece of 
music or art, the balanced inter- 
personal relationship, the organised 
behaviour of te championship team, 
and the like. . 
3ý 
(1) Wehner, 'v1. L., The Endless Stream that never arrives, Music 
Educators Journal, Vol-59, No. 1,1972, pp. 24 - 7. 
(2) Auerbach, A. G., The Bisociative or Creative Act in the Nursery 
School, Young Children, Vo1.28,1972, pp. 27 - 31. 
(3) Op. cit. 
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He also asks the teacher to dispel awe of masterpieces and take time: 
to show in detail the methods the artist 
or author used .... If a child 
is shown 
how a masterpiece is developed step by 
step, he will stop thinking of it as some- 
thing beyond his reach and will gain 
confidence that he too can do some original 
work. 
5. In creative teaching there comes a time when the teacher 
withdraws and the children find the unknown themselves. At this 
moment the teacher and the children, in a sense, change roles. 
The teacher, in building high motivational tensions is the planner, 
the leader, the guide and the producer. However, at one point in 
the lesson s/he withdraws from this role and the children spurred 
on by these tensions become the planners, the guiders and the 
producers. 
Much has been written about the role of the teacher in creative 
work. Paynter calls him/her an enabler and Murphy writes: 
Music is one more activity which can offer 
scope for creativity. The teacher must 
have a very special outlook for this kind 
of work. He must be content almost to 
restrict his role to organising ........ 
he must provide the springboard from which 
the child jumps into musical creativity. 
He can, in fact, do more in joining in with 
the children's improvisations and by showing 
them how to explore their own ideas than by 
suggesting ideas whigh would possibly have 
a narrowing effect. ll) 
Torrance(2) asks the teacher to encourage the habit of working out 
the full implications of ideas. A child should at first be encouraged 
(1) Murphy, W., Creative Music Making in the Primary School, in Rainbow, 
B. (ed. ), Music Teacher's Handbook, London, Novello, 1968 quoted in 
Plummeridge, C. Creativity. The Need for Further Clarification, 
Psychology of Music, Vo1.8, No. 1,1980, pp. 34 - 90. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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to do some of the tedious work involved in working it out himself 
and later submit his work to the standard tests of science, art and 
literature and the like. 
The Gulbenkian report spells out the problems for the teacher: 
The role of the teacher in the arts is at 
once vital and complicated. The teacher 
is not simply to let anything happen in 
the name of self expression or creativity. 
Neither is it to impose rigid structures 
of ideas and methods upon the children. 
The need is for a diffiqu. t balance of 
freedom and authority. kl 
Other writers stress the importance of the relationship between 
pupil and teacher. Moustakas asks the teacher to be concerned with 
the experience undergone, the process of being oneself and with 
passing on his or her commitment to the activity in question: 
It is necessary that the individual at 
whatever level of education, be confronted 
by resources, issues and problems which are 
meaningful and relevant to him. It is 
essential that the teacher hold an unyielding 
and deep trust in the child as a person of 
value with capacities and talents which, 
when free to be expressive will eventuate in 
positive and constructive experience. If 
we trust the capacity of the individual for 
developing his own potentiality, then we can 
permit him the opportunity to choose his own 
way in learning. It is important that the 
teacher be a real person- enthusiastic, sad, 
angry, joyful, calm, excited, stand out in 
an honest way with the range of feelings 
that differentiates the living person from 
the mechanical role player. It is essential 
the teacher prize the child as a person, be 
aware of and value his feelings and thoughts, 
convey genuine understanding based on the 
child's perceptions, and accept his tempo 
(1) Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, The Arts in Schools, London, 
1982, P. 33. 
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and pace, his way of perceiving and 
relating to the life of the classroom. 
It is also importan that the teacher 
provide resources. l) 
6. In creative teaching, exact outcomes are unpredictable. 
No teacher will know the outcome of the lesson (unlike a converp'ent 
thinking lessons). S/he may have some ideas for development but 
needs to let each individual find his/her own resolution, feeding 
in such things as other people's handling on a similar theme in the 
way of listening material, for example. Maxwell Davies writes: 
In watching and helping work like this 
to grow the teacher should forget all 
he knows from his own experience which 
is irrelevant to the situation in hand, 
and participate in the discovery of 
possibilities with the composer; any 
pre-conceived idea as to what the work 
should eventu. lly encompass must be 
forgotten. 2) 
He`does also in the quotation in Chapter Three illustrate well how 
and when to introduce the established composers tackling the same 
problem. 
There is also the phenomenon of the 'happy accident' that often 
occurs in this work. In a group of children working on a piece 
originally based on the alternation of aD minor and aC major chord, 
the guitarist forgot to change the chord giving the 'accident' of a 
C in the tune against aD minor chord. The group so liked this 
(1) Moustakas, C., Creativity and Conformity in Education, in 
Mooney and Razik (eds. ), Explorations in Creativity, New 
York, Harper & Row, 1967, pp. 183 - 4. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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that the effect was retained as a feature of the piece. Indeed, 
Schafer claims such a basis for developments in musical style: 
Perhaps some of the most striking 
musical devices may be the result 
of the limitations of human intelli- 
gence, rather than inspiration. For 
instance, it is commonly assumed that 
organum (the singing in parallel fourths 
and fifths) came into existence when 
certain members of the singing group 
mispitched the notes of plainchant. 
Similarly, it is conceivable that the 
canon came into existence when certain 
voices lagged behind lead voices. If 
this is true, we might conclude that 
organum was the invention of the tone 
deaf while canon was the invention of 
the slow learner. (1) 
Certainly children discover both the devices in this way. 
7. In creative teaching, conditions must be set which make 
possible preconscious thinking. Torrance(2) talks of the necessity 
of providing active and quiet periods, pointing to the previously 
discussed accounts of how periods of quiet and relaxation are conducive 
to creative thought because of the importance of the subconscious. 
The problem of returning to primary processes in early childhood has 
already been discussed in Chapter Three. However, it is possible to 
encourage a more intuitive mode of thought in the older child. 
Paynter writes: 
And for all its 
fm-usic'3s intellectual 
content it is ultimately one of those 
non-verbal intuitive areas of experience 
which help to characterise or individualise 
(1) Schafer, M., Where does it all lead? Australian Journal of 
Music Education, No. 12, April, 1973+ pp. 3- 5" 
(2) Op. cit. 
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and which open doors on a totally 
different kind of "knowing" not 
dependent on received information. 
In such experiences lie the clues to 
individual self-realisation and 
fulfilment and it is this that the arts 
offer; something not covered by ýºy other 
aspect of the school curriculum. l1) 
Part of the process is the reassembling of past experiences in a new 
order. A tendency to get children to verbalise about their activity 
too soon will destroy this mode of thinking. 
8. Creative teaching means that students are encouraged 
to develop and generate their own ideas. The highly creative child 
is often regarded as 'silly' or 'crazy' for disregarding the logical 
and orderly. A boy exhibits feminine ideas, only to be ridiculed. 
A highly creative child in the class may be a problem for the teacher 
and pupils. 
Torrance 
(2) 
stresses the need to teach the highly creative 
individual skills for avoiding peer sanctions so that he will not 
have to exist as a miserable deviate in the shadow of his more athletic 
and socially adept peers. It looks as though a certain degree of 
alienation is inevitable. He refers to Stein as he writes: 
Help the highly creative child to 
maintain his assertiveness without 
being hostile and aggressive. He 
must be aware of his superiors, 
peers, and subordinates as persons. 
He may work alone but he must not be 
isolated; withdrawn or uncommunicative. 
In the classroom he must be congenial 
but not sociable; outside the class- 
room he must be sociable but not 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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intimate. He must "know his place" 
without being timid, submissive or 
acquiescent and must "speak his mind" 
without being domineering. In all 
relationships he must be sincere, honest, 
purposeful and diplomatic. In the 
intellectual area, he must be broad with- 
out being "bookish" or "too scientific" 
and "sharp" without being overcritical. 
9. In creative teaching, difference, uniqueness, individualit 
and originality are stressed and rewarded. In this way the creative 
process is self-generating. In Chapters One and Two the problems 
involved in originality and novelty were discussed. 
10. In creative teaching the process is an important as the product. 
Much has already been said about this in Chapter Two. Torrance(') 
asks the teacher to teach the child to value his creative thinking, 
helping him to appreciate his imagination not excessive day-dreaming. 
One way of doing this he suggests is getting him to write ideas in a 
notebook which he calls the 'idea trap' habit. 
11. In creative tasks certain conditions must be set to permit 
creativity to operate. The classroom must have the physical 
conditions of a learning laboratory. Torrance(2) stresses the 
importance of allowing the young child to play around with objects and 
ideas and of making them sensitive to environmental stimuli. He 
adds that different people will be sensitive to different stimuli - 
a person needs to be sensitive to human feelings to be creative in 
personal relationships, to. chemical phenomena if he wants to be a chemist. 
This links with Chapter Two on the role of skills in the process 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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and the need for experience in a particular medium. Such materials 
as are required should be made available to the child. 
Often the space available for music is far from ideal and in 
the 1960's I designed a music room with booths suitable for creative 
work. Clearly as much sound making equipment including record and 
tape should be available. It should be like the progressive 
kindergarten of Hawkins: 
Here there was not only a style of 
teaching that involved children deeply 
in subject matter, but the subject 
matter grew with the style-water, sand, 
clay, paint, good infant literature, 
the cultivation of story and song, 
carpentry, lenses, prisms, magnets, 
blocks, the house of packing boxes and 
orange creates, soil and seed, the dance 
and all the rest. I do not believe 
that this tradition failed at all; its 
influence has been reduced by erosion 
(sometimes to the vanishing point), by 
pressures from thin mechanical programmes 
of "reading readiness, " "number experience" 
and the like, most of which tend to reduce(l) 
the very readiness they seek to cultivate. 
Auerbach 
(2. ) 
advocates materials in the nursery school being grouped 
according to function rather than structure so that blocks are in 
the doll's corner to make a house outline, painting materials nearby 
to make a mother's costume. Such patterns of unusual things next 
to one another could apply to the music laboratory. 
(1) Hawkins, D., The Informed Vision: an Essay in Science Education, 
Daedalus, Summer 1965, PP- 538 - 52. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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Noise is also involved in music and is inevitable in composition 
work. Maxwell Davies writes of children composing incidental music 
for Peter Pan: 
There was a frightful noise, and I have 
noticed that when children are composing 
in a group, it is like an Art Room, they 
do not seem to mind if other people are 
busily engaged in the same activity 
round about. They can only, it seems, 
hear the thing they themselves are 
actually on - if they are knocking on 
a glockenspiel, and someone is knocking 
the guts out of the xylophone next door, 
they hear their own glockenspiel only. 
The poor teacher has to suffer. You can- 
not do it too o¬ten if you wish to retain 
your sanity. 
X1) 
12. Creative teaching is success rather than failure oriented. 
Excessive early evaluation will be construed as disapproval and 
block the process. The principle of 'deferred judgement' should 
be used - no evaluation until all the ideas are out. In the process 
there will be success and failure but the failure must be seen as 
constructive, as leading to a new solution. Paynter writes of the 
process: 
Fundamentally it is a matter of having 
something to say, finding the right 
materials to express it and experiment- 
ing with them - selecting and rejecting, 
contrasting and complementing - until 
the medium (whatever it is, sound, paint, 
etc. is under control. It will involve 
trial and error and probably a number of 
false starts. We cannot expect that 
everything will work out speedily, pain- 
lessly and exactly as we want at the first 
attempt, or that there will never be any 
need to retrace our steps ................ 
(1) Op. cit. 
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It requires patience and, to some extent, 
there is a built in element of failure. 
Things can go vein wrong, so that we have 
to begin again. (1 
Maxwell Davies writes how carefully he has to be in evaluating 
pieces concluding: 
Really, you have to go very carefully 
because if you say something injurious, 
you might do more injury than you think 
you are doing. I cannot emphasize that 
enough, because I am sure that the state 
of composition among young people generally, 
even at College level, is largely due to 
their not being encouraged enough and people 
trying to make them conform to standards 
which they are just not capable of under- 
standing, or which they, sometimes quite 
justifiably, consider to be absolutely 
irrele(at to their own needs of expres- 
sion. 2) 
So this process must all the while be supported by encouragement. 
It has already been seen how in the incubation phase of the creative 
process the mature artist has to suspend his evaluative powers. This 
passage about the young Grieg illustrates this well: 
No doubt the dramatic, hot-tempered 
Edward Grieg felt like running away 
from the whole business after he had 
his first piano lesson. Was it to 
get this experience that he had been 
sent away from home by Ole Bull? 
Close to the piano was a stout 
bald-headed man with his right fore- 
finger under his ear didactically 
repeating Ilmmer langsam, stark, 
hochheber, langsam, stark, hochheber 
""""""".. ý (Ever slow, strong, lift 
high, slow, strong, lift high ..... 
) 
(1) Op. cit. 
(2) Op. cit. 
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It was that occasion that started 
the bitterness that Grieg always felt 
towards the conservatory at Leipzig. 
We hear it from his lips several times. 
Once he writes to his friend, Julius 
Röntgen, complaining about his lack of 
technique in composition: "For this, 
however, I have not only myself to 
blame but above all the damned Leipzig 
Conservatory where I definitely learned 
nothing at all ......... " 
The one teacher who got Edward Grieg's 
devotion and love was the old Moritz 
Hauptmann. The young man, transplanted 
on to foreign ground, was always longing 
for kindness. From the moment that 
Hauptmann said to Edward Grieg that they 
were to be good friends Grieg was willing 
to die for him. 
Charming and of tender humour is the 
picture that Edward Grieg gives as of his 
old master, who, because of his illness, 
gave his lessons at his home, the Thomas 
School, the old lodgings of Bach. He 
was sitting on his sofa in dressing 
gown and skull-cap, spectacles on his nose, 
and, while the yellow-brown sap of snuff 
dropped from his nose down into Edward 
Grieg's practice book, he made his 
delicate comments bearing witness to the 
power of his mind. The sixteen-year 
old boy was composing and when Hauptmann 
nodded his old head and said "Sehr 
schbn, sehr musikalisch" ("Very beautiful, 
very musical"), Edward Grieg knew that he 
had made a good start 9n the way that is 
the road of the arts. ll) 
Loane makes some excellent points about teacher assessment. He 
describes three phases: 
(1) Quoted in Ross, M., op. cit. P. 15. 
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Firstly, the teacher attends to the pupils' 
music as a receptive and open minded 
audience -listener. It is in sound that 
pupils have embodied their musical think- 
ing, and it is only by sharing that think- 
ing in our own musical experience that we 
can come to know anything about it at all. 
Secondly, the teacher reflects on 
that audience-listening experience, along 
lines perhaps similar to the discussions 
in this article, in order to identify 
explicitly what is musically important 
in the piece. Our discussion of the 
taped examples suggested that each piece 
had its own successes and failures, and 
that the relative importance of various 
possible criteria of success and failure 
(for example, rhythmic synchrony? tonal 
adventurousness? 'correct' resolution 
of discord? ) differed from piece to 
piece. We might conclude that every 
piece of music generates its own criteria 
of success and failure. If so, then 
only this kind of reflection on a parti- 
cular composition can begin to reveal the 
specific criteria of success and failure 
which that piece creates. 
There should be no surprise or 
embarrassment if different teacher's 
assessments differ to some extent (although 
there should certainly be both if they are 
consistently contradictory! ). This is not 
because our response to music is in some way 
mystic or ineffable, but because it is hugely 
complex. So any explicit account of response 
to music must address only part of the complex 
whole. Two different music teachers may well 
articulate insight into a different aspect of 
the child composer's musical totality ......, 
Thirdly, the teacher selects among his 
or her insights those which it seems important 
to communicate with the pupils (or, in special 
cases, to commit to written records, or to 
pass on to parents). He or she seeks to 
identify and point out successes, so that the 
pupils may know that their work is respected 
and valued, so that a technique stumbled upon 
by good chance may become a skill regularly 
usable, and (perhaps) so that the ideas of 
one small group may be shared with the rest 
of the class. He or she may seek to identify 
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and point out failures, and so direct 
the pupils' attention to ways of over- 
coming them. 
If, as we suggested, the success of 
a musical achievement transcends any 
verbal account of it, then the assessment 
of the musical achievement must be perma- 
nently provisional and open-ended. It is 
possible for even the most sensitive teacher 
to "miss the point" from time to time. This 
implies that the identification of failure 
in pupils' music might be communicated in 
the form "x made me wonder because .... I 
wonder what you might feel about yourselves. 
Try xl........ Try x2 ...... Try x3 .... Try 
some more ideas of your own, listen and 
decide which is best. " Rather than the form 
"x was wrong! " Looked at in this way, 
assessment is not only a sort of knowing - 
it is also a sort of communication, in fact 
a sort of interaction. 
Further, it seems that the teacher's 
communication of his or her assessment must 
be selective, for three reasons. Firstly 
there is not likely to be enough time to 
think things out fully, let alone share that 
thinking with the pupils during the white 
heat of the classroom lesson! Secondly, 
some of what we discern in pupils' music 
might be disturbing to them if discussed 
aloud. Especially in their songs, pupils 
may articulate very private concerns under 
the cloak of artistic objectivity, and it 
is not for us to lift that cloak. Thirdly, 
in any event, making our analysis explicit to 
the pupils is but a means to the end of further 
elaboration of musical experience itself. No 
one could doubt that the selection of points 
to raise aloud must be made with that objective 
firmly in view. 
Assessment in the sense outlined here 
consists of comparing a pupil's achievement 
with that pupil's needs and interests, as 
revealed in the music he or she creates. 
ýlý 
(1) Op. cit. 
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13. In creative teaching provision is made both to learn 
many knowledpes and skills and to apply these knowledges and skills 
in new problem-solving situations. The importance of skills have 
already been discussed in Chapter Two. 
14. In creative teachinpp self-initiated learning is encouraped. 
Discovery is, as has already been seen, an early stage in the develop- 
ment of creative thinking. Without it no 'tonal imagery' can 
develop. Marsh writes: 
Thus it is possible to take a body of 
subject matter that seems essential to 
an understanding and true appreciation 
of music, and organise learning 
experiences by which the students may 
'discover' concepts considered vital. 
If the processes of learning are truly 
creative, the concepts which are formula- 
ted may not always be those anticipated 
by the teacher, but they Viýl be related 
to the total discipline. l 
Grieg describes his earliest discoveries in the field of sound: 
What a rest for thought to follow 
memory back to the first early dawn 
of morning. And why not go right 
back? Why not begin with remember- 
ing the marvellous mystic satisfaction 
achieved by reaching one's arms up to 
the piano and finding - not a melody. 
Far from it! No-it had to be a 
harmony. First a third-then a triad, 
then a fourth, and, at last -with both 
hands to help-Oh glorious! A fifth, 
a chord of the ninth. When I had 
found them out my delight knew no 
bounds. That was a triumph! No 
later one has been able to intoxicate 
me like that one. I must have been 
about five years old then. A year 
later I was given lessgns in piano 
playing by my mother. l2) 
(1) Marsh, M. V., Explore and Discover Music, Ontario, Collier-Macmillan 
Ltd, 1970, P. 4. 
(2) Quoted in Paynter, J., op. cit. 
272 
15. In creative teaching, skills of constructive criticism 
and evaluation skills are developed. Evaluation has already been 
seen as part of the creative process but it must not appear too 
soon. Lasker(l) describes how weakness can be turned into strength 
by evaluation and fragments of a composer's work are performed and 
discussed in the classroom. Class assessment of compositions can 
be very helpful. 
16. In creative teaching, ideas are manipulated and explored. 
17. Creative teaching involves democratic processes. Each 
individual has unique contribution. Often the compositions are 
collective works and the individual contribution has to take its place 
in alongside the contributions of others. Group music making offers 
special opportunities for group decision-making (unlike many of the 
other arts) and demands great sensitivity to other people. 
There is some discussion as to whether individuals should work 
individually or in groups. There is much to be said for both 
methods. Taylor and Block write on the solution of 
problems in technology: 
Should group or individual work come first 
on problems requiring creative thinking 
when equal time is devoted to each? The 
conclusion may now be amended to read: 
No evidence is available that it makes 
any difference in number of ideas produced 
whether-group or individual work comes 
first. However, more ideas are produced 
by a given number of individuals working 
(1) Lasker, H., Why can't they compose? Music Educators Journal, 
Vol. 59, No. 8, pp. 41 - 5. 
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in a group, regardless of whether 
individual work co es before or 
after group work. 
T1) 
This may, of course, not necessarily be the same for musical group 
work when a group of children is required to try out the ideas. 
However, in the -coup situation it is often one child 
(the leader) 
whose ideas are being tried out and it is the teacher's job to see 
that over .a period of 
time various children get a turn at leading. 
This is not to say that a leader in group work should be designated. 
It is a question of the teacher being sensitive to the dynamics 
operating in the groups. 
18. In creative teaching methods are used unique to the 
development of creativity. In these Hickok and Smith(2) list 
deferred judgement (already discussed), brain storming (a technique 
to encourage the flow of ideas that could be developed in musical 
work) and creative ideation which includes the following techniques: 
adaptation (new words to old tunes), new uses (new ways of producing 
sounds), modification (a variety of products around a single idea), 4 
magnification (making a tune longer or repeating it or playing it 
louder or emphasizing some parts), minification (the opposite of 
magnification), substitution (trying out new instrumentations, for 
(i) Taylor, D. W. and Block, C. H., Should group or '-individual work 
come first on problems requirinp creative thinking when equal 
time is devoted to each? Dept. of Industrial Administration 
and Dept. of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, 1957, 
Technical Report, p. 29. 
(2) Op. cit. 
274 
example), combining (putting two ideas together), rearrangement 
(changing the structure of the form or parts to make it more 
aesthetic), reversing (inverting a tune or playing a rhythm 
back- 
wards). 
Torrance(') adds to this that children should be given 
informa- 
tion about the creative process -the preparation, illumination, 
experimentation model being most favoured. Research showed 
that 
with the exception of first an. i fifth graders children could be riven 
a set of principles to enable them to think creatively. The problem 
in the first three grades was the sheer number of ideas produced; 
they did not seem to need the encouragement that adults needed to 
produce a quantity of ideas. 
Summary 
The idea of encouraging pupils to compose is not new in music 
education. Rousseau mentioned it in the eighteenth century and 
later Curwen. Yorke-Trotter developed it at some length, particularly 
vocal improvisation, and stressed the need for spontaneity. Dalcroze 
included piano improvisation as the last in his three skills, 
following rhythm and solfege. Justine Ward, working from the basis 
that all children are musically creative, included improvised song 
from the very beginning of her scheme for upper infants and juniors. 
Orff's approach to it was very structured and although he invented 
the easily played classroom pitched percussion, he also included song. 
The work of Marion Richardson and Herbert Read in encouraging 
(1) Op. cit. 
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children's free expression in art, Peter Slade in drama and Sybil 
Marshall, Margaret Langdon and David Holbrook in creative writing 
all influenced music education. It was in the 
60's that the idea 
of creative music making came to the fore with the arrival of 
the 
Orff classroom pitched percussion instruments, Maxwell 
Davies' work 
at Cirencester Grammar School and the writings of George 
Self and 
Brian Dennis. In 1970 came the DES paper Creative Music 
in Schools 
in which various strands were apparent - the use of the 
term 
'creative' primarily for composition type activities, the fact that 
the work had affinities with work of avant-garde composers and that 
it often included integration with the other arts. Paynter and 
Aston's Sound and Silence arpeared in the same year with similar 
strands apparent. The philosophers Dewey and Langer also had a 
great influence. But some teachers regarded it only as the solution 
to the -problem of difficult classes and not for the most able who 
could cope with traditional academic courses or for those learning 
'proper' instruments, creative work being, linked with classroom 
percussion. Swanwick recommended the extension of the term 'creative' 
to include imaginative approaches to other aspects of music as well. 
Hickok and Smith make a comprehensive list supported by many other 
music educationalists of the ideal conditions for creative music 
teaching. These include the encouraging of new results, divergent 
thinking (so that music in education is more than the training in 
the skills apparent in musical education), the resolution of emotional 
tensions (althou here a distinction must be made between music 
education and therapy), open-endedness, the change in the role of the 
teacher to allow children free exploration, respect for children, 
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intuitive thinking, the encouragement of the children's own ideas, 
the valuing of uniqueness, individuality and orginality, better 
physical conditions in the building of specially planned rooms, 
secure psychological conditions, the late introduction of evaluation, 
the utilisation of skills, self-initiated learning and constructive 
criticism. 
Summary of the Part One 
Certain strands of thought have run through it. The first 
is that there are two interlinked concepts of creativity- the 
traditional one linked to divine inspiration and later modified to 
include self-development and the more modern linked to problem- 
solving and new inventions. They are linked by qualities such as 
imagination, originality and the creation of something of value. 
It is postulated that all are creative. Some writers see a 
scale stretching from the rare quality of original genius to ordinary 
everyday inventiveness that is exercised by everyone in their 
ordinary lives. Links can then be made between artists and 
ordinary` people which have implications for education in the develop- 
ment of some sort of general creative capacity. This view of 
creativity is disputed by some writers who hold that it is specific 
to certain disciplines and not a general mental energy. While certain 
skills and information in a particular field are necessary for any 
work of great value, there are common features among creative people 
in many spheres. This capacity is related to intelligence but while 
highly creative people are always intelligent, intelligent people 
are not necessarily creative. It is measured not by intelligence 
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tests but by a number of so-called creativity tests, although is not 
certain whether these tests in childhood predict a creative adult. 
The creative process is a complex one, differing in 
degree, level 
and length in children of various ages and adults and 
the 
unconscious plays a significant part in it. It is akin 
to the 
problem-solving process. Rigidity, lack of flexibility, an 
emphasis on conformity and too rapid evaluation hinder 
the process 
and knowledge, skills, experience and information are required. 
Although these will be rudimentary at first, high levels of 
creativity are not reached without them. 
So creative work involves a creator, a process, a product and an 
environment that encourages it. It must in some way be novel, 
original, different. This can be new to the person creating it or 
new to the world. It might also be a new combination of existing 
elements. It could also be an extension or elaboration of what 
exists already such as in the performing arts - an actor creating 
part or a performing musician using the work of a composer. 
Although the process may involve elements of chance, conscious and 
deliberate activity is also involved. 
In the second part of the thesis children's compositions will 
be examined in some detail in an attempt to chart the development 
of their creative process. The model proposed encompasses many of 
the ideas set out in this part. These links will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter Two of Part Two. 
